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ABSTRACT 
This theses consists of three chapters. In chapter one, firms collude in a lobby which takes the initiative of a game 
by transferring money to a regulator who is in charge of determining the industry size. Transfers are intended to 
influence the regulator to limit the industry size relative to the case of unregulated entry. The regulator’s objective 
function weights both personal welfare and social welfare, with a greater weight on the former indicating a higher 
degree of selfishness and less concern about societal expectations. Chapter one investigates the effects of varying this 
weight as well as the effects of changes in the technology and the fixed cost. The model shows that corruption turns 
out to be non-monotonic in the regulator’s level of selfishness. This implies that higher level of the regulator’s self-
ishness may, counter intuitively, end to lower corruption. The model suggests that in both the case of a very high 
cost technology and the case of a high fixed cost of entry, both corruption and social welfare are (1) lower in magni-
tude and (2) less sensitive to the regulator’s level of selfishness. Therefore, lowering entry cost or marginal costs can 
increase corruption. Chapter two introduces the probability of apprehension which can punish both the regulator 
and the lobby for bribery. The model investigates the effect of implementing two policies: deregulation by means of 
lowering entry costs and deterrence by improving the detection technology. The results suggest that enhancing the 
detection technology may not necessarily decrease corruption. The effect of the detection technology on corruption 
might be different for different levels of the regulator’s selfishness. In addition, reducing bureaucratic entry costs 
may only lead to an increase in social welfare and a decrease in corruption for a certain range of values for the 
regulator’s selfishness. Hence, the regulator’s type plays a key role in determining the economic outcomes. Chapter 
three presents a three-tier hierarchical model, comprising of three players: a politician, a regulator, and a lobby. The 
politician’s problem is to optimize the combination of two policy reforms of deregulation and deterrence in order to 
maximize his chance of re-election, which is positively influenced by a modified measure of social welfare, in which 
producer versus consumer surplus can play asymmetric roles in increasing the re-electability of the politician. By 
letting the type of the politician and the regulator to be varied in a continuous range, the model enables us to have a 
more detailed picture of the comparative statics of changes in policymakers’ type on outcomes of the model. An 
incumbent politician can be categorized into four different types: oligarchic, semi-oligarchic, semi-populist and pop-
ulist depending on the relative importance of producer as opposed to consumer surplus in increasing electability. 
Moreover, based on parameters of the model and namely the level of the politician’s populism, the regulator may 
receive zero-bribe or positive-bribe, depending on his own selfishness type. The model shows that an increase in the 
regulator’s selfishness may only harm semi-populist and populist politicians’ chance of success, not that of oligarchic 
and semi-oligarchic politicians. Comparative statics of the model also show that the players’ characteristics are of 
lower importance when parameters of the model lie in extreme values. Therefore, the regulator’s level of selfishness 
has almost no effect on relatively highly populist or relatively highly oligarchic politicians. Policymakers of extreme 
values, whether the politician or the regulator, decides more independent of other parameters of the model. The 
model predicts that in two similar economies, the one with a higher level of the politician’s populism may involve a 
wider range of regulators in the bribery process. Moreover, a politician with a higher level of populism is more 
sensitive to the level of the regulator’s selfishness. Therefore, the type of the politician matters as it determines the 
sensitivity of other variables of interest to the regulator’s type. Whether having a more populist politician in the office 
ends up in lower corruption or not, depends on other parameters of the model, namely the regulator’s level of self-
ishness.  
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POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS - 
OVERVIEW 
CHAPTER 1 - OVERVIEW 
This theses consists of three chapters. In chapter one, firms collude in a lobby which takes 
the initiative of a game by transferring money to a regulator who is in charge of determining 
the industry size. Transfers are intended to influence the regulator to limit the industry size 
relative to the case of unregulated entry in which firms do not need any licence to become 
operational. The regulator’s objective function weights both personal welfare and social wel-
fare, with a greater weight on the former indicating a higher degree of selfishness and less 
concern about societal expectations. In developing countries with weak political institutions, 
for instance, in absence of checks-and-balances, the policy makers’ character or preferences 
or priorities become very significant. The key theme of chapter one is to investigate the role 
that the regulator’s type can play in determining the outcome of the model. By regulator’s 
type, here I mean the regulator’s level of selfishness.  
The main result of chapter 1 is that corruption is non-monotonic in regulator’s level of self-
ishness; first increasing and then decreasing. The policy implication of this result is that by 
having a less selfish regulator, we can end up with a higher level of corruption. Intuitively, 
the reason is that it becomes costlier for the lobby to protect the industry, because the regu-
lator requires a greater compensation for deviating from higher social welfare. Perotti and 
Volpin (2004) show the same insight using a different framework. Hence, the policy impli-
cation would be that fighting with corruption may not necessarily reduce corruption, given 
that the economy faces with high fixed cost and high-cost technology.  
The model also suggests that in both the case of a very high cost technology and the case of 
a high fixed cost of entry, both corruption and social welfare are (1) lower in magnitude and 
(2) less sensitive to the regulator’s level of selfishness. Therefore, lowering entry cost or mar-
ginal costs can increase corruption. 
In light of the results of the model, a change in a parameter of the model can end up in 
higher industry size, higher corruption and lower social welfare. This is in contrast to Straub’s 
(2009) conclusion that more competition always enhances social welfare. Moreover, by tak-
ing into account the role of regulator’s selfishness, the model reveals conditions where more 
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competition can lead to either an increase or a decrease in corruption. This result is in line 
with empirical studies in the literature (Straub, 2009; Pieroni and d’Agostino, 2013). 
CHAPTER 2 - OVERVIEW 
Policymakers are faced with a package of goals, encompassing corruption reduction and so-
cial welfare enhancement. Implementing different institutional reforms may have different 
effects on each of the desired goals. This chapter provides a framework to investigate the 
outcome of institutional reforms in more detail. The setting of the model is based on the 
same entry game introduced in chapter one. 
The main contribution of chapter two is to investigate the effects of deterrence or anti-cor-
ruption policies and deregulation as two potential policy instruments on social welfare and cor-
ruption along with distinguishing the different types of regulators according to their prefer-
ence towards personal welfare as opposed to social welfare. Two new state variables for the 
quality of two institutions are introduced in this chapter: (1) Institutional reform, or deregu-
lation, or state of bureaucratic process; (2) Deterrence, which determines probability of ap-
prehension. 
Chapter two paves the way to answer the problem raised by Jain's (2001, p. 102) in privati-
zation on comparing ‘marginal utilities of efforts to fight corruption versus reduction in the 
role of industrial policies’. Which one is more effective: reducing the government’s role in 
the economy or implementing anti-corruption activities? 
To check the robustness of the results, chapter two investigates comparative statics under 
two scenarios: (1) costless reform, which is a simpler case and (2) costly reform. The case of 
costless reform is basically the same as chapter one. The difference is that in the new model 
in chapter two, implementing deregulation is the same as reducing the fixed cost in chapter 
one. Therefore, the model still shows non-monotonic corruption in regulator’s level of self-
ishness for different levels of fixed cost. This implies the adverse consequences of imple-
menting a reform in terms of inducing higher corruption in certain circumstances. In other 
words, it might be the case that depending on parameters of the model, a less selfish regulator 
provokes more efforts from the lobby and consequently more total transfer from them. 
In either cases of costless and costly reform, the model shows both ‘grease-the-wheels’ and 
‘sand-in-the-wheels’ effects, depending on parameters of model. ‘Grease-the-wheels’ effect 
refers to a case of simultaneous increase in both social welfare and corruption and ‘sand-in-
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the-wheels’ describes the case of simultaneous decline those two. This suggests that for an 
economy, higher social welfare can be achieved at the price of obtaining higher corruption. 
The ultimate effect of a policy depends on two opposing effects: (1) profit-enhancing effect and 
(2) welfare-enhancing effect. One policy implication of this is the confirmation of the results of 
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) that corruption minimisation may not be part of optimal 
policy design. This is so because there would be too much of sacrifice of other welfare goals, 
namely social welfare to reach to lower corruption. 
Moreover, corruption turns out to be (1) non-monotonic in deregulation and (2) less sensi-
tive in deregulation for high values of regulator’s selfishness. We can conclude that unlike 
some general results in the literature (for example Djankov et al. (2002) and Emerson (2006)), 
(1) regulation does not necessarily increase corruption, and (2) higher competition does not 
necessarily decrease corruption, which confirms the result we had in chapter one. Hence, the 
model is more consistent with Pieroni and d’Agostino (2013) who show that there would be 
a more complex correlation among competition and corruption. 
Depending on the regulator’s level of selfishness, corruption may turn out to be non-mono-
tonic in probability of apprehension. This shows that probability of apprehension may not 
necessarily be taken as a barrier to wrongdoing which is in line with the finding of Mookher-
jee and Png (1995). As Banerjee et al. (2012) state: ‘Greater corruption in one country could 
simply be a reflection of a greater willingness to fight corruption in that country.’  
CHAPTER 3 - OVERVIEW 
Following Acemoglu et al. (2005) we need to work on economics of institutions to under-
stand the mechanics of emergence of institutions by considering the political processes be-
hind them. Following the main motivation on finding a proper answer to the Jain’s (2001) 
problem, the model will help us in finding the marginal effect of different institutional re-
forms. In the real world, the economy deals with a hierarchy of policymakers with different 
objective functions. Hence, chapter three introduces a new player called ‘the politician’ and 
of a higher rank in the hierarchy of policymakers.  
Chapter three presents a three-tier hierarchical model, comprising of three players: a politi-
cian, a regulator, and a lobby. The politician’s problem is to optimize the combination of two 
policy reforms of deregulation and deterrence in order to maximize his chance of re-election, 
which is positively influenced by a modified measure of social welfare, in which producer 
versus consumer surplus can play asymmetric roles in increasing the re-electability of the 
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politician. By letting the type of the politician and the regulator to be varied in a continuous 
range, the model enables us to have a more detailed picture of effects of changes in policy-
makers’ type on outcomes of the model.  
This chapter investigates the policy effects in two cases: 
(1) Neutral politician: who assigns equal weights on producer surplus and consumer sur-
plus.  
(2) Non-neutral politicians: in which the politician assigns different weight to consumer 
surplus and producer surplus. Based on behaviours of social welfare and amount of 
investment on deterrence, the politician could be categorised into four groups: (1) 
Oligarchic, (2) Semi-oligarchic, (3) Semi-populist, and (4) Populist. It should be noted 
that there is no fixed range of the politician’s level of populism for each of these four 
groups. In other words, the range of the politician’s populism corresponding to each 
group may change as other parameters of the model change.  
Chapter three finds that in order to have zero corruption, we do not need to have a com-
pletely benevolent regulator in the office. Moreover, politician’s type changes those who 
would be involved in the bribery process. In other words, the politician’s type determines 
whether the regulator may involve in the bribery or not. 
The interesting result of chapter three is that regulator’s selfishness can help the politician to 
achieve higher probability of re-election. However, that would be the case only for oligarchic 
and semi-oligarchic politicians. Hence, these two types of the politician look for their com-
plementary regulators, i.e. more selfish regulators, to achieve their goals. That means that the 
regulator’s selfishness can be a danger only for populist and semi-populist politicians.  
Two other general lessons from chapter three are 
(1) As in the case of chapter two, given the setting of the model which is inspired by the 
real world, there is no simple and generic pattern for variables of interest, i.e. corrup-
tion, industry size and social welfare.  
(2) Comparative statics of the model also show that the players’ characteristics are of 
lower importance when other parameters of the model lie in extreme values. For 
instance, as the politician becomes more populist, probability of re-election is less 
sensitive to the regulator’s level of selfishness. One policy implication is that a pop-
ulist politician makes decisions less dependent on the regulator’s level of selfishness. 
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In other words, parameters of the model are of a lower impact when policymakers 
are of extreme types, whether the politician or the regulator.
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CHAPTER 1  
THE EFFECTS OF REGULATOR’S SELFISHNESS ON 
COMPETITION, CORRUPTION AND SOCIAL WELFARE 
Abstract 
In this model, firms collude in an association that later, by collecting a membership fee, forms a lobby. The lobby 
takes the initiative of a game by transferring some money to the second player, the regulator who is in charge of 
issuing licences and, hence, determining the industry size. Transfers are to make more personal welfare for the regu-
lator and therefore to prevent any outcome close to that of the unregulated entry. This model investigates the effects 
of the regulator’s type or preference, in the game between the lobby and the regulator. The main result of the model 
is that corruption turns out to be non-monotonic in regulator’s level of selfishness which implies that having a more 
selfish regulator in the office, who is prone to be corruptible, does not necessarily lead to higher corruption in an 
economy. The model also suggests that in both the case of a very high cost technology and the case of a high fixed 
cost, both corruption and social welfare are (1) lower in magnitude and (2) less sensitive to the regulator’s level of 
selfishness. Therefore, lowering fixed cost and improving technology, can increase corruption. In contrast to some 
findings in the literature, the model shows that higher competition may not be associated with higher social welfare 
and lower corruption. 
1.1  INTRODUCTION 
‘Since [more than two decades of] privatisation in Iran has led the economy to anarchy, it 
would have been better if it was not pursued from the first date’, declared Masoud Nili 
(2013), the chief economic adviser to Iran’s president Rouhani during 2013-2017. This be-
comes more interesting knowing that Nili has been actively among the main leading advo-
cates of market-oriented policies in Iran and was the chief strategist of the 3rd five-year de-
velopment plan; the plan that according to Hakimian (2008) resulted in relative stability and 
the resumption of gradual reform during 2000–2005. He instead recommends that the gov-
ernment should have pursued a restructuring of state-owned enterprises rather than 
privatising them. He also added, ‘Just three percent of enterprises in manufacturing sector, 
construct approximately 70 percent of value-added in this sector ... Such a privatisation has 
not worked in favour of Iran’s economy and it was better not to be pursued at all if it was 
supposed to be implemented in this way’. In general, pursuing and implementing market-
oriented policies and privatisation have brought up new difficulties for governments in most 
of the transition economies. For instance, as discussed by Rodrik (1996), even in developed 
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countries, politicians might be encountered by the fact that some necessary reforms may turn 
out to be unpopular. Hence, to make it politically more feasible, politicians need to justify 
their intended plans to the public, who may overwhelmingly support the revision of 
privatisation (Denisova et al., 2012). According to the survey of European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (EBRD), which was based on the responses of 28,000 individu-
als in 28 post-communist countries, 80 percent of respondents would like to revise current 
privatisation in some way  (EBRD, 2007). Now, the following question would be why the 
public, who is assumed to be of high impact in electoral systems, may oppose a highly rec-
ommended and necessary reform. One answer deals with the perceived rise in corruption by 
the public during the process of privatisation.  
In case the rules of the game dictate a high dependence of firms’ profit on decisions of 
government bodies, then those who benefit from the status quo, which usually are monop-
olies, might see their profits at risk. Therefore, they might be encouraged to prevent any 
unwanted consequences of reform policies through regulatory capture and bribery. Most of 
the transition economies are highly regulated ones in which the governments tend to adopt 
different forms of control over firms. This can be due to the long history of state-oriented 
policies or the desire of the governments to be dominant on the private sector to prevent 
any political oppositions. For instance, in 1989 the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps 
(IRGC) in Iran, was invited by then-president of Iran, Rafsanjani, to take its capabilities to-
wards the country’s reconstruction in the aftermath of Iran-Iraq eight years war. However, 
few years later and during the succeeding president, the economic participation of IRGC’s 
subsidiaries became more visible. Eventually in 2005, it ended with the cancellation of two 
contracts by IRGC: a contract with Turkcell in telecommunication and another with Tepe 
Akfen Vie (TAV) Airports Holding in aviation. In the latter case, IRGC used military force 
to prevent the operation of the airport. Later, IRGC’s subsidiaries became the contractors 
of both projects. It did not stop there, and the head of another subsidiary became the min-
istry of oil and gas during Ahmadinejad’s administration between 2005-2013. Such an ap-
proach, later resulted to even more contracts in key economic sectors like banking, insurance, 
trading, food and telecommunications.  
Consequently, increase in the perception of corruption seems to be the common problem of 
privatisation, regardless of the adopted path by the government. An economy may encounter 
some problems in implementation of market-oriented policies, regardless of the various strat-
egies and outcomes (Denisova et al., 2012); whether privatisation is being pursued through 
establishing greenfield industries or through selling the existing state-owned enterprises. For 
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instance, Nili (2015) believes that monopolies in Iran have been among the opposing group 
of any political dialogue with the west because they know that lifting the sanctions may open 
Iran’s market to foreign competitors, and hence, their profits will be endangered. 
Fighting with corruption requires deep understanding of causes, channels and results of cor-
ruption. Depending on the context, the roots and consequences of corruption can be differ-
ent. Andvig (2007) criticises the n-country, cross-section econometric analyses of corruption 
in which corruption on average causes lower growth rates and lower per capita GDP. In 
other words, distinguishing different countries by their differences causes higher explanatory 
power in the transition countries. Following this approach, chapter one aims to investigate a 
regulatory capture model by having a thorough look on the mechanics of relations and more 
specifically the role of regulator’s selfishness. 
In the framework of transition economies, firms may legally be required to hold a 
government-issued licence to enter a market and become operational. Even if the firms are 
already operational, they might need to be qualified by some governmental bodies to be able 
to continue their activities. Therefore, the governments, whether benevolent or self-inter-
ested, are faced with the question of what are the socially optimal industry size and the pos-
sible ways to achieve that level of industry size. Even developed economies, in terms of social 
welfare, may not necessarily be benefitted by following free-entry policies. Mankiw and 
Whinston (1986) and Bliss and Di Tella (1997) show that by the presence of ‘business stealing 
effect’, free entry may lead to more than socially optimum industry size. Mankiw and Whin-
ston (1986) define the ‘business stealing effect’ as the situation in which an increase in the 
number of firms leads to a decline in the equilibrium output per firm.  
Some models assume the industry size as an exogenous variable in the model (Grossman and 
Helpman, 1994), while others assume it to be determined endogenously. In the latter group, 
at least two sub-groups can be recognised; the first group are those models in which the 
industry is determined after firms decide whether to remain in the market or not  (Bliss and 
Di Tella, 1997; Mitra, 1999; Etro, 2014). The decisions of firms to remain in the market are 
determined by, for example, satisfying the incentive compatibility constraint. The second 
sub-group of models also assumes industry size as an endogenous variable, but they take it 
as a control variable of the regulator or the social planner  (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986; 
Emerson, 2006). 
This chapter belongs to the second sub-group as it assumes the industry size as the regulator’s 
control variable. The regulator is in charge of issuing licences. Following Belleflamme and 
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Peitz (2010, p. 86) we can we can call the regulator the second-best social planner; which 
means that he can control entry but not the behaviour of firms once they are in the market.  
Regarding the regulator’s objective function, this chapter assumes it to be similar to that of 
Grossman and Helpman (1994), Mitra (1999) and Perotti and Volpin (2004) where the reg-
ulator maximises the weighted function of both his personal welfare and social welfare. At 
least two other groups of models can be recognised in the literature, in terms of the regula-
tor’s objective function. The first group, like that of Mankiw and Whinston (1986), only takes 
social welfare as the regulator’s objective function. They provide a model for market entry 
and study the outcome of their model in two cases: (1) free entry, (2) under a social planner. 
In the second case, they assume that the social planner finds the maximising level of industry 
size for the social welfare. The second group assumes only personal welfare as regulator’s 
objective function (Bliss and Di Tella, 1997; Emerson, 2006). The main question of Bliss and 
Di Tella (1997) is ‘how could it be rational for a corrupt agent to induce exit of a firm under 
his control that constitutes his only source of bribe income?’ As was stated earlier, the second 
part of the regulator’s objective function, i.e., social welfare, can provide different answers 
to the above question. 
Without taking care of social welfare, the regulator may lose his position and hence may lose 
the chance of being benefitted from bribes. The personal welfare of the regulator depends 
on the magnitude of transfers of association or the received bribes by the regulator. Hence, 
similar to the model of Perotti and Volpin (2004), the model presented in this chapter is a 
combination of both ‘regulatory capture’ and ‘tollbooth theory’. As explained by Djankov 
(2002), the ‘regulatory capture’ theory sees the regulation as the choice of the industry, while 
‘tollbooth theory’ emphasises the role of the bureaucrats and regulators in determining the 
regulatory framework of an economy.  
Chapter one contributes to the literature of positive economics of institutional change. Ac-
cording to Acemoglu et al. (2005) and Hoff and Stiglitz (2008),  in this approach, any oppo-
sition to institutional changes is mainly due to the few people who benefit from the existing 
system. They are that politically strong that can block any unfavourable institutional change 
even if it is at a great social cost.  
The model in this chapter is built on the framework of  Bliss and Di Tella (1997) and Emer-
son (2006) who investigated the relationship of the corruption and competition. However, 
the difference of this chapter with theirs is not limited to just the regulator’s objective func-
tion. Both models assume a graft-maximising regulator whose decision can cause some firms 
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to exit. Bliss and Di Tella define an exogenous parameter of ‘deep competition’, which has 
an uncertain effect on equilibrium corruption. Both models assume the officials as the bribe-
demanders. Each firm has to make a decision about whether to pay up or to exit. Therefore, 
the industry size, or what they call ‘abundance of firms’, is determined indirectly by the cost 
burdened on firms in terms of the bribe. In Emerson, the number of firms is determined 
such that the incentive compatibility constraint for each firm is satisfied for the equilibrium 
bribe. This chapter assumes a different procedure for industrial organisation. In this model, 
I assume the association (or lobby) as the leader of the game who supplies the bribe. The 
second player of the game is the regulator, who decides based on what he receives as a bribe.  
Having said the above, the industry size is determined in an interest lobby model like that of  
Grossman and Helpman (1994)1. In this chapter, some incumbent firms know that unregu-
lated entry can end to zero profit. They also know that the regulator’s greed can work in their 
favour. Therefore, they form an association and let the regulator know that for any decision 
he makes, some money is going to be transferred to him, which he can have it for his own 
personal welfare. The association (or the lobby) knows the regulator’s reaction function2. 
After the determination of the number of licences by the regulator, any entrant should be a 
member of the association to have the licence. The membership fee is simply the amount 
transferred to the regulator divided by the number of licences. The association can affect the 
industry size by its choice of transfer. Thereafter, the association and the lobby may be used 
interchangeably.  
The main contribution of chapter one is to introduce the role being played by the regulator’s 
characteristic, or preference, or priorities in the game between the regulator and the lobby. 
The regulator’s characteristics have been recognised as a key factor in some models. For 
                                                 
1 The lobbying process presented by Grossman and Helpman (1994) can be the case only in electoral systems. 
For analysing non-electoral systems, it is better to interpret the procedure as bribery in which money would be 
transferred to a corruptible regulator.  
2 For instance, the ‘Radio Positioning and Identifying Companies Syndicate (RPICS)’ in Iran is an example of 
such a lobby. It comprises of 41 private companies who are either producer or importer or both. If a firm wants 
to join RPICS, they need to provide three licences from three different governmental bodies. The incumbents 
also are required to submit their extended business identity card, issued by the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
on yearly basis to be able to attend and vote in the general assembly of RPICS. This is how the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs constantly monitor the firms to hold their licences. Firms would benefit not only from vari-
ous discounts and special import tariffs, they would also easily make collective decisions to prevent any decision 
that can endanger welfares of the members. For instance, in 2016, RPICS failed to convince one of the gov-
ernmental bodies to implement an auction through their normal procedures in which the members of RPICS 
could compete with each other. Following that, the deputy of RPICS denounced the act of ignoring RPICS by 
making some pressures through interviewing major news agencies. The deputy revealed how by ignoring RPICS 
and its members as the leading private bodies of the industry, the new contract wastes the public resources by 
importing out-of-date products. The deputy based his argument on the fact that ignoring RPICS violates the 
main spirit of the 6th five-year development plans by not giving space to the main body of the private sector in 
the industry. 
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instance, Bó (2006, p. 221) discusses how personal characteristics of regulators may make 
differences in regulatory outcomes. As another example, Armstrong and Sappington (2007, 
p. 1562) point to the regulator’s characteristic as one of the seven factors that affect optimal 
regulation in monopolies; especially in transition and developing economies where political 
institutions are weak and policymakers’ type or characteristic becomes highly significant. The 
regulator’s characteristic can be shown in two ways: (1) how greater the regulator’s concern 
about consumer welfare are compared to that of the shareholders’, for example, Armstrong 
and Sappington (2007); (2) the regulator’s selfishness or how benevolent or self-interested 
the regulator is, for example Grossman and Helpman (1994).This chapter adopts the second 
approach. 
Here, the regulator’s character is recognised by his attitude towards personal welfare rather 
than to social welfare. I refer to this feature of the regulator’s character as the level of selfishness3. 
Different authors use a different metaphor to refer to what I name ‘regulator’s level of self-
ishness’. For example, Hoff and Stiglitz (2004) define their paper based on the ability of 
individuals to strip assets. We can think of higher selfishness the same as the higher ability 
to strip assets. Later they note to ‘civic virtue’, which reflects the presence of a fraction of 
agents in each society who always pursue the rule of law, even if it is against their private 
interest. On the opposite side, the absence of civic virtue can lead to “bad” equilibrium. Like 
the case of Russia when corrupt managers or criminal figures obtained control rights through 
official privatizations.  
In the analysis of this chapter, letting the regulator’s selfishness to be varied in a continuous 
range can generate surprising results. While most of the existing models assume either a fixed 
or a binary for the regulator’s level of selfishness, by introducing the regulator’s level of 
selfishness, this model assumes the regulator’s selfishness to be continuous in a range. This 
allows us to do comparative statics using a spectrum of values for the regulator’s character-
istic. For example, Boycko et al. (1996), in their theory of privatisation, assume that the poli-
tician is the one who always cares more about his own money. One can interpret the regula-
tor’s selfishness in this model as what Bliss and Di Tella (1997) introduce as the parameter 
for ‘deep competition’, according to which, lower level of the regulator’s selfishness reflects 
higher tendency of the regulator to increase competition to yield the highest social welfare. 
                                                 
3 Following Grossman and Helpman (1994) and depending on the context, some authors call the similar coef-
ficient ‘the weight the government attaches to political contributions relative to aggregate social welfare’ (Gold-
berg and Maggi, 1999; Mitra, 1999; Gawande and Bandyopadhyay, 2000; Mitra et al., 2002; Dutt, 2009). I follow 
other group of authors who use the term ‘selfish’ and ‘self-interested’ or ‘non-benevolent’ (Laffont and Tirole, 
1990; Boot and Thakor, 1993; Sumner, 1996). 
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Suzumura et al. (1987, p. 162) separate different kinds of regulators in a different manner. 
They define a ‘first-best’ government as the one that enforces the marginal cost principle, 
but by ‘second-best’ government, they mean ‘oligopolistic (marginal-cost-equals-marginal-
revenue) pricing is taken for granted by an entry regulating government pursuing social wel-
fare optimisation’. Bó (2006), in his survey of regulatory capture, discusses personal charac-
teristics of regulator in his discussion of ‘revolving door’ phenomenon. ‘Revolving door’ 
investigates the connection between government regulators with the firms that they regulate. 
It is common that regulators try to obtain highly profitable positions in the same field for 
their retirement. 
Lower level of the regulator’s selfishness may not necessarily refer to the regulator’s charac-
ter. It might imply more constraint case for the regulator where he cannot find space to 
reveal his tendency towards gaining more personal welfare. This can be the result of a tighter 
checks-and-balances in place4.  
Characterizing the model by the regulator’s selfishness implies that this chapter follows the 
footsteps of ‘public choice’ theory in which the regulator, or more generally the government, 
is less benign and policymakers usually follow their self-interests. The empirical study of  
Djankov et al. (2002) compares implications of the public interest theory and the public 
choice theory and find their result consistent with the latter. They also find two different 
approaches in the public choice theory. The first approach, which is known as “regulatory 
capture” and mainly pioneered by Stigler (1971) sees regulation more in favour of the indus-
tries. The second approach of the public choice theory, which is coined as “tollbooth” view 
by Djankov et al., holds that regulation works more in favour of politicians and bureaucrats. 
Their empirical investigation shows more consistencies with the second approach; i.e. ‘toll-
booth’ in which politicians and bureaucrats are mainly benefitted from regulation. Using the 
lobbying process between the lobby from the industry side and the regulator from the gov-
ernment side enables us to do a more thorough investigation of the public choice theory. To 
do this, the model provides a simple version of Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Mitra 
(1999). 
Interaction among different players of an economy is at the core of emergence of institutions. 
The players’ objectives determine the demand and supply of a specific institution (Acemoglu 
                                                 
4 For instance, as in the case of Iran during 2000s and 2010s, when a relatively more reformist government 
takes the administration, a more balance of power was in place. That provided a ground for stricter monitoring 
by the other major party, the conservatives. The ultimate result has been lower corruption due to higher level 
of monitoring. So one should not interpret that as a result of the governance of more benevolent regulators in 
the office. 
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et al., 2005). For example, if more competition lies within the interest of a politician, that 
would pave the path for more reforms towards higher competition. Consequently, the soci-
ety will benefit from more pro-market institutions. Moreover, any change in economic poli-
cies may bring some opposition due to the changes in the framework of the economic game. 
In this context, the personal characteristic of the policy-maker plays a significant role in de-
termining the institutional framework. The focus of this chapter is to show the effect of the 
regulator’s characteristics, specifically the regulator’s level of selfishness, on social welfare 
and corruption. As Boot and Thakor (1993) suggest, even a small degree of difference in the 
regulator’s quality can create significant departures from social optima. 
Adopting a low cost technology or reducing a fixed cost can potentially trigger the magnitude 
of corruption. In this chapter, the technology, fixed cost of production and the regulator’s 
type are the main three exogenous variables. The main question is how the combination of 
these may affect the industry size relative to the first best, and what would be the corruption 
and social welfare in such an economy. In the proceeding chapters, I will expand on this by 
looking at the effect of deregulation policies as well as anti-corruption policies. Deregulation 
directly affects the fixed cost and anti-corruption policies try to reduce the level of corruption 
by fighting with bribery.   
Competition is usually assumed to be a cure for corruption and a guaranteed way to enhance 
social welfare (Emerson, 2006; Straub, 2009; Pieroni and d’Agostino, 2013). This chapter 
suggests that when the industry size is a control variable of the regulator, it might be the case 
that for a relatively more benevolent regulator, more competition would not associate with 
lower corruption and higher social welfare. This outcome seems to be highly dependent on 
the marginal cost, and hence, in a more general conclusion, it depends on the cost function 
of the model. 
The model also shows that the regulator’s characteristics can have a higher impact on cor-
ruption and social welfare only if the marginal cost and fixed cost are low enough. In other 
words, the importance of the regulator’s character is different for different states of cost. 
Clearly, the elements of the cost function are different in different sectors of the economy. 
The results of the model presented in this chapter echo the suggestion of Pieroni and d’Ago-
stino (2013), that the general picture of the relation between economic freedom and corrup-
tion can be different from that of the sectoral level. Additionally, a lower level of the regula-
tor’s selfishness can reduce corruption only for certain ranges of the regulator’s selfishness. 
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In other words, more selfishness in the regulator can even lead to a reduction in corruption, 
provided that the level of selfishness exceeds some value.  
Other political economy models of reform (Dewatripont and Roland, 1992, 1995; Perotti 
and Volpin, 2004; Campante and Ferreira, 2007) emphasize lobby formation, uncertainty 
and/or asymmetric information, from which I completely abstract in this chapter. In addi-
tion, other political economy models (Biais and Perotti, 2002; Caselli and Gennaioli, 2008) 
are dynamic and they usually investigate the interaction of two groups of producers: incum-
bents and entrants. However, my static model assumes only one group of producers or elite. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 1.2  discusses the model by first looking at 
the regulator’s and the lobby’s objective functions and then characterising the equilibrium. 
To be able to compare the outcomes of the model with a benchmark case, section 1.2.2   
introduces unregulated entry as the first best. Section 1.3  investigates the comparative statics 
of the model in technology, fixed cost and more importantly, the regulator’s level of selfish-
ness. Section 1.4  concludes and shows potentially interesting questions to be answered based 
on this model.  
1.2  MODEL 
Although this model follows existing models of lobbying and corruption, I make no claim 
of generality for it. In the interest of simplicity and clarity, a large number of modelling 
choices are made in the process, which also have functional implications. 
This model portrays a closed economy with two main players: the regulator and the associa-
tion, which later will be called the lobby5. The regulator is assumed to have the full power of 
determining the industry size by issuing new licences for new firms and renewing licences 
for incumbents. Each firm needs to hold a government-issued licence. The regulator is re-
sponsible for issuing the licence. Nevertheless, any entrant needs to be a member of the 
association to obtain the licence. Without the licence, the regulator can stop any activity and 
prosecute offenders. Note that licences cannot be re-sold6. In other terms, the price of the 
licence is not a choice variable for the regulator. It is assumed that the licence will be issued 
                                                 
5 The assumption of the close economy makes this model different from those models with similar framework 
in trade policy literature, (For example Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Lahiri and Ono, 2003; Mitra, 1999). 
6 Caselli and Gennaioli (2008) present a model to compare the economic and political consequences of two 
institutional reforms. They assume that the licence to operate a firm can either be purchased from the govern-
ment or in the market for control. In the market for control, licences can be traded. They show that the ability 
to trade licence in the market for control, makes the economic consequences different with different levels of 
political opposition to implement them.  
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based on membership in the association and other qualifications, such as legally supported 
contracts with shareholders and employees, adequate financial credibility and so on and so 
forth.  
The association is the other player of the game. The association eventually forms the lobby, 
which consists of all identical licence-holder firms in the industry. The association can start 
with even one firm to maintain the power of a monopolist. For example, in the 2011 Iranian 
embezzlement scandal, the biggest case of bank fraud in Iran, the main suspect who tries to 
bribe the regulator is said to be the price-maker in the steel market (Tabnak, 2012)7.  
Existing firms know the economy well and can predict its future based on social, political 
and economic facts. For instance, they know that social and political pressures can eventually 
force the regulator to open the doors of the economy. Therefore, the association anticipates 
the regulator’s behaviour knowing that he can potentially take some bribe to work in favour 
of the association by issuing fewer licences. The association makes it clear for the regulator 
that some money can be transferred based on the number of licences he is going to issue. 
Then the regulator will determine the number of licences. Based on the number of firms, the 
membership fee of the association is determined by dividing the amount of bribe by the 
number of licences. In short, the association tries to convince the regulator to issue fewer 
licences and to work in the lobby’s favour. But this will be done just by promising some 
transfers in exchange for issuing fewer licences. 
The timeline of the game is as follows:  
1. First stage: The lobby chooses the level of transfer to the regulator, given the reaction 
function of the regulator.  
2. Second stage: Given the bribe and the reaction function of the firms, the regulator 
chooses the industry size.  
3. Third stage: Firms compete in a Cournot fashion.  
In order to derive the subgame perfect equilibrium, the game should be solved using 
backward induction. In other words, given the outcome of the game between the lobby and 
the regulator, firms decide on quantity. Then the regulator decides on number of firms given 
the reaction of firms and the amount of transfer chosen by firms. Finally, the lobby chooses 
the transfer given the reaction of other players. 
                                                 
7 As Andvig (2007) notes, these anecdotal kind, single, and well-documented stories may reveal more general 
features of the procedure of corruption. 
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There are 𝑁 firms in this economy that form a Cournot competition given the outcomes of 
the game between the association (lobby) and the regulator. There are features of monopo-
listic competition in this market in a sense that each firm faces a downward sloping demand 
that shows its market power. Since the entry is not free in this market, not all of the features 
of monopolistic competition are available here (Varian, 2010, p. 478). This model considers 
only one type of producer with identical abilities, skills and no initial wealth. Further, we will 
see how they compete in Cournot fashion.  
A linear demand function and an identical cost function are assumed for all firms. The in-
verse demand function has the form of 
 𝑝(𝑄) = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑄, 𝑎 > 0, 𝑏 > 0 (1.1)  
in which 𝑎 and 𝑏 are parameters of the demand function and 𝑄 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑖  is the total product 
of the industry. For example, Etro (2014) assumes that 𝑏 reflects the ‘size of the market’, 
which can be referred to the endowment spent in the market or the number of consumers.  
Cost function is identical to all firms and is of the following form 
in which 𝑞𝑖 is the quantity produced by firm 𝑖. Fixed cost is present because there are some 
factors that are fixed for the economy as a whole, even in the long run (Varian, 2010, p. 478). 
The number of active firms or number of licences in an industry could be fixed by law. Fixed 
cost can represent expenses like physical costs, machineries and buildings as well as expenses 
like lobbying, lawyers’ fees, public relations costs and so on. Fixed cost is important in this 
theses as it represents bureaucratic barriers to entry. In this model, since the firms know that 
in the following steps, a game between the lobby and the regulator is going to be played, and 
they need to contribute some money to the lobby, they will consider some of these expenses 
in their cost function as a fixed cost. While having the fixed cost ensures the existence of 
increasing returns to scale, it can also be helpful in comparing the outcomes of the game with 
that of the first best. 
It may appear that because of restricted entry to the market, we might have positive profit in 
the long-run. However, this may not be true since the opportunity costs should be considered 
as well. In other words, if we consider the opportunity cost of the value of the licence, the 
profit will become zero in the long-run. 
The setting of the model leads to the following equilibrium quantity of 
 𝐶𝑖 = 𝑐𝑞𝑖
2 + 𝐹, 𝑐 > 0 (1.2)  
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𝑞∗ =
𝑎
𝑏(𝑁 + 1) + 2𝑐
 
at the price of 
𝑝∗ =
𝑎(𝑏 + 2𝑐)
𝑏𝑁 + (𝑏 + 2𝑐)
 
Equilibrium quantity shows that there is a ‘business stealing effect’ in the market, which 
means that existing firms react to the entry of more competitors by contracting their output 
level (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010). Appendix 1 proves that equilibrium profit at 𝑞∗ is always 
decreasing in industry size. 
 
𝜋∗(𝑞∗)
= −
𝐹𝑁2𝑏2 + (2𝐹𝑏2 + 4𝐹𝑏𝑐)𝑁 + 𝐹𝑏2 + 4𝐹𝑏𝑐 + 4𝐹𝑐2 − 𝑎2𝑏 − 𝑎2𝑐
(𝑁𝑏 + 𝑏 + 2𝑐)2
. 
𝜋∗𝑁
′ < 0 
(1.3)  
After the competition of firms, there will be the game between the lobby and the regulator. 
At the second stage of the game, the regulator chooses the industry size given the level of 
transfer from the association (lobby). For simplicity, it is assumed that there is only one 
regulator. The lower number of regulators, as explained for example by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1993) can reduce corruption. 
The regulator, in his objective function, takes into account both his own enrichment (𝑝𝑤) as 
well as social welfare (𝑠𝑤). The regulator cares about social welfare, because otherwise, he 
may lose his position as a regulator. Like Laffont and Tirole (1990, p. 5), it is assumed that 
the existence of courts and a constitution would exert control over public decision-makers 
like the regulator in this model. Courts are assumed to ‘act on hard information transmitted 
by various parties (e.g., whistle-blowers, including consumers, mass media, discontented or 
idealistic civil servants, etc.) and content themselves with correcting deviations from what is 
specified in the constitution.’ 
Social welfare is defined as the simple unweighted sum of consumer surplus (𝑐𝑠) and pro-
ducer surplus (𝑝𝑠) where 𝑐𝑠 and 𝑝𝑠 are defined as follows 
 𝑐𝑠∗ = (𝑎 − 𝑏𝑁𝑞∗)𝑝∗/2 (1.4)  
 𝑝𝑠∗ = 𝑁∗𝜋∗ (1.5)  
in which 𝑝∗ and 𝑞∗ are defined previously. Some models like Mankiw and Whinston (1986) 
take just consumer surplus as social welfare. Unlike the most common function of social 
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welfare in the literature, some other models like Armstrong and Sappington (2007) assign 
different but related weights to consumer surplus and producer surplus8. 
 𝑠𝑤 = 𝑐𝑠 + 𝑝𝑠. (1.6)  
The regulator in this model has almost the same objective function as in Grossman and 
Helpman (1994) and Mitra (1999) where regulator’s payoff is a weighted sum of personal 
welfare and social welfare.  
 𝐺 = 𝛾. 𝑇𝑟 + (1 − 𝛾). 𝑠𝑤 (1.7)  
It is assumed that the regulator’s personal welfare equals total transfer (𝑇𝑟) which will be 
introduced further. 
The regulator’s type is characterised by his level of selfishness which is denoted by 𝛾. A 
higher 𝛾 represents a relatively more selfish regulator. In other words, 𝛾 is the weight that 
the regulator attaches to his personal welfare; so, the weight assigned to social welfare is 1 −
𝛾9. Therefore, 𝛾 distinguishes different types, priorities or preferences of the regulator. In 
the real world, we may face regulators of different types in terms of their preferences towards 
their personal welfare in comparison with social welfare. This change can happen after each 
election when new government takes the office or when new regulators being appointed as 
a result of some social or political pressures. As an example of these kinds of pressures, in 
July 2016, Rouhani, the president of Iran fired some CEOs of major public banks and ap-
pointed new members for the board of Iran’s National Development Fund after that their 
payslips with extraordinary high salaries, bonuses and loans got published in media (Karami, 
2016).  
Now by combining (1.6) and (1.7) it is clear that the regulator’s objective function is highly 
dependent on the industry size.  
                                                 
8 In early stages of developing this model, I followed the same method by assigning weights to 𝑐𝑠 and 𝑝𝑠. Later, 
following the suggestion from members of the department, the weights were dropped to deal with the most 
common function of social welfare in the literature.  
9 The weight attached to personal welfare of the regulator in this paper is equivalent to the weight the govern-
ment attaches to political contributions in Grossman and Helpman (1994) model. Following the seminal work 
of Grossman and Helpman, some papers have tried to test whether their predictions are empirically valid or 
not. For instance, Goldberg and Maggi (1999), using data on nontariff barriers for the United States in 1983, 
in addition to finding confirmation for Grossman and Helpman prediction, find the weight of welfare in the 
government's objective to be around 0.98 (with a 95-percent confidence interval of 0.97-0.99), as opposed to a 
weight of around 0.02 for contributions. Likewise, Mitra et al. (2002) found the same result using four years of 
industry-level data from Turkey in the period of 1983 to 1990. They found the government’s weight on social 
welfare to be much larger than the weight on political contribution. They also mention that the government’ 
weight on social welfare is generally higher for the democratic regime than for dictatorship. 
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 𝐺(𝑁) = 𝛾. 𝑇𝑟(𝑁) + (1 − 𝛾). [𝑐𝑠(𝑁) + 𝑝𝑠(𝑁)] (1.8)  
 𝑁
∗ = argmax
𝑁
𝐺 (𝑁) (1.9)  
The formation of the lobby can be an outcome of a game, which is assumed to be initiated 
by an association. Association can start to perform even by a single incumbent in an indus-
try11. Members of the association know that unregulated entry can end to zero economic 
profit in long-run. It is assumed that firms need to hold a licence to operate, and the number 
of licences in each industry is determined by the regulator. Any non-holder of the licence is 
assumed to be prosecuted in case of being caught operational. The association’s membership 
fee is determined by dividing total transfer to the regulator by the number of licences issued. 
The license is not re-sellable. Having said all of the above, the association invites others to 
join so that they can convince the regulator to stop issuing more licences, and hence, benefit 
from higher profits with a lower number of rivals. The regulator is assumed to be careful of 
both his personal welfare and social welfare. Therefore, the association will try to transfer 
some money because it can affect the number of licences chosen by the regulator. In other 
words, the association knows the reaction function of the regulator.  
The lobby, or the association, transfers some money (𝑇𝑟) to the regulator, because it is a 
common knowledge that the regulator cares for his personal welfare. This model is different 
from Hoff and Stiglitz (2008, 2004) in its settings in a sense that even the privatisation 
through letting more firms to operate, may generate some economic losers, and hence, it will 
cause their reaction. Later, after that the regulator determines the number of licences (𝑁), the 
association will be reimbursed by collecting membership fees. So, the membership fee is 
assumed to be equal to 𝑇𝑟/𝑁. 
On the other hand, any firm who is willing to be a member of the lobby, allocates a fraction, 
𝛼 ∈ [0,1], of its profit, 𝜋. The initial association collects all the contributions to form the 
lobby and act collectively by transferring all the collected transfers to the regulator. Hence, 
the association and the lobby can be used interchangeably. 
                                                 
11 In some markets, the regulator and the lobby is the same person or entity. Like the ‘Royal College of Radi-
ologists’ which determines the number of radiology trainees each year. Recently they have noticed that the 
number of radiologists per population in UK is the lowest in the Europe in 2015. 4.7 radiologist per 100k 
population which remained static over the last 5 years. This could be regarded as social pressure on the lobby 
to increase the number of trainees. But since the profit of each radiologist might be declined they may stop 
increasing the total number of radiologists after some point (The Royal College of Radiologists, 2015). 
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Since the regulator receives this amount because of his position, we can call total transfer as 
corruption as well12. Henceforward, what is meant by corruption in this model is the following 
 𝑇𝑟 =  𝑁𝛼𝜋𝑖 = 𝛼. 𝑝𝑠 (1.10)  
Corruption is actually a fraction, 𝛼, of producer surplus, 𝑝𝑠, as defined in (1.10)13. The lobby 
chooses what fraction of their total profit to transfer to the regulator to convince the regu-
lator to protect them by issuing less of licences and prevent more entry. Based on the amount 
transferred by the lobby, the regulator chooses the number of firms to maximise his objective 
function.  
Transfer is a metaphor for myriad ways, such as cash bribing, facilitating some of the regu-
lator’s problems in his personal life or even some side payments to the regulator for his 
party’s campaign in electoral competitions14.  
The measure of corruption defined in (1.10) captures the environment of the entry game in 
this model. According to Banerjee et al. (2012), we need to transit to model manifestation of 
corruption in different environments. The environment reflects ‘both the usual focus of the 
corruption literature—the nature of the monitoring and the punishments as well as the in-
trinsic motivation of the bureaucrats (e.g., how corruption fits into their moral compass)—
and, what is less emphasised, the nature of the particular economic decision that the bureau-
crats are participating in.’ This definition of corruption in (1.10) will be helpful in other as-
pects as well. Banerjee et al. (2012) mention two reasons that could justify expanding the 
existing models of corruption: First, it can help to have more testable predictions according 
to different settings. Second, it can help to change policy design with regard to the settings. 
This will be more helpful in those cases that punishment cannot be feasible. 
                                                 
12 As Sonin (2008) states ‘what is considered as a fully legal lobbying activity or campaign contribution in an 
OECD country might be thought of as a bribe or even outright extortion in some other economy.’ 
13 Note that 𝑝𝑠, refers to the amount of producer surplus that the regulator perceives, not the one that produc-
ers perceive. To discuss the latter, we must subtract the amount of transfer to the regulator, i.e., 𝑝𝑠𝑃 = (1 −
𝛼)𝜋. 
14 In any case, the money is gained due to the regulator’s position for goals other than legal and/or social ones. 
For example, in an interview with a senior official in Iran’s railways, he told me about the offers he received 
from some of the operating firms in the market to finance all of his son’s education expenses in a leading 
university in US or UK. Transfer can also be providing airplane and helicopters for policymakers as mentioned 
by Mitra et al. (2002). In a more complicated way, in the 2011 Iranian embezzlement scandal, the owner of an 
active firm in Steel market, which later was executed, offered the officials to construct a double-decker highway 
between two cities without asking for any money in exchange; just to have more say in Iran’s steel market 
(Tabnak, 2012). Hence, a reasonable fraction of the regulator’s annual budget was freed, which later could be 
collected personally. As another example, one can refer to the case of Helmut Kohl, who was accused of 
accepting secret donations for his party. Later no evidence of Kohl’s personal enrichment was found but it 
should be regarded as a type of corruption. At the end, Kohl was ordered to pay a fine of DM 300,000. Also, 
his party, the CDU, was charged €21 million and suffered electoral costs (Kunicová, 2006). 
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One possible way to make the model more realistic is to assume that the regulator may not 
receive all the transfers because of other factors like the power of the central government. 
In the following chapters, by introducing the probability of apprehension, I will assume dif-
ferent objective functions for the regulator and the lobby.  
To see the full image of comparative statics and to ckeck for the robustness of the results, 
this chapter also investigates two more variables: (1) economic social welfare or social welfare 
net-of-transfer, and (2) scale-neutral corruption. Economic social welfare (𝑠𝑤𝑎) is defined as 
accounting social welfare minus total transfer, or 
 𝑠𝑤𝑎 = 𝑐𝑠 + 𝑝𝑠 − 𝑇𝑟 = 𝑐𝑠 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝑠. (1.11)  
Social welfare net of transfer, 𝑠𝑤𝑎, can be defined as ‘economic social welfare’ in contrast to 
‘accounting social welfare’. The latter does not take into account the dead-weight loss of 
corruption to the society. In other words, the society assigns zero weight to personal welfare 
of the regulator. As briefly discussed by Grossman and Helpman (1994), by some manipula-
tion of weights, the objective functions with the two different definitions of social welfare 
are almost the same15. 
Corruption is sensitive to scales. Hence, we need to remove the role of scale in measuring 
corruption. This is in line with the Bardhan and Mookherjee's (2006) recommendation to 
avoid defining corruption just as total bribes16. Therefore, scale-neutral corruption (𝑇𝑟𝑅) is de-
fined as the following:  
 𝑇𝑟𝑅 =
𝑇𝑟
𝑁𝑝𝑞
 
(1.12)  
The lobby seeks to maximise its members’ welfare. Similar to the model of Bliss and Di Tella 
(1997), this model assumes that there is a surplus in the industry, and it is better to share it 
with the corrupt regulator than to lose all or a big fraction of it. Bliss and Di Tella (1997) call 
                                                 
15 They also define weights in a different manner. They define the government’s objective function as 𝐺 =
∑𝐶 + 𝑎.𝑊, where 𝐶 is contribution of each lobby, 𝑊 is aggregate, gross-of-contributions welfare and 𝑎 > 0 
is the weight assigned. They also introduce another way to weight which is 𝐺′ = 𝑎1∑𝐶 + 𝑎2(𝑊 − ∑𝐶). Max-
imizing 𝐺 and 𝐺′ is the same when 𝑎 = 𝑎2/(𝑎1 − 𝑎2) provided that 𝑎1 > 𝑎2. They assume that this condition 
is satisfied because ‘politicians value a dollar in their campaign coffers more highly than a dollar in the hands 
of the public.’  
16 They also say that defining corruption only based on bribes could be misleading in the study of welfare effects 
of decentralization. They recommend to entail ‘costly efforts made by citizens to influence the design or appli-
cation of laws in their own self-interest. This might include contributions by interest groups to politicians or 
costs incurred by citizens to evade laws.’ 
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it ‘surplus-shifting corruption’. Banerjee et al. (2012, p. 61) refer to models that cooperatives, 
like the cooperatives of farmers, can act like the lobby17.  
The lobby’s objective function is to choose the level of transfers that maximises the remain-
der of producer surplus after making the transfer to the regulator. One can think of different 
ways the transfer can be made depending on different levels of the regulator’s effectiveness. 
For example, in the 2011 Iranian embezzlement scandal, the suspect who was accused of 
supplying bribe, reduced the share of the minister of urban development by two percent after 
his impeachment18  (Tabnak, 2012).  
As mentioned before, since the Cournot competition among firms takes place after the 
lobby-regulator game, the equilibrium level of output, like the model of Bliss and Di Tella 
(1997), may not be affected by the lobbying process. So, the objective function of the lobby 
is  
 max
α
𝐿 = (1 − 𝛼). 𝑁. 𝜋𝑖 = (1 − 𝛼). 𝑝𝑠 (1.13)  
 𝛼∗ = argmax
𝛼
𝐿 (𝛼) (1.14)  
It should be noted that 𝛼∗ and 𝑁∗ could not be solved analytically. Therefore, I used numer-
ical approach by which I found the equilibrium using different sets of variables.  
Figure 1-1 gives a more detailed visual presentation of 𝐿 with respect to 𝛼 and 𝑁. As ex-
pected, lower 𝛼 and lower 𝑁 bring the highest return for the lobby. The maximum of 𝐿 is 
where 𝑁 is around one (pure monopoly) and 𝛼 is roughly zero (no transfer from the lobby 
to the regulator).  
                                                 
17 In case of having no access to corruption perception indices, we might have other useful regional indicators. 
For instance, Andvig (2007) mentions the following three: (i) estimates of the size of the second economy, (ii) 
the number of newspaper stories about corruption, or (iii) the number of people convicted of economic crimes 
including corruption. 
18 Laffont and Tirole (1993, p. 476) distinguishes five channels through which the interest groups can influence 
the regulators or more generally, public decision makers: (1) Monetary bribes, which due to legal issues may 
not be common; (2) ‘Revolving door’, which is the promise by firms or their law firms to recruit the regulators 
later or upon their retirement (Bó, 2006); (3) Personal relationships, which gives more incentives to the regula-
tors to work in favour of their friends in firms; (4) Imposing less of public pressures from the lobby side, for 
instance by refraining from criticizing publicly the regulator’s management; (5) Making indirect transfers 
through a few key elected officials who have influence over the regulators. For instance, contributing monetarily 
to political campaigns or providing votes and lobbying of the ‘Grass Roots’ (employees, shareholders, suppliers, 
citizens of communities where plants are located. 
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Figure 1-1 - Lobby Objective Function as a Function of 𝑁 and 𝛼 
We are interested in finding the combinations of 𝑁 and 𝛼 which results to the same 𝐿, i.e., 
the indifference curves. Since 𝑁 < 1 is not possible in this model, we can show the contours 
in a two-dimension as in Figure 1-2. Those indifference curves at the left reflect higher return 
for the lobby. So, the less 𝛼 (transfer) will result to more 𝐿 (lobby’s welfare), as expected. 
Appendix 1 discusses the formula of the contours of the lobby function.   
1.2.1  Equilibrium 
Following the first order condition of the regulator’s objective function in (1.7) we have 
 𝐺𝑁
′ = (1 − 𝛾)𝑐𝑠𝑁
′ + (1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝛾)𝑝𝑠𝑁
′ = 0, (1.15)  
and hence, 
𝑁 
 
𝛼 
Figure 1-2 - Lobby Indifference Curves 
 
 
36 
 
 
 −
𝑐𝑠𝑁
′
𝑝𝑠𝑁
′ = 1 +
𝛼𝛾
1 − 𝛾
. 
(1.16)  
If (1.16) does not hold, then the regulator may change his choice of industry size.  
By solving (1.15) for 𝑁, we can get the regulator’s reaction as a function of 𝛼. Figure 1-3 
depicts the regulator’s reaction function to the lobby’s choice of transfer (𝛼), which will be 
discussed in the next section.  
 𝑁𝑟 = 𝑁𝑟(𝛼),𝑁𝑟𝛼
′ < 0 (1.17)  
 
Figure 1-3 - Reaction Function of the Regulator 
𝑁 remains strictly positive for all values of 𝛼. More detailed comparative statics and charac-
terisation of the regulator’s reaction function will be presented in section 1.3  . For instance, 
it will be shown that the regulator’s reaction function is always downward sloping in 𝛼 for 
different values of the parameters of the model.  
Given the number of firms, the lobby wants to find the point on reaction function that 
achieves the highest return. This must clearly satisfy the tangency condition that the slope of 
the indifference curve equals the slope of the reaction function. In other words, the lobby 
would like to choose 𝛼 along the highest possible indifference curve. As explained before, 
those indifference curves on the left reflects higher returns for the lobby. So, the lobby would 
like to choose 𝛼 on 𝐿2 and 𝐿3 rather than 𝐿1, but 𝐿2 and 𝐿3 are not feasible. 
𝑁 
𝛼 1 0 
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Mathematically, to find the equilibrium transfer and industry size, the reaction function of 
the regulator from (1.17) should be plugged into the lobby’s objective function in (1.13). 
Then the lobby would solve for 𝛼 to find the equilibrium level of transfers, 𝛼∗. 
 𝛼
∗ = argmax
𝛼
𝐿(𝑁𝑟(𝛼)) (1.18)  
Figure 1-4 shows the equilibrium at the tangency of the regulator’s reaction function and the 
contours of the lobby’s payoff.  
Figure 1-4 - The Equilibrium 
By having a more careful look at the lobby’s objective function, it can be concluded that 
transfers may work in favour of the lobby only if the marginal effect of industry size on profit 
(𝜕𝜋∗/𝜕𝑁) exceeds average profit, defined as 𝜋/𝑁.  
 𝐿 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑁𝜋 (1.19)  
𝐿𝛼
′ = −𝑁𝜋 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑁𝛼
′𝜋 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑁𝜋𝑁
′ 𝑁𝛼
′  
= −𝑁𝜋 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑁𝛼
′⏟
−
(𝜋 + 𝑁𝜋𝑁
′ )⏟      
+/−
 
Only if 𝜋 + 𝑁𝜋𝑁
′ < 0 we may have 𝐿𝛼
′ > 0. Otherwise, the lobby’s utility will be always 
negative in transfers; which remains no incentive for the lobby to transfer some of the col-
lective profits to the regulator. So, the necessary condition is to have elastic profit with re-
spect to industry size.  
𝜋 + 𝑁𝜋𝑁
′ < 0 →
𝜋
𝑁
<
𝜕𝜋
𝜕𝑁
→
𝜕𝜋/𝜋
𝜕𝑁/𝑁
> 1 → 𝜖𝜋,𝑁 > 1 
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It is important to note that if 𝜖𝜋,𝑁 > 1 it is not necessarily the case that 𝐿𝛼
′ > 0. In other 
words, the effect of transfers on the lobby’s utility does not depend solely on this elasticity. 
Other parameters of the model are important too. But when 𝜖𝜋,𝑁 > 1 we are sure that the 
lobby may not transfer anything because it decreases the lobby’s utility. This leads us to as-
sume the following. 
Assumption 1. Evaluated profit at equilibrium quantity is elastic with respect 
to the industry size;  
 |𝜖𝜋,𝑁| > 1. (1.20)  
In the following section it will be shown that without Assumption 1 there will be no interior 
solution for the regulator as well. In other words, in case Assumption 1 is violated, there will 
be no incentive for the regulator to stop issuing licences. This will be discussed in section 1.3   
It is also important to discuss conditions under which the lobby would be formed. Grossman 
and Helpman (1994) do not provide a theory of lobby formation. Following Mitra (1999), 
each firm decides to participate in forming the lobby if the benefits of collective action 
through the lobby is greater than the benefits without lobbying. I assume that the regulator’s 
objective function is the same with or without lobbying. The only difference is that without 
lobbying, no transfer would be made from the lobby, and hence, the regulator chooses the 
industry size by maximising social welfare. Or it can be the case that the regulator assigns no 
weight on personal welfare (𝛾 = 0), which again ends to the same result.  
In the next sub-section, it will be discussed that the number of firms under the lobby-regu-
lator game is always lower than the unregulated entry case19. Hence, the lobby knows that 
without any effort to convince the regulator, there would be more competitors in the market, 
which results to lower profit for each firm. 
Since in case of zero transfer from the lobby will result to unregulated entry into the market 
and hence lower profit for each firm, firms decide to form a lobby to avoid the stated above 
outcomes under unregulated entry. However, firms may collude in the lobby only if the profit 
of the firm under lobbying net of the amount spent on transfers would be greater than the 
profit of the firm with no lobbying. This condition will be discussed in the next sub-section 
in more details. 
                                                 
19 The reason I call it ‘unregulated entry’ and not ‘free entry’ is due to presence of fixed cost.  
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1.2.2  The First Best 
The first best is the case of unregulated entry in the long-run. In the first best case, the 
equilibrium number of firms, 𝑁𝑒, is determined such that no profit remains for a typical firm. 
Industry size in the first best is the highest given other parameters of the model. Hence, 
under the first best, 𝑐𝑠 is the highest. Using the explicit form for the first best provides us 
with benchmark values to compare the outcome of the model under the first best with the 
case of lobby-regulator game. This is the case where there is no barrier to entry and more 
entry results to a reduction in profit until no profit remains for firms. Hence, no incentive 
would be left for outsiders to enter the market. 
 𝑁𝑒 = {𝑁: 𝜋
∗(𝑁𝑒) = 0} (1.21)  
 
 
 
𝑁𝑒 =
𝑎 √𝐹(𝑏 + 𝑐) − 𝐹𝑏 − 2𝐹𝑐 
𝐹𝑏
 
(1.22)  
Now the benchmark is set for 𝑏 = 2, 𝑐 = 10 and 𝐹 = 20. The value of 𝑎 is set such that 
𝑠𝑤 = 100 in the unregulated entry case. Following this, it turns out that 𝑎 = 48.401. So, 
to do comparative statics, we set the benchmark values to above values. Following this pro-
cedure, we would have the following values for the first best.  
𝑁𝑒
∗ = 7.74, 𝑠𝑤𝑒
∗ = 100 
Remark 1 Industry size under the lobby-regulator game is always less than 
or equal to industry size in the first best and in the long-run perfect com-
petition. 
What is shown in Remark 1 is a standard result in the literature but with a different setting  
(for example Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010; Mankiw and Whinston, 1986; Suzumura et al., 
1987).  
Using our benchmark, in the first best when 𝑐 = 10, the industry size is 𝑁𝑒
∗ = 7.74. The 
simulation of the model shows that equilibrium industry size under the lobby-regulator game 
is always less than 7.74. This means that by allowing the lobby-regulator game to be played, 
we definitely will have lower industry size, which guarantees higher levels of profit for firms. 
This can be regarded as an aspect of dead-weight loss in the model with the lobby-regulator 
game. 
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Social welfare in the first best is also always greater than social welfare under the lobby-
regulator game. This means that the game causes a social inefficiency. This confirms the 
intuition that the lobby devotes considerable resources to maintain the number of firms fixed 
in their range of comfort. As Varian (2010, p. 428) stated: 
‘Lobbying expenses, lawyers’ fees, public relations costs, and so on can be substantial. From 
the viewpoint of society, these kinds of expenses represent pure social waste. They aren’t true 
costs of production; they don’t lead to any more output being produced. Lobbying and public 
relations efforts just determine who gets the money associated with existing output. From the 
viewpoint of society, they represent a pure dead-weight loss since they don’t create any more 
output, they just change the market value of existing factors of production.’ 
Now that the case of unregulated entry is introduced, let’s go back to the discussion of lobby 
formation, discussed in the previous sub-section and use the newly defined case of unregu-
lated entry. As stated there, firms may collude in the lobby only if the profit of the firm under 
lobbying (𝜋(𝑁∗)) net of the amount spent on transfers would be greater than the profit of 
the firm with no lobbying. Since no-lobbying results to the unregulated entry, this means that 
we have to compare the benefits of the lobby under the lobby with that under the first best. 
This requires to satisfy the following condition for lobby formation.  
 (1 − 𝛼∗)𝜋(𝑁∗) ≥ 𝜋(𝑁𝑁𝐿) (1.23)  
If we just assume that firms will take no lobbying, a foreword to the unregulated entry, then 
they will think of 𝜋(𝑁𝑁𝐿) = 𝜋(𝑁𝑒) = 0. Therefore, in our case in which we assume that 
without lobbying, the outcomes of unregulated entry are expected, then (1.23) can be trans-
lated to that both 𝛼∗ > 0 and 𝜋∗ > 0. If we assume that no lobbying may not necessarily 
ends to unregulated entry, then we have to add an assumption to make sure that the lobby 
will be formed. 
Assumption 2. To allow firms to form the lobby, functions and parameters of 
the model will be chosen such that the following condition will be satisfied.  
 
𝜋(𝑁𝑁𝐿)
𝜋(𝑁∗)
≤ 1 − 𝛼∗ 
(1.24)  
Hence if we know that 𝑁∗ ≤ 𝑁𝑁𝐿 , and since we assume that we always have 𝜋𝑁
′ < 0, then 
we will have this condition satisfied. 
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1.3  POLICY EFFECTS 
This section investigates the effects of changes in the three main exogenous variables of the 
model on four endogenous variables. The three exogenous variables are regulator’s level of 
selfishness (𝛾), technology or marginal cost (𝑐) and fixed cost (𝐹). The four endogenous 
variables are equilibrium transfer (𝛼∗), equilibrium corruption (𝑇𝑟∗), equilibrium industry 
size (𝑁∗) and social welfare (𝑠𝑤∗). 
1.3.1  Effects of Changes in the Regulator’s Level of Selfishness 
First, the changes in the regulator’s level of selfishness (𝛾) will be examined. In different 
numerical experiments taken for this chapter, the model cannot be solved for low levels of 
the regulator’s selfishness20. This shows that to have 𝛼∗ = 0, there is no need for a com-
pletely benevolent regulator. Hence, an economy can experience zero-corruption even when 
the regulator is slightly selfish. This also depends on other parameters of the model. Chapter 
three discusses this in more details. In all further numerical experiments, Assumption 1, 
Assumption 2 and second order conditions for maximisation problems are checked and they 
are all satisfied.  
Now that the equilibrium and the first best are introduced, we can review some basic and 
immediate comparative statics of the model which construct the building blocks of the re-
sults. Appendix 3 discusses how 𝛾 affects the building components of corruption and social 
welfare; which are 𝜋∗, 𝛼∗ and 𝑁∗. 
Comparative statics of the model show that an increase in 𝛾 reduces the regulator’s payoff 
and increases the lobby’s and firms’ payoff. Moreover, costlier technologies have ambiguous 
effect on 𝛼∗ and 𝑁∗ which largely depends on 𝛾. Appendix 3 discusses how 𝑐 and 𝛾 affect 
variables of interest. In light of what is presented in Appendix 3, Result 1 discusses the ulti-
mate effect of these parameters on social welfare and corruption or total transfer 
one might ask about the ultimate effect on total transfer or corruption.. 
 Assuming 𝜖𝜋,𝑁 > 1, (1) social welfare is monotonically decreasing in 𝛾, (2) cor-
ruption is non-monotonic in 𝛾; first increasing and then decreasing. 
                                                 
20 For our benchmark values, on the regulator side of the game, for 𝛾 < 0.12 there is no real root for the first 
order condition. It’s only for 𝛾 > 0.12 that we will have a well-behaved downward sloping reaction function 
for the regulator. In case we can prove that, it would be a general case, then we can interpret it as the fact that 
transfers from the association (lobby) will only influence those regulator with higher than some specific level 
of selfishness. 
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An increase in 𝛾 reduces the equilibrium industry size. Consequently, 𝑐𝑠 decreases and 𝑝𝑠 
increases. The marginal change in 𝑝𝑠 is bigger than the marginal change in 𝑐𝑠. Hence, 𝑠𝑤 is 
declining in 𝛾. This implies that any increase in the regulator’s level of selfishness does not 
end in favour of social welfare.  
To study the effect of changes in 𝛾 on corruption, three variables must be investigated; 𝛼, 𝑁 
and 𝜋. 𝑁 and 𝜋 are decreasing in 𝛾 but 𝑇𝑟 is increasing, because the marginal increase in 
profit is higher than the marginal effect on 𝛼 and 𝑁. But in those economies with higher 
levels of regulator’s selfishness, the marginal increase in profit becomes closer to the sum of 
marginal effect on both 𝛼 and 𝑁.  
Result 1 implies that for those economies with better technologies, the magnitude of corrup-
tion is higher. Better technologies help to create higher profits as discussed in Appendix 322. 
Accordingly, the amount of money that the lobby is willing to pay is higher too. Intuitively, 
the amount of money required to make an impact in say petrochemical industry is much 
higher compared to the amount of money required to make an influence in a local market in 
a village. As another example, think of a thief who wants to break a chained door. The only 
thing he needs is a bolt cutter. However, if he wants to hack someone’s computer, at least 
he needs to hire an expert which is definitely more expensive than a bolt cutter. So, better 
technologies cost more to be broken. 
1.3.2  Changes in Fixed Cost and Technology 
Based on the comparative statics of changes in 𝑐 and 𝐹, the following result summarizes how 
the outcome variables of interest, corruption and social welfare, might be changed accord-
ingly. Then, the next sub-section discusses the effect of changes in fixed cost in more details 
which will be used for further discussions in chapter two and three.  
 An increase in either of 𝑐 or 𝐹 leads to 
  (1) a lower level of social welfare, 
  (2) a lower level of the regulator’s corruption, 
  (3) a less sensitive and monotonically decreasing function of social welfare 
in 𝛾, and  
  (4) a less sensitive and non-monotonic function of corruption in 𝛾. 
                                                 
22 See Figure 1-18 in Appendix 3. 
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Figure 1-6 - Social Welfare (𝑠𝑤∗) vs. the Regulator's 
Levels of Selfishness for different Marginal Cost 
 
Different levels of technology and fixed cost, determine the behaviours of social welfare and 
corruption with respect to changes in regulator’s level of selfishness. In case of a very low 
cost technology or low fixed cost, as the level of the regulator’s selfishness increases, social 
welfare is monotonically decreasing in 𝛾, while corruption is non-monotonic in 𝛾; first in-
creasing and then decreasing.  
A change in either technology or fixed cost affects both 𝑠𝑤∗ and 𝑠𝑤𝑎
∗ similarly; in terms of 
their magnitude both face a decrease. In terms of the trend, 𝑠𝑤∗ and 𝑠𝑤𝑎
∗ are both decreasing 
in 𝛾 for different levels of technology and fixed cost23.  
The effect of changes in marginal cost becomes lower for higher values of 𝑐. The same holds 
for 𝐹. In the first best where 𝛾 = 0, the evaluated social welfare for benchmark values (in-
cluding 𝑐 = 10 and 𝐹 = 20) is 𝑠𝑤∗ = 100. When 𝛾 increases to 0.35, we will have 𝑠𝑤∗ =
99.54. Assuming 𝛾 constant, a decrease of around 30% in the marginal cost, from 𝑐 = 10 
to 𝑐 = 7 yields roughly a 45% increase in social welfare, from 𝑠𝑤 = 100 to around 𝑠𝑤 =
145.79. A rise of 20% in the marginal cost to 𝑐 = 12 leads to around 30% of a decrease in 
social welfare. A rise of around 50% from the benchmark marginal cost to 𝑐 = 15, reduces 
social welfare by about 56%. Finally, if marginal cost is doubled from the benchmark value 
of 10 to 20, social welfare reduces by around 85%.  
Result 2 has clear policy implications for the regulator. In the case of a high-cost technology, 
having a more corruptible regulator in the office does not induce higher corruption. This 
                                                 
23 The reader may find the figures of 𝑠𝑤𝑎
∗ and 𝑇𝑟𝑅
∗ in Appendix 4. 
Figure 1-7 - Corruption vs. the Regulator's Selfish-
ness for Different Levels of Marginal Cost  
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may sound counter-intuitive; as always it is expected that a more selfish regulator’s sets ex-
pectations for corruption higher in the economy. As shown in Figure 1-7 if the regulator’s 
selfishness exceeds some amount, an economy with a more selfish regulator may end-up in 
a lower corruption. A more selfish regulator is too greedy and may be convinced with a 
relatively lower amount of transfer. When the cost of production increases, less of money 
remains. Therefore, the regulator would be happy to receive even a small fraction of that 
money. On the contrary, in the case of low cost technology, corruption is non-monotonic in 
regulator’s level of selfishness. This suggests the regulator that if he wants to increase his 
monetary gain, he has to first follow those policies that reduce the marginal cost. Secondly, 
one should not necessarily associate an increase in the regulator’s selfishness to an increase 
in corruption.  
The next sub-section discusses the effects of changes in fixed cost in more detail.  
1.3.2.1 Further Details on Changes in Fixed Costs 
One of the main themes in chapters two and three is institutional changes and more specif-
ically, investment on deregulation. Deregulation mainly affects the fixed cost. Therefore, 
chapter one presents a deep dive on how changes in fixed cost affects the outcomes of the 
model to pave the way for further discussion in the second and the third chapter.  
The model interestingly predicts that lowering fixed cost, which could be through the re-
moval of red tapes ends to more corruption. Ease of entry to the market can be an example 
of reduction in fixed cost. Figure 1-10 shows that if fixed cost reduces to a third of its value, 
corruption can be increased by more than 8 times. Although as depicted in Figure 1-15, the 
lobby picks a lower level of transfer as a result of an increase in 𝐹, the regulator will react by 
reducing number of licenses. The reason can be seen in Figure 1-10 where corruption in-
creases. In other words, having fewer rivals has helped firms a lot by increasing their profits, 
as in Figure 1-11. So, they do not see a reason to increase the regulator’s share from their 
profit (𝛼) because the total magnitude of transfer (𝑇𝑟) is still increasing. Since the total mag-
nitude of corruption has increased, then the lobby allows fewer firms in the market, which 
is in favour of  all players. 
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Figure 1-9 - Social Welfare (𝑠𝑤∗) vs. the Regulator's 
Selfishness for Different Levels of Fixed Cost 
 
Figure 1-10 - Corruption vs. the Regulator's Level 
of Selfishness for Different Levels of Fixed Cost 
In light of Result 1, we can expect that in developing countries where less efficient technol-
ogy is being used or firms are dealing with high fixed cost, a more corrupt regulator gets 
convinced to work in favour of the lobby for a very low level of bribe. Also, in the context 
of developing countries, we may witness less corruption in total as more selfish regulator 
takes the office. Also, it is expected that in developed countries where more efficient tech-
nology is adopted, a regulator with the same low level of selfishness as in developing 
countries may receive a much bigger fraction of bribe. Moreover, corruption may be higher 
as a consequence of a change in the regulator’s selfishness but it can be dropped to a lower 
value for further increases in the level of selfishness.  
Result 2 also suggests that after some level of 𝛾, having even a more selfish regulator may 
reduce the level of corruption. Intuitively, the reason is that it becomes costlier for the lobby 
to protect the industry, because the regulator requires a greater compensation for deviating 
from higher social welfare. Perotti and Volpin (2004) show the same insight according to 
their framework. 
In the present setting of the model, 𝛾 is not a policy instrument. However, in light of the 
results discussed, one can suggest that if the level of the regulator’s selfishness was a policy 
instrument, and if the goal is lowering corruption, then having a more selfish regulator can 
be of interest. The point is reducing the corruption is not the only goal in an economy for 
policymakers. Other variables like social welfare should be taken into account as well. This 
becomes more important when we look at numbers. Corruption, at maximum, is around 8% 
of the value of social welfare. For very high levels of 𝛾, this ratio become lower than 3%. By 
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10% increase in 𝛾 from 0.8, total corruption reduces by around 25% to 5.37, while social 
welfare falls by 3% to 86.24.  
When the technology is very costly, any change in the regulator’s level of selfishness has 
almost no effect on either of social welfare and corruption. In other words, the regulator’s 
personality plays a major role only when firms are benefitting from a low cost technology. 
In case of low cost technology, Result 2 and Result 1 together suggest three main ranges for 
the regulator’s level of selfishness; (1) very low 𝛾, where social welfare is decreasing and 
corruption is increasing; (2) medium level of 𝛾, in which social welfare is decreasing but 
corruption is either constant or steadily increasing; and (3) high levels of 𝛾, in which both 
social welfare and corruption are declining rapidly. Having a relatively more benevolent reg-
ulator might be helpful to reduce corruption and to raise social welfare only if 𝛾 lies in the 
first range; in other words, if 𝛾 is low. As 𝛾 exceeds some level, having a more benevolent 
regulator, can result to no effect on corruption or even an increase in it. As firms face a 
higher fixed cost, region 1, in which corruption is increasing, becomes shorter and region 2 
becomes wider. 
There is a range of low marginal cost at which, an increase in marginal cost results in higher 
industry size, higher corruption and lower social welfare24. This is in contrast to Straub’s 
(2009) conclusion that more competition always enhances social welfare. In brief, if we con-
sider the role of the regulator’s characteristics, then for low levels of marginal cost, it might 
be the case that a more selfish regulator can increase competition and corruption and de-
crease social welfare at the same time. The result that more competition can lead to either an 
increase or a decrease in corruption is in line with empirical studies in the literature (Straub, 
2009; Pieroni and d’Agostino, 2013). 
Changes in fixed cost ends to direct relation of competition and corruption. Figure 1-16 and  
Figure 1-10 show that by an increase in the fixed cost, one can see a reduction in industry 
size and in corruption. This implies that given the role of the regulator’s level of selfishness, 
less competition can end to less corruption. 
What has been discussed so far in this sub-section shows the ultimate effects of changes in 
𝐹. As was mentioned previously, chapters two and three will discuss the implications of 
                                                 
24 This statement is based on Figure 1-25, Figure 1-6 and Figure 1-7. 
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changes in fixed cost in more details. Therefore, the following paragraphs shows the me-
chanics of changes in 𝐹. 
Remark 1 An increase in 𝐹 leads to a lower and a less sensitive equilibrium trans-
fer and equilibrium industry size. 
An increase in 𝐹 has almost the same effect on equilibrium industry size as the marginal cost. 
In order to fully investigate the effects of changes in fixed cost, again, it is needed to inves-
tigate the effect on 𝜋∗, 𝛼∗ and 𝑁∗ as the main components.  
The fixed cost can affect equilibrium profit both directly and indirectly through equilibrium 
industry size as shown in (1.3). So, to be able to see why 𝜋∗ is non-monotonic in 𝐹, as shown 
in Figure 1-12, we need to see the effect of 𝐹 on 𝑁∗ as well. As 𝐹 increases, the regulator’s 
reaction function shifts to the left and becomes flatter. This is the same for both low and 
high levels of 𝛾 as shown in Figure 1-13 and Figure 1-14. 
The direct effect of a fixed cost on equilibrium profit is negative. The indirect effect is posi-
tive. Since we have 𝜕𝑁∗ 𝜕𝐹⁄ < 0 and 𝜕𝜋∗ 𝜕𝑁∗⁄ < 0, and hence, we have indirect positive 
effect of 𝐹 on 𝜋∗ through 𝑁∗, the overall effect depends on the magnitude of these two 
opposite effects. For low levels of 𝐹, the direct effect in absolute value is lower than the 
indirect one. Hence, for low levels of 𝐹, equilibrium profit is increasing in 𝐹.  
The regulator’s level of selfishness is important too. As shown in Figure 1-12 for low levels 
of 𝛾, the direct effect is bigger than the indirect effect for wider range of 𝐹. 
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Figure 1-11 – Profit at Equilibrium vs. Levels of the Regu-
lator's Selfishness for Different Fixed Costs 
 
Figure 1-12 – Profit at Equilibrium vs. Fixed Cost for Dif-
ferent Levels of the Regulator's Selfishness 
Next, I will look into the effects of a change on reaction functions of the regulator. Figure 
1-13 and Figure 1-14 show two cases for changes in reaction functions as a result of change 
in 𝐹 for two levels of 𝛾. 
 
Figure 1-13 - Regulator's Reaction Function for 
Different Levels of Fixed Cost, Case of a relatively 
less selfish regulator (γ = 0.3). 
 
Figure 1-14 - Regulator's Reaction Function for Dif-
ferent Levels of Fixed Cost, Case of a relatively less 
selfish regulator (γ = 0.9). 
Having said the effects on the equilibrium profit and reaction functions, 𝛼∗ and 𝑁∗ should 
be investigated. Again we should look for both the changes in magnitude and the behaviour 
of 𝛼∗ in 𝐹 and 𝛾. Given that 𝛾 is fixed, as depicted in Figure 1-15, higher 𝐹 causes lower 
level of 𝛼∗. 
Unlike the comparative statics in marginal cost, equilibrium transfer is always monotonically 
decreasing in 𝛾 for different levels of fixed cost. For low levels of fixed cost, the equilibrium 
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transfer is more sensitive to the regulator’s level of selfishness. The policy implication learnt 
from this is the same as that of costly technologies that was previously discussed: competi-
tion-wise, policymakers should be less worried about changes in the regulator’s selfishness 
when an industry is faced with a high fixed cost. 
 
 
Figure 1-15 - Transfers versus the Regulator's Level 
of Selfishness for Different Levels of Fixed Cost 
 
 
Figure 1-16 - Industry Size versus the Regulator’s 
Level of Selfishness for Different Levels of the Fixed 
Cost 
A rise in fixed cost reduces 𝑁∗. Also, as depicted in Figure 1-16, in situations with a higher 
fixed cost, 𝑁∗ is less sensitive to the regulator’s level of selfishness. 
1.4  CONCLUSIONS 
The model presented in chapter one investigates the game between the regulator and the 
lobby in an industry. The lobby, which is a collusion of all firms, as the leader of this game, 
tries to convince the regulator through transferring a fraction of its members’ profit. The 
lobby takes the regulator’s reaction function as given. At the second stage of the game, the 
regulator chooses the industry size such that it maximises his objective function. In the sec-
ond stage, the regulator has already obtained the transferred money, which can be interpreted 
as bribery from the lobby.  
The regulator’s objective function consists of both the regulator’s personal welfare as well as 
social welfare. This function will be maximised with respect to the number of firms chosen 
by the regulator. The model investigates how the regulator’s type, or his tendency towards 
personal welfare rather than social welfare, can change and deviate the outcome of the model 
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from the first best case. A more selfish regulator is the one who attaches a higher weight to 
his personal welfare. 
The model shows that a more selfish regulator does not always convey higher corruption to 
the economy. The reason is a more selfish regulator can be convinced easier which ultimately 
ends to lower level of corruption.  
 The model shows that the outcome variables of interest are less affected by the regulator’s 
type when high fixed cost are burdened on firms. The same finding holds for the case where 
firms employ high-cost technologies.  
The main result of the model presented in chapter one is that more competition may not 
necessarily associate with less corruption and higher social welfare. Although some argue 
that competition is a cure for corruption and a booster for social welfare (e.g. Straub, 2009), 
the model in this chapter, in line with some other findings in the literature (e.g. Bliss and Di 
Tella, 1997), shows that this relation can be more complicated. The immediate policy impli-
cation would be to not generalise the relation between corruption and competition as other 
parameters of the model play significant roles. According to the comparative statics of the 
model, a general policy implication is that competition is less subject to changes in regulator’s 
level of selfishness when firms employ relatively costly technologies or high fixed cost. By 
considering the role of the regulator’s characteristics, then for low levels of marginal cost, a 
more selfish regulator may turn out to reduce competition, increase corruption and decrease 
social welfare at the same time.  
Low-quality institutions can worsen the outcomes of market-oriented policies as well. Nili 
(2015) discusses that privatisation should be defined within a bigger framework of reform to 
reduce any possible friction. This may bring up another problem for the governments that 
in the case of having a choice to pursue two different policies, which one may bring higher 
social welfare and lower corruption for the economy. Are there any predictable side effects 
of following such policies when an economy is suffering from the weakness in both institu-
tional and structural aspects? The following chapters will shed more light one this question 
based on the model presented in chapter one.  
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1.6  APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 
𝑑𝑁
𝑑𝛼
=
−(𝑁𝑏+𝑏+2𝑐)(𝐹𝑏2𝑁2+(2𝐹𝑏2+4𝐹𝑏𝑐)𝑁+𝐹𝑏2+4𝐹𝑏𝑐+4𝐹𝑐2−𝑎2𝑏−𝑎2𝑐)𝑁
(−1+𝛼)(𝐹𝑏3𝑁3+(3𝐹𝑏3+6𝐹𝑏2𝑐)𝑁2+𝐴0𝑁+𝐴1)
𝐴0 =  3Fb
3 +
12Fb2c + 12Fbc2 + a2b2 + a2bc 
𝐴1 = Fb
3 + 6Fb2c + 12Fbc2 + 8Fc3 − a2b2 − 3a2bc − 2a2c2Equilibrium 
profit is decreasing in industry size 
Profit at 𝑞∗ is always decreasing in industry size.  
𝜕𝜋∗(𝑞∗)
𝜕𝑁
= −𝑏𝑞∗2⏟  
−
+
𝜕𝑞∗
𝜕𝑁⏟
−
[−2𝑞∗(𝑏𝑁 + 𝑐) + 𝑎⏟            
−
] 
This suggests that the sign of 𝜕𝜋∗(𝑞∗) 𝜕𝑁⁄  depends on the interaction of the two terms with 
opposite signs, but by contradiction, it can be proved that 𝜕𝜋∗(𝑞∗) 𝜕𝑁⁄  is always negative.  
−𝑏𝑞∗2 +
𝜕𝑞∗
𝜕𝑁
[−2𝑞∗(𝑏𝑁 + 𝑐) + 𝑎] < 0 → 
𝑏𝑁 + 𝑐
𝑏𝑁 + 𝑐 + 𝑏 + 𝑐
< 1 
which always holds. 
Appendix 2 Lobby’s contour 
The lobby contours would be as follows: 
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𝑑𝑁
𝑑𝛼
=
−(𝑁𝑏 + 𝑏 + 2𝑐)(𝐹𝑏2𝑁2 + (2𝐹𝑏2 + 4𝐹𝑏𝑐)𝑁 + 𝐹𝑏2 + 4𝐹𝑏𝑐 + 4𝐹𝑐2 − 𝑎2𝑏 − 𝑎2𝑐)𝑁
(−1 + 𝛼)(𝐹𝑏3𝑁3 + (3𝐹𝑏3 + 6𝐹𝑏2𝑐)𝑁2 + 𝐴0𝑁 + 𝐴1)
 
where  
𝐴0 =  3Fb
3 + 12Fb2c + 12Fbc2 + a2b2 + a2bc 
𝐴1 = Fb
3 + 6Fb2c + 12Fbc2 + 8Fc3 − a2b2 − 3a2bc − 2a2c2. 
Appendix 3 Effect of a change in 𝜸, 𝑭 and 𝒄 
Corruption and social welfare are the main outcomes of interest in chapter one. The main 
components of these variables are 𝛼, 𝑁 and 𝜋. This appendix discusses the effects of changes 
in parameters of the model on these three. 
Remark 2 An increase in 𝛾 (1) reduces the regulator’s payoff, (2) reduces 
the equilibrium industry size and (3) increases the elasticity of the regula-
tor’s reaction function. 
Now we can discuss the sign of the regulator’s first order condition, shown in equation (1.15). 
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑁
= (1 − 𝛾) 𝑐𝑠𝑁
′⏟
+
+ (1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝛾) (𝜋 + 𝑁𝜋𝑁
′ )⏟      
−
 
So, the sign of 𝜕𝐺/𝜕𝑁 depends on the interaction of two effects mentioned above. Note 
that without Assumption 1, the above will definitely result to 𝜕𝐺 𝜕𝑁⁄ > 0, which means that 
there would be no incentive for the regulator to stop issuing more licences as it always results 
to higher outcome for the regulator. Therefore if 𝜖𝜋,𝑁 < 1, there would be no reason for the 
regulator to stop increasing the industry size. Hence, without having Assumption 1 satisfied, 
the regulator has no incentive to stop increasing the industry size. The above shows that the 
regulator will increase number of firms until the point where the weighted marginal effect of 
𝑁 on consumer surplus becomes equal to the weighted effect of 𝑁 on producer surplus. 
Figure 1-17 depicts the change being made in the reaction function due to the change in 𝛾. 
Intuitively, any change in the regulator’s preferences towards his personal welfare rather than 
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social welfare, results to lower competition and fewer firms. An increase in 𝛾 can be inter-
preted as leaning towards a more corruptible regulator. Those policies which empty more 
space for corruptive actions and rent-seeking can be examples of an increase in 𝛾. 
 
Figure 1-17 - Regulator's Reaction Functions for Different Level of Regulator's Selfishness 
By an increase in 𝛾, reaction function shifts to the bottom left. Regulator’s selfishness has 
effects not only on the magnitude of industry size, but also on the slope of the reaction 
function or sensitivity of the regulator to transfer. In other words, a more selfish regulator is 
more sensitive to what the lobby is going to allocate from the profit of each firm to the 
regulator. On the other hand, as shown in Figure 1-17, 𝑁∗ under a less selfish regulator is 
less subject to changes in 𝛼. Intuitively, a more benevolent regulator decides more independ-
ent of what is being transferred to him.  
When the regulator is less selfish, the marginal utility from a given dollar of transfer (or bribe) 
is smaller; so, the lobby has to spend more per unit of protection received. It, therefore, 
hedges by paying slightly more but accepting less protection. For example, suppose that the 
lobby is paying 𝛼0 and receiving protection 𝑁0 < 𝑁1; where 𝑁1 is the number of firms under 
a benevolent regulator. Now suppose 𝛾 decreases marginally. For a given 𝛼0, the new regu-
lator would set a higher 𝑁, and for given 𝑁0 the new regulator would need a higher 𝛼. The 
lobby hedges by accepting marginally higher 𝑁 while offering a marginally higher transfer. 
For low values of 𝛼 all reaction functions with different levels of the regulator’s selfishness 
converge. Intuitively when very low level of transfer is being made, all types of regulator 
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would announce the same level of industry size. The change of the regulator preferences 
towards more personal welfare causes higher changes in 𝑁 only when 𝛼 is not very low25.  
Even when 𝛼 is high, the regulator may not set the industry size at zero. This means that 
transfer is not the only determinant of the industry size. Industry size will only be close to 
zero when other parameters of the model, like the regulator’s level of selfishness, exceeds 
some level. The comparative statics shows that even in case of very high 𝛾, the regulator 
becomes less sensitive to transfers and may determine the industry size, almost, regardless of 
the level of transfer.  
Here are more formal discussion on what was discussed above. 
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝛾
=
𝜕
𝜕𝛾
(𝛾. 𝑝𝑤 + (1 − 𝛾)(𝑐𝑠 + 𝑝𝑠)) =  𝑇𝑟 − 𝑐𝑠 − 𝑝𝑠 
= −(1 − 𝛼)𝑝𝑠 − 𝑐𝑠 < 0 
Note that as stated earlier, I assume 𝑝𝑤 = 𝑇𝑟 = 𝛼. 𝑝𝑠. The above is subject to change if the 
personal welfare of the regulator does not equal to corruption. The slope of 𝐺(𝑁), which 
was discussed in (1.15), changes as 𝛾 changes. 
𝜕
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝛾
= −𝑐𝑠𝑁
′⏟  
−
− (1 − 𝛼) (𝜋 + 𝑁𝜋𝑁
′ )⏟      
−
< 0 
Also, regulator’s reaction function is concave. Following (1.17) and (1.15), 
𝜕2𝐺
𝜕𝑁2
= (1 − 𝛾) 𝜕2𝑐𝑠/𝜕𝑁2⏟      
−
+ (1 − (1 − 𝛼)𝛾) 𝜕2𝑝𝑠/𝜕𝑁2⏟      
−
  
Since the higher 𝛾 corresponds to lower slope of 𝐺(𝑁) and 𝐺(𝑁) is concave, we can con-
clude that higher 𝛾 relates to lower equilibrium industry size. 
It can be derived from the above that 𝛾 directly affects concavity of the regulator’s objective 
function. That is 
𝜕
𝜕𝛾
𝜕2𝐺
𝜕𝑁2
= −
𝜕2𝑐𝑠
𝜕𝑁2⏟
−
− (1 − 𝛼)
𝜕2𝑝𝑠
𝜕𝑁2⏟
−
> 0 
                                                 
25 In the models of chapter 2 and 3, due to the introduced policies, a change in 𝛾 changes the intercept of 
reaction functions as well as their slope.  
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So, by an increase in 𝛾, the elasticity of the regulator will increase. 
 
Remark 3 An increase in 𝛾 results to (1) an increase in profit of the firm, 
(2) an increase in the lobby’s payoff.  
Assumption 1 guarantees the positive effect of 𝛾 on Lobby’s payoff. So, by having 𝜖𝜋,𝑁 > 1, 
the regulator’s selfishness works in favour of the lobby. In case of the violation of 
Assumption 1, having a more selfish regulator in office may work against the lobby’s benefit. 
Thus, the assumption that makes 𝐿𝛼
′ > 0, assures that the regulator’s selfishness will work 
in favour of the lobby. 
Here are more formal discussion on Remark 3. We know that 
𝜕𝜋∗(𝑞∗)
𝜕𝛾
=
𝜕𝜋∗(𝑞∗)
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝑁
𝜕𝛾
 
Previously we discussed that 𝜕𝑁 𝜕𝛾⁄ < 0 and Appendix 1 shows that 𝜕𝜋∗(𝑞∗) 𝜕𝑁⁄ < 0. So 
𝜕𝜋∗(𝑞∗) 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0. Note that the regulator’s reaction function will be plugged into the lobby’s 
function to find the equilibrium 𝛼∗. 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝛾
=
𝜕
𝜕𝛾
(1 − 𝛼)𝑁(𝛼, 𝛾)𝜋(𝑁(𝛼, 𝛾)) 
Using envelope theorem  
𝜕𝐿∗
𝜕𝛾
= (1 − 𝛼∗)𝑁𝛾
∗′
⏟
−
(𝜋∗ + 𝑁∗𝜋𝑁
∗′)⏟        
−
> 0. 
 
Intuitively for low levels of marginal cost, firms are expected to be more flexible and in 
control of more resources to allocate to transfers. Therefore, for low levels of marginal cost, 
there might be an increase in transfers, even when a more selfish regulator is in the office.  
Figure 1-18 shows that firms’ profit is increasing in the regulator’s level of selfishness for all 
levels of marginal cost. However, the impact of the regulator’s selfishness is higher when 
marginal cost is low.  
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Figure 1-18 – Profit at Equilibrium vs. Levels of 
Regulator's Selfishness for Different Marginal Costs 
 
Figure 1-19 – Profit at Equilibrium vs. Marginal Cost 
for Different Levels of Regulator's Selfishness 
Generally, the marginal cost has a negative effect on regulator’s payoff. By an increase in 
marginal cost from a low value, the regulator’s reaction function first shifts upward. Any 
further increase in marginal cost causes the regulator’s reaction function to be shifted down-
ward. All these show that equilibrium industry size is not monotonic in marginal cost. This 
is something specific to our settings in this model and holds even in the first best. Equation 
(1.26) in Appendix 5 shows the condition for a marginal cost that makes the equilibrium 
industry size decreasing in 𝑐. Figure 1-5 shows how regulator’s payoff reacts to a change in 
marginal cost. Any increase in marginal cost reduces the regulator’s payoff, but the effect on 
maximising level of 𝑁 depends on the level of marginal cost. 
 
Figure 1-20 - Effect of a change in Marginal Cost on Regulator's Utility 
𝑁 
𝑁3 𝑁2 𝑁1 
𝐺 
𝑐1 < 𝑐2 < 𝑐3 𝑐1 𝑐2 𝑐3 
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The fact that an increase in marginal cost causes the regulator to first choose a higher industry 
size and then a lower one, is specific to the settings of the models, namely the cost function. 
But introducing the regulator’s selfishness may change the effect of marginal cost on reaction 
function. Figure 1-21 and Figure 1-22 show how differently the effect of marginal cost is on 
regulator’s reaction function for different levels of the regulator’s selfishness. Given a range 
of low values for the regulator’s level of selfishness, i.e. among relatively more benevolent 
regulators, more benevolent regulator is in the office, like in Figure 1-21, the lobby can pre-
dict that for any transfer made from the lobby, the regulator is going to determine lower 
levels of industry size. However, given a range of high values of the regulator’s selfishness, 
or among relatively more selfish regulators, in the case of a selfish regulator, like in Figure 
1-22, the lobby sees that the regulator will respond to transfers differently. The intersection 
of the two regulator’s reaction functions for 𝑐 = 5 and 𝑐 = 15 expresses the effect of trans-
fer on regulator’s reaction.  
 
Figure 1-21 - Regulator's Reaction Function for 
Different Levels of Marginal Cost, Case of a relati 
vely less selfish regulator (γ=0.3). 
 
Figure 1-22 - Regulator's Reaction Function for 
Different Levels of Marginal Cost, Case of a rela-
tively more selfish regulator (γ=0.9). 
Having said the effect of regulator’s selfishness on his reaction function, now the lobby 
knows that to convince a less selfish regulator, a higher transfer must be made. Hence, the 
lobby’s behaviour as the leader of the game should be investigated more carefully.  
Remark 4 An increase in 𝛾 leads to a decrease in equilibrium transfer. 
Equilibrium individual transfer (𝛼∗) is higher for low levels of 𝛾 and 𝑐. As 
𝛾 and 𝑐 increase, equilibrium transfer becomes lower. 
This means that the lobby determines a higher fraction of profit to be transferred to the 
regulator when the regulator is relatively more benevolent. In other words, the lobby might 
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find it beneficial for its members to increase the share of the regulator from their profit only 
if the marginal cost is low.  
 
Figure 1-23 - Transfers versus Regulator's Selfishness for c=7, c=10 and c=25 
Figure 1-23 compares transfers versus regulator’s selfishness for three levels of marginal cost. 
For low levels of regulator’s selfishness, transfers would be higher for the case with a higher 
marginal cost. The lobby transfers less in those economies with more selfish regulators. As 
the lobby faces more selfish regulator it would transfer less. But the decrease in transfer for 
the case of the high marginal cost is bigger than the decrease in the case of low marginal cost. 
The following summarises the relation of 𝛼∗ and 𝑐 for different levels of 𝛾.  
Remark 5 An increase in 𝑐 leads to an increase or a decrease in equilib-
rium transfer depending on the level of the regulator’s selfishness; for low 
levels of 𝛾 and 𝑐, equilibrium transfer is non-monotonically increasing in 
𝛾 but as either 𝛾 or 𝑐 increases, equilibrium transfer becomes monoton-
ically decreasing. 
The question is how the level of selfishness changes the relationship of transfers and marginal 
cost from increasing to decreasing. Figure 1-17 shows that we know that the regulator’s re-
action function is less elastic for lower 𝛾’s; i.e., a less selfish regulator is less sensitive to 
transfers compared to a selfish one. So, the lobby knows that for a less selfish regulator, a 
higher transfer is needed to keep the same number of industry size. So, for the case in which 
a less selfish regulator is in office, even higher marginal cost may not prevent the lobby from 
allocating a higher fraction of their profit to transfers. Provided that the lobby is equipped 
with adequate resources, it would have continued to increase transfers to the regulator. The 
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empirical investigation of Clarke and Xu (2004) confirms that ‘enterprises that are more 
profitable are more likely to pay bribes and pay higher bribes than less profitable enterprises’.  
Figure 1-24 - Transfers versus Marginal Cost for Different Levels of the Regulator’s Level of Selfishness 
When 𝑐 is fixed, 𝜋 and 𝑝𝑠 increases as 𝛾 increases, which means that the lobby is doing the 
right thing to protect itself. Intuitively, when the regulator is more selfish, it becomes easier 
for the lobby to convince him. So, it takes fewer resources from the lobby. In other words, 
a higher fraction of the profit would be needed to convince a more benevolent regulator. 
Therefore, we see a decrease in transfer because even by a decrease in transfer the profit and 
producer surplus are protected. 
The benchmark lets us compare some numbers here. In the benchmark when 𝑐 = 10 we 
have 𝑁𝑒 = 8.17. There would be no transfer in our first best. Then for 𝛾 = 0.35, the lobby 
chooses transfers around 𝛼∗ = 0.29. For a more selfish regulator (𝛾 = 0.95) the lobby 
chooses 𝛼∗ = 0.08. As discussed earlier this means that a more selfish regulator can be con-
vinced with a lower share of profit. By fixing 𝛾 at around 0.35, the lobby would react to an 
increase in marginal cost by increasing the transfer from around 0.29 to 0.32. For a more 
selfish regulator (𝛾 = 0.95), transfers are decreasing in 𝑐. The lobby reacts to an increase in 
marginal cost by changing the share of the regulator (transfers) from around 0.09 to around 
0.08.  
Remark 6 An increase in 𝑐 leads to an increase or a decrease in equilib-
rium industry size depending on parameters of the model and level of reg-
ulator’s selfishness. Assuming all other parameters constant, for higher 
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values of 𝑐, an increase in 𝛾 makes 𝑁∗ to be increasing for a wider range 
of 𝑐. 
 
Figure 1-25 - Industry Size versus Marginal Cost for Different Levels of the Regulator’s Level of Selfishness 
By an increase in the marginal cost, the regulator would first determine the higher industry 
size and then he would decrease it. The same relation between industry size and 𝑐 holds in 
the first best. Appendix 5 discusses the condition under which the industry size is increasing 
in 𝑐 in the first best. Like the same way we analysed the effect of 𝑁 on the regulator in (1.16), 
we can show that the effect of a change in marginal cost depends on how marginal cost can 
affect consumer surplus and producer surplus. A range of marginal cost causes more changes 
in consumer surplus rather than producer surplus. For this range of marginal cost, the equi-
librium industry size is increasing in marginal cost. On the other hand, there is a range of 
marginal cost that affects producer surplus more than consumer surplus. The equilibrium 
industry size is decreasing in that range of marginal cost.  
Non-monotonicity of industry size in the marginal cost is due to the model, and namely, the 
cost function. However, having variation in the regulator’s selfishness, reduces the level of 
sensitivity of the equilibrium industry size to the regulator’s level of selfishness. Also, for 
higher levels of the regulator’s selfishness, the industry size is increasing for a bigger range 
of marginal cost. Figure 1-25 shows that the maximising level of marginal cost shifts to the 
right as the economy experiences a more selfish regulator. It can be seen by the fact that 
𝑐1̅ < 𝑐2̅ < 𝑐3̅ where 𝛾1 < 𝛾2 < 𝛾3. Figure 1-25 also suggests that by an increase in marginal 
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cost, industry size becomes flatter in 𝛾. This means that industry size is more sensitive to the 
regulator’s level of selfishness for lower levels of marginal cost. The policy implication of 
this finding is that in those economies with costly technologies, industry size is less subject 
to changes in the regulator’s level of selfishness. Hence, competition-wise, policymakers 
should be less worried about changes in the regulator’s selfishness when firms employ high 
cost technologies. Therefore, fighting with corruptible individuals may not make significant 
effect.  
There are ranges of marginal cost and regulator’s selfishness at which an increase in compe-
tition accompanies with higher transfer. Figure 1-24 and Figure 1-25 show such a situation. 
For instance, when 𝛾 = 0.45, which is considered as a relatively benevolent regulator, an 
increase in marginal cost, ends to a higher level of transfer and also higher level of industry 
size. Note that here it is the individual transfer, 𝛼∗, is being investigated, not total transfer or 
corruption. The effect on corruption will be discussed in the following section. This section 
aims to show that, having a relatively benevolent regulator is a trigger for the lobby to in-
crease the fraction of their profit to share with the regulator, even when the cost of produc-
tion increases. 
  
Appendix 4 Robusness check; Investigating Scale-Neutral Corruption and 
Economics Social Welfare 
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Figure 1-26 - Social Welfare net of Transfer (𝑠𝑤𝑎
∗) 
vs. the Regulator's Levels of the Regulator's Selfish-
ness for different Marginal Cost  
 
 
Figure 1-28 - Social Welfare net of Transfer (𝑠𝑤𝑎
∗) 
vs. the Regulator's Level od Selfishness for D iffer-
ent Levels of Marginal Cost 
 
Figure 1-29 – Scale-neutral Corruption vs. the Reg-
ulator's Level of Selfishness for Different Levels of 
Fixed Cost 
 
Appendix 5 The number of firms under the first best and long-run perfect 
competition.  
First best- Number of firms under unregulated entry, is given in (1.22). To have 𝛿𝑁𝑒/𝛿𝑐 <
0 we must have 
𝜕𝑁𝑒
𝜕𝑐
=
−(4𝐹 √𝑏 + 𝑐 − 𝑎√𝐹)
2𝐹𝑏√𝑏 + 𝑐
≤ 0, 
Figure 1-27 – Scale-neutral corruption vs. Mar-
ginal Cost for Different Levels of Regulator's 
Selfishness 
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or 
 𝑐 >
𝑎2
16𝐹
− 𝑏 
(1.25)  
If 𝑐 violates the condition above, number of firms in the first best would be increasing in 
marginal cost. It is easy to show that 𝜕2𝑁𝑒/𝜕𝑐
2 < 0 which means that 𝑁𝑒 is concave in 𝑐. 
 
Long-run perfect competition - One can take perfect competition in the long-run as the 
first best. In long-run only firms that can produce at break-even point can survive in the 
market. The break-even point for each firm in long-run is where 𝑀𝐶 = 𝐴𝐶. The level of 
output each firm can produce at break-even point is 𝑞𝑙𝑝𝑐
∗ = √𝐹/𝑐. In a competitive market 
the equilibrium price is determined by 𝑝 = 𝑀𝐶. So, we will have 𝑝𝑙𝑝𝑐
∗ = 2√𝑐. 𝐹. Market 
demand at this price will be determined as 𝑄𝑙𝑝𝑐
∗ = (𝑎 − 2√𝑐. 𝐹) 𝑏⁄ . 
The industry must be able to produce the quantity demanded. Each firm produces only  
𝑞𝑙𝑝𝑐
∗  so the optimum number of firms is  
𝑁𝑙𝑝𝑐
∗ =
𝑄𝑙𝑝𝑐
∗
𝑞𝑙𝑝𝑐
∗ =
𝑎√𝑐 − 2𝑐√𝐹
𝑏√𝐹
. 
To have 𝛿𝑁𝑙𝑝𝑐
∗ /𝛿𝑐 < 0 we must have 
𝜕𝑁𝑙𝑝𝑐
∗
𝜕𝑐
=
𝑎 − 4√𝑐𝐹
2𝑏√𝑐𝐹
≤ 0, 
or 
 𝑐 > 𝑎2 16𝐹⁄  (1.26)  
This means that when 𝑐 violates this condition, number of firms would be increasing in 
marginal cost. Second derivative is 
𝜕2𝑁𝑙𝑝𝑐
∗
𝜕𝑐2
=
−𝑎
4𝑏𝑐√𝑐𝐹
 
which is always negative, meaning that, for sure, 𝑁𝑙𝑝𝑐
∗  is concave in 𝑐. So as 𝑐 increases we 
would have only a decreasing relationship between equilibrium industry size and marginal 
cost. So, the increasing and concave relationship of industry size and marginal cost holds in 
the first best too.  
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It can easily be proved that in the first-best, equilibrium industry size is always decreasing 
and convex in the fixed cost of production. In is shown in other sections that this relation is 
in place even in the model under the lobby-regulator game.  
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CHAPTER 2  
THE IMPACTS OF INVESTMENTS IN DEREGULATION AND 
DETERRENCE POLICIES ON CORRUPTION AND SOCIAL 
WELFARE 
Abstract 
In this model, firms collude in a lobby and play a game in which the lobby transfers some money to a potentially 
selfish regulator to convince him to keep the industry size in their favour. In a comparative static analysis 
involving different levels of the regulator’s selfishness, I find that a more selfish regulator might induce lower 
levels of corruption. The model introduces the probability of apprehension which can punish both the regulator 
and the lobby for bribery. The model investigates the effect of implementing two policies: enhancing detection 
technology and deregulation. The results suggest that enhancing the detection technology may not necessarily 
decrease corruption. The effect of the detection technology on corruption might be different for different levels 
of the regulator’s selfishness. In addition, deregulation which reduces the fixed cost of production by cutting 
bureaucratic costs, may only lead to an increase in social welfare and a decrease in corruption for some certain 
ranges of the parameters of the model, namely the regulator’s selfishness. 
INTRODUCTION 
Any transition from a planned and centralised economy requires a shift from a highly con-
centrated industrial structure. Emerging economies usually lack institutions that foster entre-
preneurship (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2008) and mostly exist side by side with weak political 
institutions such as party system or independent media (Estrin et al., 2009). A centralised and 
planned economy is accompanied usually by highly regulated markets in which there are too 
many bureaucratic obstacles to being economically active. In this framework with high in-
tensity of bureaucratic barriers, the economic players try to convince political authorities to 
work in their favour. In addition, the regulators and policymakers, while cautious not to lose 
their position, want to deploy their in-hand political rents by using their position to gain 
unofficial and personal gains. This can be done, for instance, by demanding some side pay-
ments or charging higher than socially optimum prices for bureaucratic works and required 
licences. Therefore, there would be the demand of bribe from the regulators which will be 
satisfied by the supply of bribe from the economic players who have to bear some costs in 
terms of money or time to satisfy all the bureaucratic requirements. In other words, economic 
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players try to capture the state by transferring money to the regulators to convince them to 
work in their favour. Therefore, especially in transition economies, we are faced with highly 
regulated markets and corruptive relations between businesses and policymakers. Usually, 
the cure is seen in enhancing ‘doing-business’ indicators as basic requirements to guarantee 
competition and market initiations, which support innovation and growth (Djankov, 2009). 
The model presented in chapter two can be regarded as the first step to follow Jain's (2001, 
p. 102) recommendation on comparing ‘marginal utilities of efforts to fight corruption versus 
reduction in the role of industrial policies’. Which one is more effective: reduction of the 
government’s role in the economy or implementing anti-corruption activities? This question 
is of direct policy relevance for transition econonimies. As Jain (2001) points out, such a 
question becomes very useful when it comes to elements of government policies like privat-
isation. The framework presented in this chapter will help us to tackle this important question 
of Jain in more detail in the next chapter.  
Chapter two provides a theoretical setting for investigating social welfare and corruption in 
a partial equilibrium model which is affected highly by the regulator of a market and active 
firms in that market. In the framework provided, the firms collude in an association which 
later forms the lobby by collecting membership fees from joining firms. On the other hand, 
the regulator, who is of second importance in the hierarchy of the government, maximises 
his objective function, which is the weighted average of his personal welfare and social wel-
fare. The regulator chooses the industry size based on the amount of money he receives from 
the lobby. Therefore, there is a game between the regulator and the lobby. The lobby decides 
on the amount of money to transfer to the regulator based on its cost-benefit calculations 
linked to the lobby’s net profits. The model hypothesizes that these benefits and costs differ 
across industries and across countries, based on (1) the regulator’s characters and (2) quality of 
governance, among other factors.  
Due to weak institutions in transition economies, policymakers tend to implement some in-
stitutional reforms to improve the good governance indicators. Good governance is one of 
the basic requirements for sustained economic development. There is no strong consensus 
on a single definition of governance in the literature. This chapter adopts the definition pro-
vided by Kaufmann and Kraay (2007, p. 6): 
the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the gov-
ernment to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and 
the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them’. 
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As discussed by (Kaufmann and Kraay, 2007), with regards to the scope of the governance, 
and according to the fact that many aspects of governance are not observable easily, it is not 
possible to provide only one indicator. Therefore, it can be portrayed only through a combi-
nation of indicators which can encompass all dimensions of governance. The latest version 
of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) research, provides six dimensions of gov-
ernance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption 
(Kaufmann et al., 2009). 
This chapter focuses on two indicators of the quality of governance: state of bureaucratic 
process (or deregulation) and the probability of apprehension. These two deal with the last 
three dimensions in the WGI. Regulatory Quality captures ‘perceptions of the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and pro-
mote private sector development’. It will be discussed in the following sections that the com-
ponents of Regulatory Quality deal with administrative quality and bureaucratic processes. 
Hence, a higher indicator of Regulatory Quality reduces the fixed cost for the firms. 
Rule of law dimension in the WGI captures ‘perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract en-
forcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence’. Finally, the Control of Corruption dimension of the WGI captures ‘perceptions of 
the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand 
forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests’. Both of 
these two dimensions increase the probability of apprehension and therefore reduce any 
wrongdoings by the players of the game. These will be discussed in more details in the fol-
lowing sections.  
The main contribution of this chapter is to investigate the effects of deterrence or anti-corrup-
tion policies and deregulation as two potential policy instruments on social welfare and corruption 
along with distinguishing the different types of regulators according to their preference to-
wards personal welfare as opposed to social welfare. Both of these two policy instruments, 
anti-corruption and deregulation policies, were mentioned as policy tools to fight corruption 
in the study of Clarke and Xu (2004) in which they combine firm-level data in 21 countries 
in the infrastructure sector. Their study investigates how the different characteristics of firms 
can affect bribery. They add as a general finding that the tool to fight corruption is to change 
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the incentives of bribe-takers through market-friendly policies like utility privatisation and 
increased competition.  
Corruption in this chapter, like in chapter 1, is measured by the fraction of producer surplus 
that is appropriated in the form of bribe or transfer by the regulator. Having said that, cor-
ruption is seen as dead-weight-loss to society. Following Caselli and Gennaioli (2008), what 
is meant by deregulation is a policy which ‘eliminates unnecessary setup costs, chiefly by reduc-
ing the number of licenses needed to open a business, the number of agencies involved in 
issuing such licenses, and the quantity of paperwork to be produced’. These would be re-
flected mainly in the fixed cost of production. Generally, the main theme of market reforms 
such as privatisation and deregulation is ‘improving economic efficiency by reducing the role 
of the state and increasing the degree of private sector competition’ (Bjorvatn and Søreide, 
2005). Without taking such an approach, privatisation might be deviated from its main goals 
as in the case of Iran (Nili, 2015). 
The model examines the comparative statics of the changes in reform policies under two 
different cases for the tax on firms. In the first case, no tax is assumed to be imposed on 
firms. This exercise is to see the behaviour of social welfare and corruption in a simpler case 
which potentially can enable us to conclude more general results. In the second case, the cost 
of implementing deregulation is assumed to be financed through a tax on firms. Therefore, 
in the second case, the tax is assumed to be endogenous and equal to the cost of implement-
ing deregulation. In both cases, the regulator’s level of selfishness plays a significant role in 
the effect of a change in the quality of the bureaucratic process on which corruption depends. 
Considering even a very low level of selfishness in the regulator deviates social welfare from 
the first best outcome under the completely benevolent regulator who prescribes unregulated 
entry. 
In addition, given the case of costless deregulation or zero tax, this chapter shows that by 
defining the policy space in a continuous range, deregulation policies may not necessarily 
reduce corruption. An improvement in the state of the bureaucratic process can be a trigger 
for higher or lower corruption depending on the type of the regulator who is ruling the office. 
Djankov et al. (2002) find that regulation is associated generally with higher corruption. It 
might be concluded from their findings that deregulation may always reduce corruption. In 
other words, this chapter shows that by considering the regulator’s level of selfishness, we 
might encounter with a case in which by implementing deregulation, the economy suffers 
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from higher level of corruption. The model shows cases where we may not see the negative 
correlation of corruption and competition as presented, for example, in  Emerson (2006).  
The model shows that when the amount of tax is determined endogenously, for a case with 
a very selfish regulator, deregulation may not change corruption a lot. This implies that when 
a more benevolent regulator is in the office, corruption is more sensitive to changes of de-
regulation. In addition, in the case of an extremely selfish regulator, corruption turns out to 
be much lower than corruption under a less selfish regulator. 
In the case of no tax, depending on parameters of the model, an increase in the state of the 
bureaucratic process does not necessarily increase social welfare.  
In the second case, where tax in determined endogenously, the model shows that in a sector 
or in an economy where a more selfish regulator rules the office, lower investment in dereg-
ulation maximises the social welfare. That means that depending on the regulator’s level of 
selfishness, an economy may need different levels of deregulation to maximise the social 
welfare. Between two cases with different levels of the regulator’s selfishness, the one with a 
more selfish regulator needs a lower level of deregulation to maximise the social welfare.  
Moreover, the results of the model show a non-monotonic relation between social welfare 
and deregulation. In other words, there are conditions under which deregulation may reduce 
social welfare.  
In addition, this chapter shows that depending on the parameters of the model we might end 
up in a situation that while following some of the reform policies ends to higher social wel-
fare, it causes simultaneously higher corruption as well. In the literature, this is known as 
‘grease-the-wheels’ effect. Early analysis of ‘grease-the-wheels’ appeared in Leff (1964), Leys 
(1965) and Huntington (1968) and express the argument that small side payments to officials 
can increase economic growth through speeding up bureaucratic processes. Dreher and Gas-
sebner (2011) find empirical evidences in support of ‘grease-the-wheels’ in the analysis of 43 
countries over the 2003–2005 period, in which corruption facilitates firm entry into highly 
regulated economies. This model shows that depending on the regulator’s type, implement-
ing deregulation might end to ‘grease-the-wheels’ effect or its opposite, ‘sand-in-the-wheels’ 
effect. The former refers to the case where by an improvement in the state of bureaucracy, 
social welfare and corruption simultaneously increase while the latter show simultaneous re-
duction in both. 
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Regarding the probability of apprehension, intuitively, it is expected to have lower corruption 
when probability of apprehension is higher. However, the results of the model show that 
only by assuming a relatively benevolent regulator in the office we may have decreasing cor-
ruption in the probability of apprehension. In other words, in sectors or economies with a 
relatively selfish regulator, increasing the probability of apprehension may not necessarily 
decrease corruption. This can be interpreted in line with the finding of Mookherjee and Png 
(1995) where in certain conditions, an increase in the penalty on the inspector for corruption 
may raise the corruption.  
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 2.1  introduces the model. Section 2.2  dis-
cusses the policy effects and results of the model. As was mentioned earlier, this chapter 
investigates the model under two different cases. Under the first case, there is no tax burden 
on firms. Under this assumption, the comparative statics of the model is investigated for 
changes in the regulator’s level of selfishness and deregulation status in section 2.2  . In the 
second case, the tax is assumed to be endogenous and equal to the cost of implementing the 
deregulation, which will be presented in section 2.3  . Comparative statics in the level of 
selfishness, deregulation status and the probability of apprehension is investigated in this 
sub-section. The conclusion which highlights some policy implications of the model is the 
last part of the chapter.  
2.1  MODEL 
The structure of the model is the same as in chapter 1. This is a regulatory capture model in 
which the association, tries to convince the regulator not to issue too many licences. The 
association does this by transferring some money to the regulator. Then the regulator deter-
mines the number of licences and, hence, the industry size.  
This model incorporates two new state variables: (1) state of deregulation or bureaucratic 
process and (2) probability of apprehension. The first one shows the state of the economy 
or sector in terms of the deregulation policies which are being implemented to reduce the 
fixed costs of the industry. The second one, the probability of apprehension shows how 
good the detection technology is in the market to apprehend wrongdoers. This probability 
is the same for both the regulator and the lobby. Both of these variables will be discussed in 
details in the following sections.  
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Given the state variables of deregulation and probability of apprehension, the timeline of the 
game which is the same as chapter one.  
In order to derive the subgame perfect equilibrium, the game should be solved using back-
ward induction. To find the equilibrium, we go backwards from the third stage. As was pre-
viously discussed in chapter one, the model cannot be solved analytically and hence I used 
the numerical simulation to see how the model works.  
2.1.1  Firms 
There are 𝑁 firms in the economy, where 𝑁 will be determined by the regulator. All firms 
compete in Cournot fashion. The inverse demand function is the same as (1.1) in chapter 1 
but the cost function is different. Cost function is identical to all firms and has the form of 
 𝐶𝑖 = 𝑐𝑞𝑖
2 +
𝑓
(1 + 𝑦)
+ 𝜏 
(2.1)  
in which 𝑞𝑖 is the quantity produced by firm 𝑖, and 𝑐 is the main component of marginal 
cost. The term 𝐹 = 𝑓 (𝑦 + 1)⁄  represents entry costs where 𝑓 is the sum of both natural 
costs and the costs of red tape and 𝑦 is the investment in deregulation. 
The amount of money spent by the government to improve the institutional framework and 
to reduce the transaction cost is represented by 𝑦. Since fixed cost includes set-up cost and 
lobbying expenses, one can take 𝑦 as the state of bureaucratic process or the amount of investment 
in deregulation by the government. The former is used when it is given and the latter refers to 
cases where 𝑦 is a policy instrument of the government which would be determined endog-
enously. Hence, hereafter 𝑦 would be used interchangeably as ‘the state of bureaucratic pro-
cess’ or ‘deregulation’. As mentioned earlier in the preceding sections, ‘Regulatory Quality’ is 
one of the ingredients incorporated in the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) by the 
World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2009). To narrow down what is meant by 𝑦, Appendix 1 
provides the full lists of variables used in the WGI to portray the ‘regulatory quality’ aspect 
of governance.  
Finally 𝜏 is the tax that each firm must pay to the government. To make the model simpler, 
it is assumed that deregulation is the only expenditure of the government. In other words, 
the probability of apprehension is out of the government’s control. Chapter 3 takes the 
model one step further and assumes that probability of apprehension is determined by in-
vestment on deterrence. 
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To have a full picture of the outcomes of the model, the model will be examined in two 
different scenarios: (1) when 𝜏 = 0; and (2) when 𝜏 > 0 where the cost of implementing 
deregulation would be financed endogenously through imposing tax to cover the expenses 
of implementing 𝑦, or formally when 𝜏 = 𝑦/𝑁.  
The equilibrium quantity and equilibrium price would be exactly the same as in chapter one. 
Profit at equilibrium turns out to be  
 
𝜋∗ =
1
(𝑁𝑏 + 𝑏 + 2𝑐)2(1 + 𝑦)𝑁
(−𝑏2𝑓𝑁3
+ (𝑏2𝑦2 + 2𝑓𝑏2 + 4𝑓𝑏𝑐 + 𝑏2𝑦)𝑁2
+ (−𝑎2𝑏𝑦 − 𝑎2𝑐𝑦 + 2𝑏2𝑦2 + 4𝑏𝑐𝑦2
+ 𝑓𝑏2 + 4𝑓𝑏𝑐 + 4𝑓𝑐2 − 𝑎2𝑏 − 𝑎2𝑐
+ 2𝑏2𝑦 + 4𝑏𝑐𝑦)𝑁 + 𝑏2𝑦2 + 4𝑏𝑐𝑦2
+ 4𝑐2𝑦2 + 𝑏2𝑦 + 4𝑏𝑐𝑦 + 4𝑐2𝑦),
𝜕𝜋∗/𝜕𝑁 < 0 
(2.2)   
Equilibrium profit shows the existence of ‘business-stealing’ effect: more entry to the market 
reduces the profit gained by each firm.   
2.1.2  The Regulator 
In the second stage of the game, given the amount of transfers from the lobby, the regulator 
determines the number of licences and, hence, the industry size. The regulator’s objective 
function is the same as in chapter 1, except that according to the probability of apprehension, 
the regulator’s personal welfare is at the risk of being confiscated.  
This model introduces detection technology through which the regulator might be caught 
and be punished by some probability. The regulator’s objective function is hence as follows 
 max
N
𝐺 = (1 − 𝜂). 𝛾. 𝑇𝑟 + (1 − 𝛾). [𝑐𝑠 + 𝑝𝑠] (2.3)  
 𝑁
∗ = argmax
𝑁
𝐺 (2.4)  
Here 𝜂 ∈ [0,1] is defined as probability of apprehension or probability of detection. In case 
of being caught, only the personal welfare of the regulator will be confiscated. As  Hoff and 
Stiglitz (2008) mention, taking transfers is like getting ‘blood on one’s hands’. It makes the 
regulator vulnerable to a loss in case of being caught. I make the minimalist assumption that 
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only the personal welfare of the regulator is vulnerable to recapture.26 Probability of appre-
hension can be regarded as an indicator for one of the dimensions of the quality of govern-
ance. As was explained earlier, ‘control of corruption’ and ‘rule of law’ are two of the ingre-
dients of the WGI by the World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 2009). For further details of the 
variables, see Appendix 2 and Appendix 3. It should be noted that since bribery is an illegal 
act, the quality of rule of law would be important too.  
As was in chapter 1, the different types of the regulator are introduced by 𝛾. As 𝛾 goes up, 
the regulator cares more about his personal welfare. Therefore, a higher 𝛾 represents a higher 
level of selfishness.  
2.1.3  The Lobby 
The lobby, which would be built upon an association, is the other player of the game given 
the outcome of the Cournot competition among firms and the number of licences issued by 
the regulator. The lobby’s goal is to avoid the outcome of unregulated entry. The basic set-
tings and definitions are exactly the same as in chapter 1. Therefore, the index of corruption 
and scale-neutral corruption are the same as the definitions given in chapter 1 presented in 
(1.10) and (1.12).  
To see the effect of the rule of law, the model assumes that, similar to the regulator, due to 
illegal transfers the lobby might get caught as well with the same detection technology. In 
case the lobby is caught by probability 𝜂, the lobby will be punished but the extent of the 
punishment depends on the government’s punishment power, represented by 𝜙. So, just a 
fraction (𝜙) of the lobby’s payoff would be confiscated. In case of not being caught, the 
lobby would earn producer surplus net of the transfer. Therefore, the lobby’s objective func-
tion is to maximise the expected outcome in the two mentioned cases by choosing transfer. 
 max
α
𝐿 = (1 − 𝜂𝜙)(1 − 𝛼)𝑁𝜋𝑖 (2.5)  
The lobby’s welfare has been reflected in (1 − 𝛼)𝑁𝜋 in Equation (2.5) as was in the lobby’s 
objective function in chapter 1. Generally, this equation is the same as the one in chapter 
one except that the lobby will be punished partially (𝜙), in case of being caught (𝜂). The fact 
                                                 
26 This model is static. However, in case of a dynamic one, like Hoff and Stiglitz (2008) we can assume that 
only personal welfare of the current period is subject to recapture and any gained personal welfare in earlier 
periods, are ‘grandfathered’ – time had gained them legitimacy. 
 
 
76 
 
that probability of apprehension may endanger the payoff of the lobby can potentially en-
hance resistance to legal reform. The detection technology goes against the interest of the 
lobby. In case of being caught, the lobby loses members or resources.  
2.1.4  Equilibrium 
The regulator determines the number of firms following the first order condition for (2.3) 
which is based on his personal welfare and social welfare. We can define the ratio of marginal 
effects of industry size on personal welfare and social welfare, marginal propensity of an 
additional license. The regulator will stop changing the industry size when the marginal pro-
pensity of an additional licence becomes equal to a ratio which depends on 𝛾 and 𝜂. 
 −
𝑇𝑟𝑁
′
𝑠𝑤𝑁
′ =
(1 − 𝛾)
(1 − 𝜂). 𝛾
 
(2.6)  
The decision of the regulator can be analysed either based on (2.6) using personal welfare 
and social welfare or in terms of consumer surplus and producer surplus. Since personal 
welfare is a fraction of producer surplus, then the problem can be explained in light of the 
net impact on consumer surplus and producer surplus. Combining (2.3) and (1.10) we will 
have 
 max
𝑁
𝐺 = (1 − 𝜂). 𝛾. 𝛼. 𝑝𝑠 + (1 − 𝛾). 𝑐𝑠 + (1 − 𝛾). 𝑝𝑠  
And then 
 max
N
𝐺 = (1 − 𝛾). 𝑐𝑠 + (1 − (1 − 𝛼(1 − 𝜂))𝛾)𝑝𝑠. (2.7)  
Following the first order condition for the regulator we have 
 𝐺𝑁
′ = (1 − 𝛾)𝑐𝑠𝑁
′ + (1 − (1 − 𝛼(1 − 𝜂))𝛾)𝑝𝑠𝑁
′ = 0 (2.8)  
and hence 
 −
𝑐𝑠𝑁
′
𝑝𝑠𝑁
′ = 1 +
𝛼𝛾(1 − 𝜂)
1 − 𝛾
. 
(2.9)  
Both (2.6) and (2.9) show where the regulator would stop changing his choice of industry 
size. 
By solving (2.8) for 𝑁, we can get the regulator’s reaction as a function of 𝛼.  
 𝑁𝑟 = 𝑁𝑟(𝛼), 𝜕𝑁𝑟/𝜕𝛼 < 0 (2.10)  
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I denote 𝑁 to the lowest level of industry size that the regulator may determine when he 
collects all the profit earned by a typical firm (𝛼 = 1).  
 𝑁  = {𝑁: 𝛼∗(𝑁) = 1}  (2.11)  
By plugging the regulator’s reaction function into the lobby’s function (2.5) and following 
the first order condition we have  
 
Lα
′ = (1 − ηϕ)(−Nπ + (1 − α)Nα
′⏟
−
(π + NπN
′ )⏟      
+/−
) (2.12)  
𝐿𝛼
′  might be zero only if 𝜋 + 𝑁𝜋𝑁
′ > 0 in which the lhs is the elasticity of profit with respect 
to industry size. As in chapter 1, the specification of the model requires to have the following 
assumption satisfied. 
Assumption 1. Evaluated profit at equilibrium quantity is elastic with respect 
to industry size; |ϵπ,N| > 1. 
If Assumption 1 is violated, then we will have 𝐿𝛼
′ < 0, ∀𝛼 and hence the lobby may not see 
transferring in favour of its members.  
2.1.5  The First Best 
As mentioned earlier in the explanation of the cost function, there are markets at which even 
in the long-run, fixed cost exists. Hence, the perfect competition case cannot be reached in 
such markets. I assume that because of specific institutional frameworks, firms always face 
with a fixed cost. Therefore, the first best in this model is when the entry to the market is 
unregulated. In this case, where the regulator is completely benevolent and accepts no bribe 
(𝛾 = 0), entry into the market will be continued until no economic profit remains for firms. 
As was discussed earlier, this is due to the ‘business-stealing effect’. As was shown in (2.2), 
that is where 𝜕𝜋∗/𝜕𝑁 < 0. According to (1.21), 𝑁𝑒 is the industry size at which there would 
be no profit in the market. By plugging the cost function in chapter 2, 𝑁𝑒 turns out to be 
 
 
𝑁𝑒 =
√((1 + 𝑦). (𝑏 + 𝑐). 𝑎2. (𝜏𝑦 + 𝜏 + 𝑓)) − (𝑏 + 2𝑐)(𝜏𝑦 + 𝜏 + 𝑓)
(𝜏𝑦 + 𝜏 + 𝑓)𝑏
 
(2.13)  
Since 𝑦 stands for the state of bureaucratic process, we are interested in the effect of a change 
in 𝑦 on the first best industry size, which from (2.13) turns out to be positive and concave. 
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𝜕𝑁𝑒
𝜕𝑦
=
𝑓(𝑏 + 𝑐)𝑎
2(𝜏𝑦 + 𝜏 + 𝑓)𝑏√((1 + 𝑦)(𝑏 + 𝑐)(𝜏𝑦 + 𝜏 + 𝑓))
> 0,
𝜕2𝑁𝑒
𝜕𝑦2
< 0. 
(2.14)  
Equation (2.14) implies that industry size in the first best is always monotonically increasing 
in deregulation. This will help us to analyse the results in the following sections. By definition, 
in the first best, 𝑝𝑠 = 0. Hence, 𝑠𝑤 = 𝑐𝑠 and therefore  
 
𝜕𝑠𝑤𝑒
𝜕𝑁
=
𝜕𝑐𝑠𝑒
𝜕𝑁
=
((𝑏 + 2𝑐)(𝜏𝑦 + 𝜏 + 𝑓) − 𝑎√(𝜏𝑦 + 𝜏 + 𝑓)(𝑏 + 𝑐)(1 + 𝑦))
2
2(1 + 𝑦)(𝑏 + 𝑐)𝑏(𝜏𝑦 + 𝜏 + 𝑓)
> 0. 
(2.15)  
(2.14) and (2.15) together imply that  
 
𝜕𝑠𝑤𝑒
𝜕𝑦
> 0. 
(2.16)  
(2.16) implies that the net effect of deregulation on social welfare in the first best is positive. 
In an economy with a higher 𝑦, there would be lower bureaucratic costs and, hence, the 
overall costs of a firm are lower. This implies a more efficient industry.  
In the context of the game between the lobby and the regulator, assuming all other parame-
ters fixed, since we know 𝜕𝜋∗ 𝜕𝑁⁄ < 0 and 𝜕𝑁𝑒 𝜕𝑦⁄ > 0, we might end up with the ques-
tion that, up to what extent 𝑦 can be improved? The answer is it can be continued until the 
firms encounter with either no profit or the case at which they share all their profits. There-
fore, as soon as 𝑦 reaches a level that can satisfy either of the above, there will be no incentive 
for the lobby to play the game. 𝑦 denotes that level of deregulation and is defined as the 
following 
 𝑦 = min
𝑦
{[𝑦: 𝑁∗(𝑦) = 𝑁], [𝑦: 𝑁∗(𝑦) = 𝑁𝑒 ]}. (2.17)  
(2.17) defines the minimum of 𝑦 that makes the industry size equal to either 𝑁𝑒 or 𝑁, where 
the former is defined in (1.21) and the latter in (2.11). In the first case no profit remains for 
the firms and in the second one, all of the profits is going to be shared with the regulator. In 
either cases, no incentive remains for the firms to play the game with the regulator. 
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Similar to chapter 1, it should be noted that firms needs to be convinced that forming the 
lobby is in their favour. Therefore, their outcome by forming the lobby should be greater 
than the case of the first best with no lobbying.  
 (1 − 𝜂𝜙)(1 − 𝛼)𝜋(𝑁∗) ≥ 𝜋(𝑁𝑒) 
where 𝑁∗ is the industry size determined under the lobby-regulator game and 𝑁𝑒 is industry 
size under unregulated entry as introduced in (1.22). This requires taking the following as an 
important assumption so that we have the lobby formed.  
Assumption 2. Provided that 𝑦 < 𝑦, to allow firms to form the lobby, func-
tions and parameters of the model will be chosen such that the following con-
dition will be satisfied.  
 
𝜋(𝑁𝑒)
𝜋(𝑁∗)
≤  (1 − 𝜂𝜙)(1 − 𝛼) 
(2.18)  
Assumption 2, which is equivalent to Assumption 2 in chapter 1, says that firms may only 
have the incentive to form the lobby provided that the expected profit after forming the 
lobby is greater than or equal to the profit under the first best number of industry size.  
To find the benchmark value for 𝑦, 𝑁𝑒 would be obtained as a function of 𝑦. Then the 
following can be solved to get the 𝑦 which makes the highest social welfare, given all other 
parameters’ values.  
 𝑦𝑒
∗ = argmax
𝑦
𝑠𝑤(𝑁𝑒(𝑦)) (2.19)  
It will be discussed in the following sections that different forms of tax change 𝑦𝑒
∗ and hence 
𝑁𝑒
∗. In case of no tax, there would be a corner solution for 𝑦𝑒
∗ and hence 𝑁𝑒
∗. However, when 
the tax is assumed to be determined endogenously in the model, there would be an interior 
solution for 𝑦𝑒
∗ and, hence, 𝑁𝑒
∗.  
As explained previously, the model is investigated in two different cases: (1) when 𝜏 = 0, 
and (2) when 𝜏 = 𝑦/𝑁. In the first case, there is no tax burden on firms and 𝑦 is assumed 
to be given to the economy as a gift. In the second case, the cost of implementing 𝑦 will be 
financed through tax on firms. Under these two scenarios, we look for how the economy 
works in terms of social welfare and corruption. 
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2.2   POLICY EFFECTS, COSTLESS DEREGULATION, 𝝉 = 𝟎 
As was explained in chapter one, fixed cost represent both physical costs as well as bureau-
cratic barriers to entry. Therefore, implementing deregulation is meant to decrease the sec-
ond type of fixed cost. From chapter one, it is expected that a decrease in fixed cost ends to 
higher magnitude of corruption. Now the question is whether deregulation may lead to 
higher corruption or not. When, on one hand, it is assumed that the cost of implementation 
of deregulation is going to be reimbursed by firms, then one can expect a non-monotonic 
relation between deregulation and corruption. This is so mainly because for firms to be ben-
efitted from a reform, they must pay for implementation of the reform. What if, by assump-
tion, firms only benefit from implementation of deregulation without being forced to pay 
for it? In the first scenario, it is assumed that 𝜏 = 0. Therefore, the cost function is 𝐶𝑖 =
𝑐𝑞𝑖
2 + 𝑓/(1 + 𝑦), which is of the same format as the cost function in chapter one.27 The 
only difference is that in chapter two, 𝑦 reduces the whole fixed cost term, i.e. 𝐹 = 𝑓/(1 +
𝑦). Therefore, it is expected to see that 𝑦 behaves exactly opposite to the effects of changes 
in 𝐹. From chapter one, it is expected that a decrease in fixed cost ends to a higher magnitude 
of corruption.  
As expected, the model in chapter two shows that corruption and economic indicator of 
social welfare can be non-monotonic in 𝑦. This would be a special case of the model in 
chapter one where deregulation is equivalent to reduction of fixed cost. Depending on the 
regulator’s level of selfishness, we might see different behaviours in 𝑇𝑟. The reason is that 
𝑇𝑟 = 𝛼.𝑁. 𝜋 where 𝛼 and 𝑁 are monotonically increasing in 𝑦 and 𝜋 is monotonically de-
creasing in 𝑦. Therefore, depending on different combinations of 𝑦 and 𝛾, the relation of 𝑇𝑟 
might turn out to be monotonic or non-monotonic.  
It also shows the existence of ‘grease the wheels’ effect. This means that we may have a 
simultaneous increase in both social welfare and corruption upon a decrease in fixed cost. I 
will discuss this effect in more detail in the following sections. 
In the following section I will assume endogenous 𝜏 where firms will pay tax to finance 
implementation of improvements in 𝑦. 
                                                 
27 It should be noted that introduction of 𝜂 and 𝑦 in this model, did not change the effects of technology on 
social welfare and corruption and they are the same as those in chapter one. Therefore, it will not be discussed 
here again. 
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2.3  POLICY EFFECTS, COSTLY DEREGULATION, 𝝉 > 𝟎 
This section assumes that firms know the government is going to impose some tax which is 
mainly to finance implementing deregulation policies to improve the state of bureaucratic 
process. Firms also know that the tax is going to be set equally to all operating firms. There-
fore, it is common knowledge in the economy that each firm has to pay 𝜏, where 
 𝜏 =
𝑦
𝑁⁄  
(2.20)  
and, hence, the cost function changes to  
 𝐶𝑖 = 𝑐𝑞𝑖
2 +
𝑓
(1 + 𝑦)⁄ +
𝑦
𝑁⁄  
(2.21)  
In this section, the comparative statics in 𝑦 will be investigated first. In the previous section 
𝑦 was taken as the state of bureaucratic process in the industry. Now by financing 𝑦 through 
tax, it can be taken as a policy towards higher quality of governance and, hence, higher effi-
ciency in the industry. The model shows that generally, social welfare is non-monotonic in 𝑦 
and, hence, there is an optimum 𝑦 which maximises social welfare. Hence, for further com-
parative statics, 𝑦 will be fixed at that optimum level and then the effect of other parameters 
will be probed.  
2.3.1  Deregulation 
In this section, the effect of deregulation policies, which is reflected in this model by an 
increase in 𝑦, will be investigated as well as the changes in the regulator’s selfishness (𝛾). 
Appendix 4 presents the effects of changes in 𝑦 and 𝛾 on 𝜋∗, 𝑁𝑟 , 𝛼
∗ and 𝑁∗. These four are 
the building blocks of corruption and social welfare. Before investigating the effects on cor-
ruption and social welfare are based on the effects on equilibrium profit (𝜋∗), reaction func-
tion (𝑁𝑟), equilibrium transfer (𝛼
∗) and equilibrium industry size (𝑁∗) which are presented 
in Appendix 4.   
2.3.1.1 Effects of Deregulation on Corruption 
Chapter 1 shows that corruption is non-monotonic in 𝛾. Before further investigation, it can 
be guessed from what were shown previously that corruption will turn out to be non-mon-
otonic in 𝑦 as it is now costly to the firms. The following figures show how corruption (𝑇𝑟∗) 
and scale-neutral corruption (𝑇𝑟𝑅
∗) may behave in response to changes in 𝑦 and 𝛾.  
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Figure 2-1–Corruption vs. Deregulation for Different 
Levels of the Regulator's Selfishness, 
𝑐 = 10, 𝐹 = 20, 𝜂 = 0.1, 𝜙 = 0.1. 
 
Figure 2-2 - Corruption vs. the Regulator's Selfishness 
for Different Levels of Deregulation, 
𝑐 = 10, 𝐹 = 20, 𝜂 = 0.1, 𝜙 = 0.1. 
 
Figure 2-3–Scale-Neutral Corruption vs. Deregulation 
for Different Levels of the Regulator's Selfishness, 𝑐 =
10, 𝐹 = 20, 𝜂 = 0.1, 𝜙 = 0.1. 
 
Figure 2-4 - Scale-Neutral Corruption vs. Levels of the 
Regulator's Selfishness for Different Levels of Deregu-
lation, 𝑐 = 10, 𝐹 = 20, 𝜂 = 0.1, 𝜙 = 0.1 
Chapter one shows that higher competition might be associated with higher corruption. 
Chapter two shows that higher industry size and hence, higher competition can only be ac-
companied by lower corruption, provided that 𝑦 be greater than some specific level, which 
that specific level is highly dependent on 𝛾28. Emerson (2006) provides a theoretical frame-
work as well as empirical evidence at which corruption and competition are negatively cor-
related. My model shows that by letting the regulator’s willingness to utilise his position and 
                                                 
28 Figure 2-19 and Figure 2-1 depict this.  
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gain more personal welfare as a continuous variable defined in a range, then we might see a 
different result from that of Emerson. This model is consistent with Pieroni and d’Agostino 
(2013) where they show that there would be a more complex correlation among competition 
and corruption.   
Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-4 reveal that comparing two sectors or two economies with almost 
the same characteristic but a different type of regulator, the one with the lower level of the 
regulator’s selfishness does not necessarily bring a lower level of corruption. This can happen 
where 𝛾 exceeds some specific level. For example in Figure 2-2, assuming fixed level of 
investment in deregulation, when 𝛾 is greater than 0.8, regardless of the level of investment 
in deregulation, lower level of selfishness accompanies with higher level of corruption. In 
other words, if the regulator’s level of selfishness is greater than some specific value, then 
the economy with a less selfish regulator might experience higher corruption.  
Two outcomes can be witnessed in the Figure 2-1 to Figure 2-4:  
1) Taking 𝛾 fixed, corruption is non-monotonic in deregulation. For relatively low levels of 
𝑦, corruption is increasing in 𝛾. However, as depicted in Figure 2-1 there is a level of 
deregulation at which corruption is at the highest. This shows that one cannot conclude 
from Djankov et al. (2002) that deregulation may always reduce corruption. They find 
correlations between stricter regulation and higher corruption. This model suggests that 
an economy may encounter increasing corruption for lower levels of 𝑦 as more deregu-
lation pursued by the government.  
Maybe the most important policy implication of the non-monotonicity of corruption in 
deregulation is that regardless of the type of the regulator, low levels of deregulation 
always ends in higher corruption. That level of deregulation, which results in the maxi-
mum corruption, increases as 𝛾 increases. Upon reaching to that level of deregulation, 
corruption becomes decreasing until 𝑦 = 𝑦, where 𝑦 is defined in (2.17). For any 𝑦 > 𝑦, 
there is no incentive for firms to participate in the game with the regulator. Remember 
that (𝜕𝑦)/𝜕𝛾 > 0, which means that for an economy with a relatively high level of reg-
ulator’s selfishness, more deregulation is needed to kill the incentives of firms to partici-
pate in the lobby-regulator game. 
 
2) Taking 𝑦 fixed, extreme values for 𝛾 does not necessarily mean higher magnitude of 
corruption. For instance, when 𝛾 = 0.95, it would be expected to have higher corruption 
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compared to any other 𝛾. However, Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-3 show that corruption turns 
out to be much lower than expected. In case 𝛾 = 0.95 it can be even lower than the case 
where 𝛾 = 0.45. Only if 𝑦 > 𝑦 we might have 𝑇𝑟∗(𝛾 = 0.95) < 𝑇𝑟∗(𝛾 < 0.95). To 
see the reason behind this we need to investigate the changes in the magnitude of 𝜋∗, 𝛼∗ 
and 𝑁∗. 
Based on Figure 2-18 and Figure 2-19 in Appendix 4, the effect of a change in 𝛾 is an 
increase in the magnitude of 𝜋∗ and a fall in the magnitude of both 𝛼∗ and 𝑁∗. According 
to these figures, under all other types of the regulator, when 𝑦 is assumed to be fixed, 
the rise in 𝜋∗ seems to outweigh the decline in 𝛼∗ and 𝑁∗, except the case of 𝛾 = 0.95. 
In this case, reduction in 𝛼∗ and 𝑁∗ is bigger than the rise in firms’ profit. This is because 
the extremely selfish regulator cares very little about social welfare and, hence, does not 
change the industry size immensely. The lobby’s respond to that is to decrease the mag-
nitude of transfer (𝛼∗) when 𝛾 is extremely high. Although this ends in a relatively high 
level of 𝜋∗ but the overall effect is that 𝑇𝑟∗(𝛾 = 0.95) is much lower than that of other 
𝛾s. As was mentioned previously, there is only one exception to this and that is where 
𝑦 > 90, where 𝛼 increases sharply and consequently we have 𝑇𝑟∗(𝛾 = 0.95) <
𝑇𝑟∗(𝛾 < 0.95).  
The policy implication of this is that the impact of implementing deregulation varies with 
respect to the type of the regulator. In other words, investing too much in deregulation with-
out taking enough care of the role that the type of the regulator plays, may not bring what a 
policymaker expects in terms of the desired impact on corruption. Therefore, a comprehen-
sive policy design thoroughly considers the effect of the regulator’s type on the outcome of 
the model.   
Scale-neutral corruption shows almost the same relationship with deregulation. This ensures 
that what was discussed as the results of corruption are robust even when we take out the 
role of scales by dividing the corruption index by the revenue of a typical firm. 
For each type of the regulator, an increase in 𝑦 beyond some level may cause the transfer to 
reach its maximum. For relatively more benevolent regulators, a lower level of 𝑦 is needed 
to extract all the profits gained by the firms. Intuitively, a small increase in investment in 
deregulation may attract the attention of the outsiders to enter the market. The incumbents 
know that this increase may not be in their favour. On the other hand, they know that the 
regulator may not be convinced easily. Therefore, in case of a benevolent regulator, the lobby 
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would decide to transfer all its members’ profit should deregulation be increased by a small 
number29. The other cases with higher levels of the regulators selfishness, firms may not be 
encountered with such a situation to be imposed to transfer all the profit gained. This is so 
because other regulators may not reduce industry size lower than some specific number.  
Remark 7 summarizes the effect of deregulation on corruption indicators.  
Remark 7 (1) Corruption is non-monotonic in the regulator’s level of self-
ishness. (2) The level of corruption converges to the same value for dif-
ferent levels of 𝛾 as 𝑦 increases. 
The point of convergence explains that if the policymaker is serious in following deregulation 
policies, he can overcome the role of the regulator’s character. It is worth compare the case 
of no-corruption and full implementation of deregulation. As shown in Figure 2-2 and Figure 
2-4 in almost all cases, corruption turns out to be lower when deregulation is implemented 
fully. Moreover, the figures show that full implementation of deregulation can end to zero 
corruption. This can be another incentive for the policymaker to follow the deregulation in 
its full capacity.  
Remark 7 can be re-stated as the following too. Corruption is non-monotonic in 𝑦; first 
increasing and then decreasing for higher levels of deregulation. Moreover, corruption is 
more sensitive to 𝑦 when a relatively less selfish regulator is in the office.  
It was mentioned in chapter 1 that a change in the level of the regulator’s selfishness should 
not only be interpreted as a change in the regulator’s character. It can be a result of a stricter 
monitoring where the regulator chooses to assign lower weight to his personal welfare.  
Now we are going to assume 𝑦 fixed at its maximising level, which will be discussed shortly 
in the next section. Following investigation is based on this assumption.  
2.3.1.2 Effects of Deregulation on Social Welfare 
Social welfare will be always lower under the lobby-regulator game than in the first best as 
shown in Figure 2-5. In addition, social welfare will be lower under a more selfish regulator. 
Deregulation may help to close the gap between the levels of the first best social welfare and 
that under the lobby-regulator game.  
                                                 
29 This can be seen in Figure 2-14 in Appendix 4 where 𝜋∗ approaches to zero for 𝛾 = 0.45. 
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Figure 2-5 - Social Welfare vs. Deregulation for Dif-
ferent Levels of the Regulator's Selfishness, 
𝑐 = 10, 𝑓 = 20, 𝜂 = 0.1, 𝜙 = 0.1 
 
Figure 2-6 - Social Welfare net of Transfers vs. De-
regulation for Different Levels of the Regulator's 
Selfishness, 𝑐 = 10, 𝑓 = 20, 𝜂 = 0.1, 𝜙 = 0.1 
It is not in favour of the economy as a whole to follow as much deregulation as it can. Figure 
2-5 shows that too much of deregulation can result in a reduction in social welfare. Therefore, 
there exists a critical value 𝑦∗ where 𝑠𝑤 is maximised. The critical value 𝑦∗ solves the fol-
lowing 
 𝑦
∗ = argmax
𝑦
𝑠𝑤. (2.22)  
This is mainly due to the opposite effects that it may cause on consumer surplus and pro-
ducer surplus. Higher levels of deregulation may have a lower impact on industry size and 
hence, on the consumer surplus. So after some level of deregulation, due to concavity of 𝑁∗ 
and hence 𝑐𝑠∗ in 𝑦, for 𝑦 > 𝑦∗, the negative effect of deregulation on producer surplus 
becomes greater than the positive effect of 𝑐𝑠∗ and as a result, 𝑠𝑤∗ becomes decreasing in 
𝑦. This can be interpreted in line with Djankov et al. (2002) who find no association between 
heavier regulation and better quality of private or public goods.  
Based on the costly nature of deregulation in the second scenario, one can predict that social 
welfare would be non-monotonic in 𝑦. In other words, when implementing deregulation has 
some cost which is going to be compensated by a group in the society, then it can be expected 
that after expending more than some specific level on that policy, the corresponding social 
cost becomes greater than the social benefit which causes social welfare to decline.  
When a more selfish regulator is in the office, the whole economy (1) benefits from less 
social welfare, and (2) lower level of deregulation is needed to maximise social welfare. In 
other words, for a more selfish regulator, the critical level of deregulation (𝑦∗) is lower which 
𝑦4
∗ 𝑦1
∗ 
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means that any further increase in deregulation after 𝑦∗ reduces social welfare. Figure 2-5 
shows that for the case where 𝛾 = 0.45, the economy needs an investment of around 𝑦1
∗ =
35 units to narrow dawn the gap of social welfare with the first best case. The required 
investment for the case of 𝛾 = 0.95 is around 20 (𝑦4
∗ = 20). In other words, any investment 
on deregulation more than 20 units decreases social welfare and widens the gap with the 
social welfare under the first best. Even by netting out the amount of transfers, social welfare 
remains non-monotonic in 𝑦 as depicted in Figure 2-6. 
Remark 8 summarize all the effects of deregulation policies on social welfare and show how 
both the accounting definition of social welfare and the economic definition may react ac-
cordingly. 
Remark 8 (1) Both social welfare (𝑠𝑤∗) and social welfare net of transfer 
(𝑠𝑤𝑎
∗) are non-monotonic in 𝑦; first increasing and then decreasing. (2) As 
the regulator’s selfishness (𝛾) increases, social welfare decreases. (3) As the 
regulator’s selfishness (𝛾) increases, lower deregulation (𝑦∗) is needed to 
maximise social welfare. 
In this model, we take the level of deregulation as given. To choose the level of deregulation, 
by looking more carefully into Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-5, we can derive Figure 2-7 in which 
three ranges of 𝑦 can be distinguished: (1) where both 𝑠𝑤∗ and corruption are increasing in 
𝑦 (𝑦 < 𝑦1
∗); (2) where 𝑠𝑤∗ is decreasing and corruption is increasing in 𝑦 (𝑦1
∗ < 𝑦 < 𝑦2
∗); 
and (3) where both 𝑠𝑤∗ and corruption are decreasing in 𝑦 (𝑦 > 𝑦2
∗). This mapping provides 
a more accurate picture of policy-making.  
Transition economies face with variety of goals due to their various institutional problems. 
They usually suffer from relatively low levels of social welfare and high corruption. Here it 
is assumed that the main goal of the government is to maximise social welfare in the first 
best. Therefore, as discussed earlier we assume that 𝑦 is going to be fixed at 𝑦𝑒
∗ which was 
derived in (2.19). Needless to say, governments may choose different strategies and, hence, 
may fix 𝑦 at other values. For instance, social and political pressures may force a policymaker 
to prioritise corruption minimisation over other goals, regardless of the possible effect of 
changes on social welfare. For instance, in different periods in Iran, anti-corruption policies 
were followed mainly due to the rival’s propaganda. For instance, as a result of publishing 
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the payslips with extraordinary high salaries, bonuses and loans of some governmental de-
partments, Rouhani administration had to prioritise anti-corruption policies mainly due to 
political pressures (Karami, 2016). 
In general, we can assume that governments choose 𝑦 as shown in (2.19). However, in re-
sponse to some political and social pressures, the government may decide to switch strategi-
cally to anti-corruption policies rather than social-welfare-enhancing policies.  
Figure 2-7 - Social Welfare and Corruption for Me-
dium and Relatively High Levels of the Regulator's 
Selfishness 
Following deregulation policies might bring some opposition because of an induced increase 
in corruption. However, as was discussed earlier, continuing further deregulation will have 
two more effects; the first effect is a later reduction in corruption, and the second one is a 
simultaneous increase in social welfare. In addition to the two effects mentioned, another 
way to respond to these kinds of opposition is to direct attentions to the magnitudes of social 
welfare and corruption. In the examples provided, the magnitude of corruption is maximum 
11% of social welfare. The marginal effect of deregulation on social welfare is bigger than 
the marginal effect on corruption.  
This model shows that depending on parameters of the model, we may or may not have the 
effect of ‘grease-the-wheels’ effect. This is where we have an increase in both social welfare 
and corruption as the results of the policies. For instance, in Figure 2-7, up to 𝑦𝑒
∗ we can see 
the presence of ‘grease-the-wheels’ effect as more deregulation is being followed. This could 
be the case especially for relatively poorer countries. As Djankov et al. (2002, p. 28) state:  
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‘In countries whose markets are fraught with failures, it might be better to have corrupt regu-
lators than none at all. Corruption may be the price to pay for addressing market failures’. 
Also, Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) refer to numerous theoretical analyses of corruption 
that have shown that corruption minimisation may not be part of optimal policy design. The 
reason is the same as what has been discussed above: there would be too much of sacrifice 
of other welfare goals, namely social welfare to reach to lower corruption. More generally, 
Bardhan and Mookherjee claim that minimisation of corruption in different areas may even 
require no government at all, which would not be a recommendation by anyone.  
So far, implementation of deregulation has been investigated in two different scenarios; cost-
less reform and costly reform. In both cases, as summarized in Result 1, it turns out that the 
economy may experience simultaneous rise in corruption and social welfare.  
 As the consequence of implementing deregulation, regardless of whether it is going to 
be financed through taxation or not, the economy may experience both ‘grease-the-wheels’ and 
‘sand-in-the-wheels’ effect, depending on parameters of the model. 
2.3.2  Improving the Detection Technology 
As mentioned earlier, the probability of apprehension in this model is an indicator of the rule 
of law. Like the model of Emerson (2006) individuals are faced with a threat of being de-
tected and punished for their illegal activities like bribery30. This probability is assumed as 
given in this chapter. In the next chapter, I will develop a model at which the probability of 
apprehension is a function of the amount of investment on anti-corruption policies by the 
policy-maker. Increased policing over government agents, increasing the freedom of media, 
increasing democratic participation, fairer and tighter monitoring and auditing, keeping the 
records of crimes and so on and so forth, can be regarded as attempts to improve the 
probability of apprehension. Therefore, it is assumed that implementing any policy which 
enhances 𝜂 is costless. In other words, it is believed that some basic reforms can be pursued 
easily without imposing any cost.  
                                                 
30 Different studies name probability of apprehension as probability of being caught (Søreide, 2006) or proba-
bility of detection (Mishra, 2007; D’Souza and Kaufmann, 2013). 
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Before investigating the effects of a change in 𝜂, we need to define the level probability of 
apprehension at which the lobby would choose to share all its members’ profit to the regu-
lator. Here, ?̅? denotes the level of probability of apprehension at which no incentive remains 
for firms to participate in the game with the regulator. 
 𝜂 = min
𝜂
{[𝜂: 𝑁∗(𝜂) = 𝑁], [𝜂: 𝑁∗(𝜂) = 𝑁𝑒 ]} (2.23)  
Remember that when 𝑁∗ = 𝑁, firms transfer all their profit to the regulator or 𝛼∗ = 1. In 
addition, when 𝑁∗ = 𝑁𝑒 there will be no profit for firms or 𝜋
∗ = 0. This is the same notion 
as 𝑦 which was defined in (2.17). It will be discussed in the following section that 𝜕𝜂 𝜕𝛾⁄ >
0. In other words, in an economy with a more selfish regulator higher probability of appre-
hension is needed to kill all incentives for firms to play the game with the regulator. 
Figure 2-8 to Figure 2-11 show how the two indicators of corruption and scale-neutral cor-
ruption might be affected as the economy experiences changes in 𝜂 and 𝛾. Figure 2-9 and 
Figure 2-11 show that the first part of Remark 7, which discusses the non-monotonicity of 
corruption in 𝛾, is robust even to changes in 𝜂. Now let us take 𝛾 as given and concentrate 
on changes in 𝜂.31 Figure 2-8 and Figure 2-10 show that there exists ?̅? ∈ [0,1] which alters 
the behaviour of corruption in response to changes in 𝜂. Depending on other parameters of 
the model, the value of ?̅? would be different. Following are the outcomes before and after 
?̅?: 
(1) 𝛾 < ?̅? 
when 𝛾 < ?̅?, corruption is decreasing in 𝜂 for most of its values except for the very high 
values of 𝜂. As depicted in Figure 2-8, as expected, corruption first decreases as 𝜂 increases. 
Despite the increase in both 𝛼∗ and 𝑁∗ in Appendix 5, this decrease happens due to a re-
duction in profit because of a raise in industry size. In other words, the change in profit 
would outweigh the changes in 𝛼∗ and 𝑁∗. However, this is not the case for all levels of 𝜂. 
As depicted in Figure 2-23, for low levels of the regulator’s selfishness, when 𝜂 exceeds some 
level (around 𝜂 = 0.47 for 𝛾 = 0.45), the equilibrium transfer becomes steeper in 𝜂 and 
consequently, as shown in Figure 2-24, the equilibrium industry size becomes flatter for all 
further increases in 𝜂. The ultimate effect would be increasing corruption due to the relatively 
                                                 
31 Similar to previous section, to make the main text shorter, the reader can find the discussion on the behaviour 
of 𝛼∗, 𝑁∗ and 𝜋∗ in Appendix 5. 
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rapid increase in transfer by the lobby. The intuition can be found in the following lines from  
Banerjee et al. (2012, p. 45): 
Greater corruption in one country could simply be a reflection of a greater willingness to fight 
corruption in that country. Because they do not supply information about the sources of corrup-
tion, these corruption indices actually tell us little about what types of governance interventions 
would help deal with these problems, or even whether we should reward or praise governments 
that have less corruption by these measures. 
(2) 𝛾 > ?̅? 
Corruption is non-monotonic in 𝜂 when 𝛾 > ?̅?. It is first increasing and then it becomes 
decreasing. As shown in Figure 2-20 in Appendix 5, 𝜋∗ is decreasing and concave in 𝜂. 
Therefore, as it approaches to ?̅?, we would see a sharper decline in 𝜋∗. The lobby knows that 
the reaction function of the regulator is steeper in slope and lower in magnitude when 𝛾 is 
higher. Therefore, the lobby will do its best by transferring more to persuade the regulator 
to determine a lower industry size. As 𝜂 reaches to ?̅?, the lobby suddenly increases its share 
for transfer as shown in Figure 2-23. Consequently, the industry size is first increasing but as 
𝜂 approaches to ?̅?, there would be a sharp increase in 𝑁∗ as depicted in Figure 2-24. As soon 
as 𝜂 = 𝜂 the marginal effect of the reduction in 𝜋∗ outweighs the marginal effect on 𝛼∗ and 
𝑁∗ and, hence, we would have corruption to be decreasing in 𝜂 as shown in Figure 2-8.  
 
Figure 2-8 – Corruption vs. Probability of apprehension 
for Different Levels of the Regulator’s Selfishness, 𝑐 =
10, 𝑓 = 20, 𝑦 = 30.94, 𝜙 = 0.1  
 
Figure 2-9 – Corruption vs. the Regulator’s Level 
of Selfishness for different Levels of Probability 
of apprehension, 𝑐 = 10, 𝑓 = 20, 𝑦 =
30.94, 𝜙 = 0.1 
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If we look at the scale-neutral corruption, 𝑇𝑟𝑅, we can see the same behaviour in the corrup-
tion index for changes in 𝛾 and 𝜂. Also, in Figure 2-10, when 𝜂 is low, the scale-neutral 
corruption under the relatively less selfish regulator (𝛾 = 0.45) turns out to be higher than 
the case of an extremely selfish one (𝛾 = 0.95). This is analogues to what was discussed in 
Remark 7 and Figure 2-3 for low levels of 𝑦. Again, this is due to the lobby’s response when 
it finds that the regulator is not looking for his personal welfare. The lobby would choose to 
offer a starting high bribe under 𝛾 = 0.45 even when 𝜂 is increasing. It is only when 𝜂 
exceeds some level (in this case 𝜂 > 0.23) that the corruption drops to something lower 
than the corruption under a more selfish regulator. 
 
Figure 2-10 - Scale-Neutral Corruption vs. Probability of 
apprehension for Different Levels of the Regulator’s Self-
ishness, 𝑐 = 10, 𝑓 = 20, 𝑦 = 30.94, 𝜙 = 0.1 
 
Figure 2-11 - Scale-Neutral Corruption vs. the 
Regulator’s Level of Selfishness for different 
Levels of Probability of apprehension, 𝑐 =
10, 𝑓 = 20, 𝑦 = 30.94, 𝜙 = 0.1 
Result 2 summarizes the impact of improvements in detection technology on corruption.  
 Depending on the regulator’s level of selfishness, corruption is non-monotonic in 𝜂; 
it can be either first decreasing and then increasing, or the opposite.  
Social welfare is increasing in the probability of apprehension. However, as it is clear from 
Figure 2-12, improving the detection technology may not fill the gap between social welfare 
in the first best (unregulated entry) and that under the lobby-regulator game. This gap be-
tween the two social welfare indicators under two different cases is due to both detection 
technology and the regulator’s selfishness. Therefore, even by an immense improvement in 
detection technology, the regulator’s selfishness may not allow the economy to reach to its 
highest social welfare under the first best.  
 
 
   
 
 
93 
 
 
Figure 2-12 - Social Welfare vs. Probability of Ap-
prehension for Different Levels of the Regulator's 
Selfishness 
 
Figure 2-13 - Social Welfare net of Transfers vs. 
Probability of Apprehension for Different Levels of 
the Regulator's Selfishness 
Social welfare net of transfers is almost monotonically increasing and concave in 𝜂. So both 
the economic definition on social welfare (𝑠𝑤𝑎
∗) and the accounting definition (𝑠𝑤∗) show 
the same behaviour in 𝜂.  
In this model, 𝜂 is assumed to be given. Even if 𝜂 is a control variable, Figure 2-12 and 
Figure 2-13 show that there is a corner solution to the problem of maximising social welfare 
in 𝜂.  
One policy that could enhance 𝜂 is taking the records of any criminal act so that individuals 
consider it in their calculations for their action. Hoff and Stiglitz (2008) note that as the legal 
system becomes more history-dependant, less incentive would remain for the players to do 
anything negative. Those wrongdoers who have broken the law or have mis-used their posi-
tion to gain more personal welfare may also face a risk of retroactive criminal prosecution in 
a history-dependant legal system. 
The concluding point about 𝜂 is that, while detection technology has only positive effect on 
social welfare, its effect on corruption can be both positive and negative. The policy impli-
cation is that if a change in 𝜂 is regarded as anti-corruption policy, then Result 2 elaborates 
that depending on the regulator’s character or preferences, the outcome can be an increase 
in corruption. This echoes the finding of Mookherjee and Png (1995) that under certain 
conditions, an increase in the penalty on the inspector for corruption may raise the corrup-
tion. Hence, a more careful investigation is required when it comes to corruption minimisa-
tion problem with the help of a change in 𝜂.  
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2.4  CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Policymakers mostly deal with multiple goals, encompassing corruption reduction and social 
welfare enhancement. Implementing different institutional reforms, while assuming them as 
exogenous variables, may have different effects on each of those goals. This chapter provides 
a framework to investigate the outcome of institutional reforms in more detail.  
This model investigates the entry of firms in an economy where government-issued licences 
are needed to operate. The existing firms do not like having more rivals due to business-
stealing effect, which reduces their profit. Therefore, they would form an association or a 
lobby, which its duty is to protect its members by transferring a fraction of members’ profit 
to the regulator to convince him to stop directing the economy towards the unregulated 
entry. The regulator is assumed to be selfish. The model shows that letting the regulator’s 
selfishness to be a continuous variable defined in a range may change the outcomes of the 
model. Two policies are investigated in this model: (1) investment in deregulation which 
reduces the fixed cost; (2) investment in enhancing the probability of apprehension as an 
indicator of the quality of governance. Apprehension works as a threat for wrongdoers in 
demanding and supplying bribes. This chapter looks at two different settings for deregula-
tion: (1) where there is no cost to implement deregulation policies and, hence, firms do not 
have to pay anything in the form of tax; (2) where investment in deregulation will be financed 
in terms of tax by the government. Firms know that it will become a part of the cost for 
firms. In the first case, if we find non-monotonicity of 𝑠𝑤∗ and 𝑇𝑟∗ in 𝑦, we can be sure 
that this relation is not due to the nature of the game and consequently the cost function. In 
other words, when social welfare and corruption show non-monotonicity in deregulation, 
while implementing deregulation has no cost, then we can be sure of a more general relation 
rather than a model-specific result.  
In any of the two scenarios for tax, even very low level of regulator’s selfishness in the reg-
ulator increases the gap of social welfare from its value in the first best, where the first best 
is defined as the case under a completely benevolent regulator who advocates unregulated 
entry to the market. 
When the tax is assumed to be zero, letting the regulator’s selfishness defined as a continuous 
variable in a range, can show us that following deregulation policies may not necessarily re-
duce corruption. An improvement in the state of bureaucratic process can be a trigger to 
higher or lower corruption depending on what type of regulator runs the office. These limit 
the prediction of Emerson (2006) where corruption and competition are always negatively 
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correlated and, hence, the outcome of the model is more consistent with the empirical find-
ing of Pieroni and d’Agostino (2013) where lack of government regulations may lead to 
higher corruption.  
Assuming the tax to be determined endogenously, corruption would be non-monotonic in 
deregulation for all levels of the regulator’s selfishness. In the case of endogenous tax, the 
level of deregulation mainly determines whether corruption is increasing or decreasing in 
deregulation. In both scenarios of tax, counter-intuitively, corruption might turn out to be 
lower under an extremely selfish regulator compared to the less selfish regulators. This de-
pends on the level of deregulation and mainly is due to low levels of industry size and the 
corresponding transfer. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that a more selfish regulator decides 
more independent of the parameters of the model.  
When tax is assumed to be endogenous, the model shows that more deregulation does not 
always lead to higher social welfare. The results are robust even for the economic definition 
of social welfare. This is mainly because deregulation is going to be financed by firms. As 
expected, social welfare is lower for relatively more selfish regulators. 
The outcomes of enhancing the probability of apprehension also show different results for 
the different types of regulators. Only when a relatively more benevolent regulator is in the 
office, apprehension would be regarded as a threat for players. Hence, an increase in the 
probability of apprehension might result to lower corruption only when the economy expe-
riences a relatively benevolent regulator. In the case of a relatively selfish regulator, invest-
ment in improving the detection technology may even worsen the corruption. This is another 
way to state what Banerjee et al. (2012) mean that greater corruption can be a result of a 
greater willingness to fight corruption.  
The contribution of chapter two is providing an answer to the Jain's (2001, p. 102) recom-
mendation on comparing ‘marginal utilities of efforts to fight corruption versus reduction in 
the role of industrial policies’. The model shows that defining the regulator’s selfishness as a 
continuous variable in a range, changes both the magnitude and trend of deregulation on 
social welfare and corruption. Depending on the regulator’s type, deregulation might end in 
‘grease-the-wheels’ effect or ‘sand-in-the-wheels’. In the former, by an improvement in the 
state of bureaucracy, social welfare and corruption simultaneously increase while in the latter 
they both face a reduction. In addition, anti-corruption policies always enhance social welfare 
but its effect on corruption remains dependant on the regulator’s level of selfishness. 
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The concluding point is that following deregulation and anti-corruption policies do not al-
ways work in favour of the economy. The model shows how the regulator’s willingness to 
utilise his position to gain more personal welfare rather than social welfare can change the 
outcomes of deregulation and anti-corruption policies.   
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2.6  APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 Regulatory Quality 
The following table is the full list of variables for Regulatory Quality presented in Kaufmann 
et al. (2009, p. 76): 
Code Concept Measured 
Representative 
Sources 
 
Global Insight 
Global Risk Service 
(DRI) 
 Export Regulations 
 Import Regulations 
 Other Regulation burdens 
 Restrictions on ownership of Business by Non-Residents 
 Restrictions on ownership of equity by Non-Residents 
Economist Intelli-
gence Unit Country 
Risk Service and De-
mocracy Index 
(EIU) 
 Unfair competitive practices 
 Price controls 
 Discriminatory tariffs 
 Excessive protections 
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Code Concept Measured 
Cerberus Corporate 
Intelligence Gray 
Area Dynamics 
(MIG, GAD) 
 Stock Exchange / Capital Markets 
 Foreign Investment 
World Economic 
Forum Global Com-
petitiveness Survey 
(GCS) 
 Administrative regulations are burdensome 
 Tax system is distortionary 
 Import barriers as obstacle to growth 
 Competition in local market is limited 
 Anti-monopoly policy is lax and ineffective 
 Environmental regulations hurt competitiveness 
 Complexity of tax System 
 Easy to start company 
Heritage Foundation 
Index of Economic 
Freedom (HER) 
 Foreign investment 
 Banking / finance 
 Wage/Prices 
Institutional Profile 
Database (IPD) 
 Administrative business start-up formalities 
 Administered prices and market prices 
 Competition: productive sector: ease of market entry for 
new firms 
 Competition between businesses: competition regulation 
arrangements 
Political Risk Ser-
vices International 
Country Risk Guide 
(PRS) 
 Investment Profile. 
Global Insight Busi-
ness Conditions and 
Risk Indicators 
(WMO) 
 Tax Effectiveness: How efficient the country’s tax collec-
tion system is. 
 Legislation: An assessment of whether the necessary busi-
ness laws are in place. 
Non-representative 
Sources 
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Code Concept Measured 
African Develop-
ment Bank Country 
Policy and Institu-
tional Assessments 
(ADB) 
 Trade policy 
 Competitive environment 
 Labour Market Policies 
Asian Development 
Bank Country Policy 
and Institutional As-
sessments (ASD) 
 Trade Policy and Forex Regime 
 Enabling Environment for Private Sector Development 
Business Environ-
ment & Enterprise 
Performance Survey 
(BPS) 
 How problematic are labour regulations for the growth of 
your business. 
 How problematic are tax regulations for the growth of your 
business. 
 How problematic are custom and trade regulations for the 
growth of your business. 
Bertelsmann Trans-
formation Index 
(BTI) 
 Competition 
 Price Stability 
Country Policy and 
Institutional Assess-
ment 
 
 Competitive environment 
 Trade policy 
European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development Tran-
sition Report (EBR) 
 Price liberalization 
 Trade & foreign exchange system 
 Competition policy 
IFAD Rural Sector 
Performance Assess-
ments (IFD) 
 Enabling conditions for rural financial services develop-
ment 
 Investment climate for rural businesses 
 Access to agricultural input and produce markets 
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Code Concept Measured 
Institute for Man-
agement Develop-
ment World Com-
petitiveness Year-
book (WCY) 
 Access to capital markets (foreign and domestic) is easily 
available 
 Ease of Doing Business 
 Banking regulation does not hinder competitiveness 
 Competition legislation in your country does not prevent 
unfair competition 
 Customs' authorities do not facilitate the efficient transit of 
goods 
 Financial institutions' transparency is not widely developed 
in your country 
 Easy to start company 
 Foreign investors are free to acquire control in domestic 
companies 
 Price controls affect pricing of products in most industries 
 Public sector contracts are sufficiently open to foreign bid-
ders 
 Real corporate taxes are non-distortionary 
 Real personal taxes are non-distortionary 
 The legal framework is detrimental to your country's com-
petitiveness 
 Protectionism in your country negatively affects the con-
duct of business in your country 
 Labour regulations hinder business activities 
 Subsidies impair economic development 
 
Appendix 2 Rule of Law 
The following table is the full list of variables for Rule of Law presented in Kaufmann et al. 
(2009, p. 77): 
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Code Concept Measured 
Representative 
Sources 
 
BRI 
 Enforceability of contracts 
 Direct Financial Fraud, Money Laundering and Organized 
Crime 
Global Insight 
Global Risk Service 
(DRI) 
 Losses and Costs of Crime 
 Kidnapping of Foreigners 
 Enforceability of Government Contracts 
 Enforceability of Private Contracts 
Economist Intelli-
gence Unit Country 
Risk Service and De-
mocracy Index 
(EIU) 
 Violent crime 
 Organized crime 
 Fairness of judicial process 
 Enforceability of contracts 
 Speediness of judicial process 
 Confiscation/expropriation 
Cerberus Corporate 
Intelligence Gray 
Area Dynamics 
(MIG, GAD) 
 Nationalisation / Expropriation 
World Economic 
Forum Global Com-
petitiveness Survey 
(GCS) 
 Common crime imposes costs on business 
 Organized crime imposes costs on business 
 Quality of Police 
 The judiciary is independent from political influences of 
members of government, citizens or firms 
 Legal framework to challenge the legality of government 
actions is inefficient 
 Intellectual Property protection is weak 
 Protection of financial assets is weak 
 Tax evasion 
GWP 
 Confidence in the police force 
 Confidence in judicial system 
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Code Concept Measured 
 Have you been a victim of crime? 
Heritage Foundation 
Index of Economic 
Freedom (HER) 
 Property Rights 
HUM  Independence of Judiciary 
Institutional Profile 
Database (IPD) 
 Respect for law in relations between citizens and the ad-
ministration 
 Security of persons and goods 
 Organised criminal activity (drug-trafficking, arms-traffick-
ing, etc. 
 Importance of the informal economy 
 Importance of tax evasion in the formal sector 
 Importance of customs evasion (smuggling, under-declara-
tion, etc.) 
 Running of the justice system 
 Security of traditional property rights 
 Security of property rights: formal property rights 
 Security of contracts between private agents 
 Government respect for contracts 
 Settlement of economic disputes: justice in commercial 
matters 
 Intellectual property 
 Arrangements for the protection of intellectual property 
 Agricultural sector: security of rights and property 
transactions 
Political Risk Ser-
vices International 
Country Risk Guide 
(PRS) 
 Law and Order. The Law sub-component is an assessment 
of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while 
the Order subcomponent is an assessment of popular ob-
servance of the law (assessed separately). 
TPR  Trafficking in People Report 
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Code Concept Measured 
Global Insight Busi-
ness Conditions and 
Risk Indicators 
(WMO) 
 Judicial Independence An assessment of how far the state 
and other outside actors can influence and distort the legal 
system. This will determine the level of legal impartiality 
investors can expect. 
 Crime - How much of a threat businesses face from crime 
such as kidnapping, extortion, street violence, burglary… 
Non-representative 
Sources 
 
African Develop-
ment Bank Country 
Policy and Institu-
tional Assessments 
(ADB) 
 Property Rights 
AFR 
 Based on your experiences, how easy or difficult is it to 
obtain help from the police when you need it? 
 Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone 
in your family feared crime in your own home? 
 Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone 
in your family had something stolen from your house? 
 Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone 
in your family been physically attacked? 
 Trust in courts 
Asian Development 
Bank Country Policy 
and Institutional As-
sessments (ASD) 
 Rule of Law 
Business Environ-
ment & Enterprise 
Performance Survey 
(BPS) 
 Fairness, honesty, enforceability, and quickness of the 
court system 
 How problematic is crime for the growth of your business. 
 How problematic is judiciary for the growth of your 
business. 
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Code Concept Measured 
Bertelsmann Trans-
formation Index 
(BTI) 
 Rule of Law 
 Private Property 
CCR  Rule of Law 
Country Policy and 
Institutional Assess-
ment (CPIA) 
 Property rights 
FRH  Judicial Framework and Independence 
GII 
 Executive Accountability 
 Judicial Accountability 
 Rule of Law 
 Law Enforcement 
European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development Tran-
sition Report (EBR) 
 Executive Accountability 
 Judicial Accountability 
 Rule of Law 
 Law Enforcement 
IFAD Rural Sector 
Performance Assess-
ments (IFD) 
 Access to land 
 Access to water for agriculture 
LBO 
 Trust in Judiciary 
 Trust in Police 
 Have you been a victim of crime? 
VAB 
 Trust in Justice 
 Trust in Police 
 Trust in Supreme Court 
 Have you been a victim of crime? 
Institute for Man-
agement Develop-
ment World Com-
petitiveness Year-
book (WCY) 
 Tax evasion is a common practice in your country 
 Justice is not fairly administered in society 
 Personal security and private property are not adequately 
protected 
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Code Concept Measured 
 Parallel economy impairs economic development in your 
country 
 Patent and copyright protection is not adequately enforced 
in your country 
Appendix 3 Control of Corruption 
The following table is the full list of variables for Control of Corruption presented in Kauf-
mann et al. (2009, p. 79): 
Code Concept Measured 
Representative 
Sources 
 
BRI 
 Internal Causes of Political Risk: Mentality, including xen-
ophobia, nationalism, corruption, nepotism, willingness to 
compromise 
 Indirect Diversion of Funds 
Global Insight 
Global Risk Service 
(DRI) 
 Losses and Costs of Corruption 
Economist Intelli-
gence Unit Country 
Risk Service and De-
mocracy Index 
(EIU) 
 Corruption 
Cerberus Corporate 
Intelligence Gray 
Area Dynamics 
(MIG, GAD) 
 Cronyism 
 Government Efforts to Tackle Corruption 
World Economic 
Forum Global Com-
petitiveness Survey 
(GCS) 
 Public trust in financial honesty of politicians 
 Diversion of public funds due to corruption is common 
 Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: 
import/export permits 
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Code Concept Measured 
 Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: 
public utilities 
 Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to 
tax payments 
 Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: 
awarding of public contracts 
 Frequent for firms to make extra payments connected to: 
getting favourable judicial decisions 
 Extent to which firms' illegal payments to influence gov-
ernment policies impose costs on other firms 
GWP  Is corruption in government widespread? 
Institutional Profile 
Database (IPD) 
 Corruption 
Political Risk Ser-
vices International 
Country Risk Guide 
(PRS) 
 Corruption. Measures corruption within the political sys-
tem, which distorts the economic and financial environ-
ment, reduces the efficiency of government and business 
by enabling people to assume positions of power through 
patronage rather than ability and introduces an inherent in-
stability in the political system. 
Global Insight Busi-
ness Conditions and 
Risk Indicators 
(WMO) 
 Corruption: This index assesses the intrusiveness of the 
country’s bureaucracy. The amount of red tape likely to be 
encountered is assessed, as is the likelihood of encounter-
ing corrupt officials and other groups. 
Non-representative 
Sources 
 
African Develop-
ment Bank Country 
Policy and Institu-
tional Assessments 
(ADB) 
 Transparency / corruption 
AFR 
 How many elected leaders (parliamentarians or local coun-
cillors) do you think are involved in corruption? 
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Code Concept Measured 
 How many judges and magistrates do you think are in-
volved in corruption? 
 How many government officials do you think are involved 
in corruption? 
 How many border/tax officials do you think are involve d 
in corruption? 
Asian Development 
Bank Country Policy 
and Institutional As-
sessments (ASD) 
 Anti-corruption 
Business Environ-
ment & Enterprise 
Performance Survey 
(BPS) 
 How common is for firms to have to pay irregular addi-
tional payments to get things done 
 On average, what percent of total annual sales do firms pay 
in unofficial payments to public officials 
 How problematic is corruption for the growth of your 
business. 
 Frequency of bribery in taxes, customs and judiciary 
Bertelsmann Trans-
formation Index 
(BTI) 
 Corruption 
CCR  Transparency / corruption 
Country Policy and 
Institutional Assess-
ment (CPIA) 
 Transparency / corruption 
FRH  Corruption 
GCB 
 Frequency of corruption among political parties, govern-
ment officials, parliament, media and judiciary 
 Frequency of household bribery 
GII  Anti-Corruption Agency 
IFAD Rural Sector 
Performance Assess-
ments (IFD) 
 Accountability, transparency and corruption in rural areas 
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Code Concept Measured 
LBO  Have you heard of acts of corruption? 
PRC  Corruption Index 
VAB  Frequency of corruption among government officials 
Institute for Man-
agement Develop-
ment World Com-
petitiveness Year-
book (WCY) 
 Bribing and corruption exist in the economy 
Appendix 4 Effect of a Change in 𝒚 on 𝝅,𝜶, and 𝑵; Case of 𝝉 > 𝟎 
Before investigating the effect of a change in 𝑦 and 𝛾 on social welfare and corruption, we 
need to investigate the changes on 𝜋, 𝛼 and 𝑁. 
Equilibrium profit (𝜋∗) shows decreasing relation in 𝑦. When more deregulation is pursued 
by the government, there are two opposite effects on 𝜋; one through the overall cost, which 
deals more with the efficiency of firms; and the other through industry size which is basically 
the business-stealing effect that was discussed before in (2.2). In terms of the effect of 𝑦 on 
fixed cost, there are two terms involving: 𝐹/(1 + 𝑦) which is inversely related to deregula-
tion and 𝑦/𝑁 which the final effect of a change in 𝑦 is ambiguous as both numerator and 
denominator change. Therefore, the final effect of deregulation on fixed cost remains am-
biguous. It will be discussed how 𝑁∗ is non-monotonic in 𝑦. Whatever the effect of fixed 
cost on 𝜋, Figure 2-14 shows that the overall effect of an improvement in 𝑦 limits the amount 
of the firms’ profit. Intuitively, higher deregulation in an economy decreases the fixed cost, 
which encourages more entry into the market and more entry causes lower profit per firms. 
The magnitude of 𝜋∗ is related to 𝛾 and moves in opposite direction. A more selfish regulator 
in the office brings higher profit to a typical operating firm in the market. 
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Figure 2-14 - The Effect of a Change in Deregulation on the Regulator’s Reaction Function, 
𝑐 = 10, 𝑓 = 20, 𝜂 = 0.1, 𝜙 = 0.1 
Since business-stealing effect dominates the efficiency effect, deregulation might increase 
until it reaches to 𝑦, which was defined in (2.17). Therefore, ultimately no incentive would 
remain for firms to participate in this game. 
The regulator reacts the same way as in the case of 𝜏 = 0 where 𝛾 shifts the reaction function 
to the right and makes it steeper. In other words, as shown in Figure 2-15, a more selfish 
regulator, not only determines higher industry size, but also he is more sensitive to what is 
being transferred (𝛼∗) from the lobby. This is because the marginal effect of an additional 
license on personal welfare of a more selfish regulator would be higher than the effect of the 
same thing on social welfare. A more selfish regulator cares more about his personal welfare.  
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Figure 2-15 - The Effect of a Change in the Regulator’s Level of Selfishness (𝛾) on the Regulator’s Reaction 
Function, 𝜂 = 0.1, 𝜙 = 0.1, 𝑦 = 100 
The effect of a change in deregulation policy is also the same as the case when 𝜏 = 0. In 
addition, the effect of a change in 𝑦 on the regulator’s reaction function is the same as what 
is depicted in Figure 2-16 and Figure 2-17. 
 
Figure 2-16 - The Effect of a Change in State of Bu-
reaucratic Process on the Regulator’s Reaction Func-
tion, 𝜂 = 0.1, 𝜙 = 0.1, 𝛾 = 0.5 
 
Figure 2-17 - The Effect of a Change in State of Bu-
reaucratic Process on the Regulator’s Reaction Func-
tion, 𝜂 = 0.1, 𝜙 = 0.1, 𝛾 = 0.9 
The model shows that implementing deregulation policies may have different outcomes 
when the economy experiences different types of the regulator. This is an important point 
being shown in detail in this model.  
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To choose 𝛼, the lobby looks at the effect of a change in 𝑦 in the firms’ profit as well as the 
effect on the regulator’s reaction function. Concerning the firms’ profit, since the firms ben-
efit from more profits when 𝑦 is low, they can allocate higher 𝛼 to the regulator. Concerning 
the regulator’s reaction function, the lobby knows that, in case 𝑦 increases, the regulator’s 
reaction function shifts to the right and, hence, regardless of the amount being transferred 
from the lobby, the regulator determines higher industry size. Therefore, to keep the industry 
size as low as possible, firms would allocate higher fraction of their profit (𝛼). They keep 
doing so for any increase in 𝑦 until 𝑦 = 𝑦 where no incentive would remain for the firms to 
stay in the game. This could be seen in Figure 2-18 too, where there is a 𝑦 at which 𝛼∗ = 1.   
 
Figure 2-18 - Equilibrium Transfer vs. Deregulation for 
Different Levels of the Regulator's Selfishness, 
𝑐 = 10, 𝑓 = 20, 𝜂 = 0.1, 𝜙 = 0.1 
Less selfish regulators would 𝑦
1
 be mo re inclined to change the industry size when more 
deregulation is in the progress. In other words, deregulation, or a change in 𝑦, may have 
higher impact for a less selfish regulators, on both 𝛼∗ and 𝑁∗. As shown in Figure 2-18, by 
an increase in the regulator’s level of selfishness, the equilibrium transfer becomes flatter in 
𝑦 for most of the values of 𝑦. Since 𝛼∗ is convex in 𝑦, as 𝑦 gets closer to 𝑦, 𝛼∗ becomes 
steeper. Figure 2-19 shows how 𝑁∗ would change in response to a change in deregulation 
for different types of the regulator’s selfishness.  
For the numerical exercise and comparative statics of the model, the benchmark values of 
the model’s parameters are set to 𝑎 = 40, 𝑏 = 2, 𝑐 = 10, 𝑓 = 20. The corresponding in-
dustry size and social welfare, which are denoted by 𝑁𝑒
∗ and 𝑠𝑤𝑒
∗ respectively, turns out to 
be 
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𝑦𝑒
∗ = 30.9383, 𝑁𝑒
∗ = 53.79,      𝑠𝑤𝑒
∗ = 289.66 
In the setting of chapter 1 where deregulation was not introduced, the same set of parame-
ters’ values resulted in the following values for industry size and social welfare: 
𝑁𝑒
∗ = 7.75,      𝑠𝑤𝑒
∗ = 100 
Note that the structure of the cost function has changed here. Therefore, the main reason 
behind the increase in the first best industry size is due to much lower fixed cost in the 
current model. Remember that in case of 𝜏 = 0, there is no interior solution for 𝑦𝑒
∗ and 
hence 𝑁𝑒
∗. It is only when the tax is assumed to be 𝜏 = 𝑦 𝑁⁄ > 0 that the model shows 
interior solution for 𝑦𝑒
∗ and 𝑁𝑒
∗. It turns out that 𝑁𝑒
∗ = 53.79, which means that no profit 
would remain for firms in the industry. As depicted in Figure 2-19, the industry size under 
the unregulated entry (first best) is always greater than the industry size under the lobby-
regulator game. A more selfish regulator will also determine a lower industry size.  
More deregulation does not lead necessarily to higher competition. As depicted in Figure 
2-19, it depends on both the regulator’s level of selfishness and level of deregulation. Fol-
lowing deregulation, while having a relatively high selfish regulator in the office (see the case 
of 𝛾 = 0.95 in Figure 2-19) may have very limited effect on the industry size and, hence, the 
competition among firms. According to Djankov et al. (2002, p. 25) ‘data do not support the 
proposition that, in the subsample of poorer countries, heavier regulation of entry is associ-
ated with better social outcomes or more competition’. What is shown in Figure 2-19 echoes 
the result of Djankov et al. (2002), provided that poorer countries tend to have regulators 
that are more selfish. This can be followed in studies like that of Mitra et al. (2002) where 
they found that more democratic regimes tend to have regulators who care more about social 
welfare.  
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Figure 2-19–Industry size vs. Deregulation for Different Levels of the Regulator's Selfishness, 
 𝑐 = 10, 𝑓 = 20, 𝜂 = 0.1, 𝜙 = 0.1 
Whether deregulation increases or decreases 𝑁∗ depends on how 𝑦 may change 𝑝𝑤 and 𝑠𝑤. 
Depending on what type of regulator rules the office, the effects of 𝑦 on 𝑝𝑤 and 𝑠𝑤 can be 
perceived differently. For instance, when 𝛾 = 0.45, the regulator decides more in favour of 
𝑠𝑤 rather 𝑝𝑤. Therefore, by an increase in deregulation he determines higher industry size 
which is not in favour of the lobby. This encourages the lobby to transfer more money to 
the regulator. However, this may not last forever. Even the one with 𝛾 = 0.45, might stop 
increasing 𝑁∗ at some level of 𝑦. That is where 𝑦 = 𝑦. In the case of a more selfish regulator, 
like where 𝛾 = 0.65, the regulator will be convinced easier and may stop increasing 𝑁 for 
lower level of 𝑦. Chapter 1 shows the same non-monotonicity of 𝑁∗ in 𝑦 for different 𝛾s.    
Appendix 5 Effect of a Change in 𝜼 on 𝝅∗, 𝜶∗ and 𝑵∗ 
To be able to analyse the effect of a change in detection technology on corruption and social 
welfare, first we need to see the effects on the components of corruption and social welfare.   
For a given level of 𝛾, 𝜋∗ is monotonically decreasing in 𝜂. Firms earn profit until 𝜂 reaches 
to 𝜂. At 𝜂, firms transfer all they earn which is a very small value as shown in both Figure 
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2-20 and Figure 2-21. From the previous sections, we know that for a given level of 𝜂, any 
increase in 𝛾 ends to an increase in the typical firm’s profit. 
 
 
Figure 2-20 - Profit vs. Probability of Apprehension 
for Different Levels of The Regulator's Level of Self-
ishness, 𝑐 = 10, 𝑓 = 20, 𝜙 = 0.1, 𝑦 = 30.94 
 
Figure 2-21 - Profit vs. The Regulator's Level of 
Selfishness for Different Levels of Probability of 
Apprehension, 𝑐 = 10, 𝑓 = 20, 𝜙 = 0.1, 𝑦 =
30.94 
According to Figure 2-12, clearly we have ?̅?1 < ?̅?2 < ?̅?3 < ?̅?4 where 𝛾1 < 𝛾2 < 𝛾3 < 𝛾4. 
Therefore, 𝜕?̅? 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0, which means that when 𝛾 increases, higher probability of apprehen-
sion is needed to kill the incentives of firms.  
Improvements in detection technology threaten the personal welfare of the regulator. There-
fore, it is expected that the regulator’s reaction function shifts to the right by an improvement 
in detection technology. This will be so because, by an improvement in detection technology, 
the regulator would be more under investigation and, hence, would have to act more in fa-
vour of social welfare. Hence, the regulator determines a higher industry size.  
Introducing detection technology and the probability of being caught can decrease the po-
tential results of the official’s monopoly. This model assumes only one corruptible official 
who has a monopoly over government services. This can lead potentially to the socially worse 
results according to Shleifer and Vishny (1993). They discuss the role that a number of bribe-
takers play in determining the equilibrium. They conclude that having an independent mo-
nopoly over government services can lead to the worst results compared to joint monopoly 
and competition.  
In addition, it is expected to have a flatter reaction function of the regulator when the 
probability of apprehension increases. Intuitively, even a more selfish regulator, becomes 
𝜋∗ 
𝜂
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more cautious in changing his choice of industry size based on an increase in his personal 
welfare upon being offered some bribe. Figure 2-22 shows the reaction function of the reg-
ulator in three different probabilities of apprehension. As depicted in Figure 2-22, the reac-
tion function shifts to the right as 𝜂 increases. In addition it becomes flatter in 𝛼; in other 
words, it gets less sensitive to transfers from the lobby. Therefore, among different econo-
mies with different detection technologies, in the one with higher probability of apprehen-
sion, the regulator determines the industry size less dependent on transfer  
 
Figure 2-22 - The Regulator's Reaction Function for Different Levels of Detection Probability (𝜂) 
The lobby knows that if the regulator has more fear of being detected, the regulator is going 
to let more firms into the market. Having that in mind, the lobby will increase the transfer 
to stop the regulator from doing so. The regulator, as the last player of the game, monoton-
ically increases industry size by an increase in 𝜂. Equilibrium transfer (𝛼∗) turns out to be 
increasing in 𝜂. Also, equilibrium industry size (𝑁∗) becomes flat in 𝜂 after it reaches to some 
level. Figure 2-23 and Figure 2-24 show how 𝛼∗ and 𝑁∗ react to changes in 𝜂 and 𝛾.  
As the regulator becomes more selfish, higher ?̅? would be needed to extract the highest frac-
tion of the firms’ profits or 𝜕𝜂 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0. In other words, the lobby would choose to increase 
its transfer to the regulator in case the probability of apprehension increases. The lobby 
would continue to transfer higher fraction of the cumulative profit to the regulator until all 
of it gets transferred to the regulator. For example for the benchmark values of the model 
where 𝑎 = 40, 𝑏 = 2, 𝑐 = 10, 𝑓 = 20, 𝑦 = 30.9 and for the case where the regulator’s self-
ishness is 𝛾 = 0.45, ?̅?γ=0.45 = 0.55. When 𝛾 = 0.50 we will have ?̅?γ=0.5 = 0.63. Finally, 
at an extreme case where 𝛾 = 0.95 the lobby will transfer all the profits when ?̅?γ=0.95 =
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0.98. In each case, as 𝜂 reaches to 𝜂, the lobby finds it in its favour to transfer all the firms’ 
profit and protect their business from new rivals. 
The lobby would be willing to transfer all the profits earned only when the probability of 
apprehension is almost 100%. However, in the case of a less selfish regulator (𝛾 = 0.5), the 
lobby would do so as soon as 𝜂 reaches to much lower value (63%). In other words, the 
profit will be transferred to convince the less selfish regulator. As the less selfish regulator is 
harder to convince, the firms’ profit would be depleted for transfers in lower value of 𝜂. In 
other words, for 𝜂 > 0.63, or generally when 𝜂 > 𝜂, the regulator may not receive anything 
more from the lobby.  
Intuitively, the introduction of the probability of apprehension reduces the personal welfare 
part of the regulator’s objective function. It has been discussed in full details in chapter one 
that in the case of a more benevolent regulator, the lobby would choose to transfer a higher 
fraction of its profit. The lobby will do that because they find it harder to convince a more 
benevolent regulator harder to convince. The introduction of the detection technology into 
the model definitely reduces the personal welfare of the regulator. Therefore, the lobby has 
to increase the transfer, even more, to encourage the regulator to act in the lobby’s favour. 
Though the lobby cannot transfer more than all the cumulative profits of all firms. Hence, 
in the case of having a more benevolent regulator in the office, transfers are at its maximum 
(𝛼 = 1) at lower value of probability of apprehension. For example ?̅?𝛾=0.45 = 0.55 while 
?̅?𝛾=0.95 = 0.98. 
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Figure 2-23 - Transfer vs. Probability of apprehen-
sion, 𝑐 = 10, 𝑓 = 20, 𝜙 = 0.1, 𝑦 = 30.94 
 
 
Figure 2-24–Industry Size vs. Probability of appre-
hension, 𝑐 = 10, 𝑓 = 20, 𝜙 = 0.1, 𝑦 = 30.94 
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CHAPTER 3  
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS: 
OPTIMISING DEREGULATION VERSUS DETERRENCE 
Abstract 
Chapter three presents a three-tier hierarchical model, comprising of three players: a politician, a regulator and a 
lobby. The politician’s problem is to optimise the combination of two reform policies of deregulation and anti-
corruption to maximise his chance of re-election. The politician’s type is assumed to be a continuous variable in a 
range, which enables us to have a more detailed mapping of the comparative statics of changes in policymakers’ 
types on the variables of interest. Based on the outcomes of the model, politicians can be categorised into four 
different types of oligarchic, semi-oligarchic, semi-populist and populist. Moreover, based on parameters of the 
model and namely the level of the politician’s populism, the regulator can be either of zero- or positive-bribe types. 
The model shows that the regulator’s selfishness may only harm semi-populist and populist politician’s chance of 
success, not that of oligarchic and semi-oligarchic politicians. Comparative statics of the model also show that the 
players’ characteristics are of lower importance when parameters of the model lie in extreme values. Therefore, the 
regulator’s level of selfishness has almost no effect on relatively highly populist or relatively highly oligarchic poli-
tician. Policymakers of extreme values, whether the politician or the regulator, decides more independent of other 
parameters of the model. The model predicts that in two similar economies, the one with a higher level of the 
politician’s populism may involve more of regulators in the bribery process. Moreover, a politician with a higher 
level of populism is more sensitive to the level of the regulator’s selfishness. Therefore, the type of the politician 
matters as it also determines the sensitivity of other variables of interest to the regulator’s level of selfishness. 
Whether having a more populist politician in the office ends up in lower corruption or not, depends on other 
parameters of the model, namely the regulator’s level of selfishness.  
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
Policymakers in transition economies try to expedite the process of development that took cen-
turies for Western Europeans. The experiences of East Asian economies show the possibility of 
acceleration in catching to the highest growth rate. However, transition economies might be 
confronted with some extra problems due to the volume of reforms required. There are certainly 
groups of insiders who are benefitting from the status quo. Hence, reform policies may bring up 
political oppositions which may make them politically less feasible (see for example Hoff and 
Stiglitz, 2004, 2005, 2008; Caselli and Gennaioli, 2008). This chapter contributes to the literature 
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of privatisation by looking at the institutional requirements of the economy, without which the 
privatisation is unlikely to improve economic performance. 
Chapter three takes the model of chapter two one step further by endogenising the two reform 
policies of deregulation and anti-corruption. Following Acemoglu et al. (2005, p. 389), ‘economic 
institutions, and institutions more broadly, are endogenous; they are, at least in part, determined 
by society, or a segment of it’. To endogenise the two policy reforms, the politician is introduced 
as a new player. The model presented in chapter three comprises of a politician, a regulator and 
a lobby in a three-tier hierarchical model like that of Bó (2006) and Laffont and Tirole (1993). 
The model abstracts from the uncertainty and/or asymmetric information emphasised in their 
chapter. In this model, there are two players from the governmental body with different objec-
tive functions, which will create a more realistic picture of a government in the real world. As 
suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1993), the relation between the top level of government, i.e. 
the politician and the secondary level of government, i.e. the regulator, adds some new insights. 
The regulator can be controlled by a central governor or a politician. This is one feature that is 
absent in the literature of political economy of entry (Perotti and Volpin, 2004). 
Each player is limited by what other players determine. As Banerjee et al. (2012) point out, by 
assuming the hierarchy of bureaucrats, we do not let players free to make their own rules. In 
other words, it is mainly due to entrenched interests of different players in the real world that 
the implementation of the first best becomes unobtainable, even for a reform-minded govern-
ment (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2008). 
Successful implementation of economic reforms requires considering the institutional context. 
Moreover, it is important to investigate the equilibrium as a result of a political process rather 
than an independent variable; as relatively little is known about the political feasibility of different 
reform paths (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2008). According to Perotti and Volpin (2004) this ap-
proach of investigating the political process and institutional context, does not allow us to offer 
a generic recommendations in favour of economic reforms. Since any reform can be captured 
by players of the game, different outcomes can be achieved given different settings and contexts. 
Failure in privatisation in Iran (Nili, 2015) and failure in privatisation and liberalisation of the 
banking system in Mexico and Russia (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2008) can be explained according 
to this approach.  
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In the model presented in this chapter, the politician’s objective is to maximise his chance of re-
election by choosing how to allocate the budget to the two reform policies of deregulation and 
anti-corruption. The budget to implement these two policies is fixed and is financed through 
taxes on firms. Hence, for instance, if the politician decides to invest more on deregulation, he 
has to deduct from investment on anti-corruption. Since usually in electoral systems, one candi-
date cannot be in the office for more than two consecutive periods, we can think of the politi-
cian’s party as the last player. Considering the incumbent party rather than the politician enables 
us to compare the results of this chapter with those studies which consider political parties, like 
that of Andvig (2007). All of different experiences in the history of transition show the im-
portance of the diversity of the politician. Andvig believes that ‘the Party’s emphasis on growth-
related promotion criteria sometimes allowed the planned systems to achieve fairly high growth 
rates, as shown recently by China and Vietnam and by the Soviet Union in part of the Stalinist 
period’. 
The model presented in chapter three follows the general argument of Blanchard and Shleifer 
(2001) and Sonin (2010) that central governments are less likely to be captured by incumbents 
due to their larger size and not been directly in contact by local firms. The politician in my model 
is like the central government, which is less likely to be captured. While the regulator can be 
regarded as a local government in their settings which could be bribed. One can find other names 
for the same concept in the literature, such as ‘the government’ or ‘the constitution-maker’ 
(Banerjee et al., 2012) or ‘founding fathers’ (Laffont and Tirole, 1990).   
The model differentiates different types of politicians by the weight he assigns on the two main 
components of social welfare: on one side of the spectrum, the model defines a populist politi-
cian who assigns higher weight on consumer surplus. On the other side of the spectrum, an 
oligarchic politician assigns higher weight on producer surplus. The politician’s level of populism 
can also be a reflection of the importance of the Communist party in formerly centrally planned 
economies and generally the party’s approach to economic growth  (Andvig, 2007). 
The two reforms that this chapter aims to investigate are deregulation and anti-corruption re-
form policies. The goal is to see how different parameters of the model, namely the regulator’s 
level of selfishness and the politician’s level of populism can affect these two reform policies 
and what would be the equilibrium social welfare and corruption. The framework assumes ‘a 
hierarchy of institutions, with political institutions influencing equilibrium economic institutions, 
which then determine economic outcomes  (Acemoglu et al., 2005, p. 391)’. Deregulation has 
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direct effects on reducing the fixed cost of entry and production. Deterrence or anti-corruption 
indirectly forces the government to pursue consumers-oriented policies through enhancing the 
probability of apprehension and ultimately competition. While some papers take the simple strat-
egy of assuming the binary choice for reform policies or binary types of the players (Hoff and 
Stiglitz, 2008), this chapter assumes the politician’s type to be a continuous variable in a range. 
This enables us to see a more detailed and accurate mapping of consequences of reforms with 
respect to other parameters of the model. 
What is meant by anti-corruption policies is perfectly framed in Rousso and Steves (2007). They 
take the following three initiatives as the main initiatives of anti-corruption programmes: (i) the 
design and publication of an anti-corruption strategy; (ii) the development of an implementing 
anti-corruption action plan and (iii) the establishment of a national anti-corruption commission 
ombudsman, or similar authority. These three component indicators are the building blocks of 
the ‘anti-corruption intensity index’, which measures the extent the transition countries followed 
anti-corruption activities in the study of Rousso and Steves (2007). However, they emphasised 
the assumption that these types of policies have a lagged effect on levels of corruption. Proba-
bility of apprehension can be regarded as an indicator for one of the dimensions of the quality 
of governance. As was explained in chapter two, ‘control of corruption’ and ‘rule of law’ are two 
of the ingredients of the World-wide Governance Indicators by World Bank (Kaufmann et al., 
2009). For further details of the variables, see Appendix 1 to Appendix 3 of chapter two. It 
should be noted that since bribery is an illegal act, a higher quality of rule of law can enhance the 
probability of apprehension significantly.  
In this model, the politician’s decision on how much to invest on anti-corruption determines 
probability of apprehension, which ultimately affects the choices of all other players, i.e. the 
lobby and the regulator. This will determine the span of control that the higher-level supervisors 
exercise and is absent in some studies related to corruption and hierarchies, for instance in 
Mishra (2007). As he predicts, this feature has implications for corruption. The model shows 
that due to the oppositions of players, having a populist politician and/or a benevolent regulator 
in the office might end in higher corruption, which is a totally deadweight loss to the society. 
The model also tries to find an answer to Jain's (2001) question to compare marginal utilities of 
anti-corruption policies and deregulation policies. The question Jain asks is that given the level 
of corruption in an economy, should the government pursue deregulation or anti-corruption 
policies? Moreover, the government needs to know the optimal level of intervention as, for 
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instance, Klapper et al. (2004) show that entry regulations are neither benign nor welfare improv-
ing. Governments might choose rules that go against them because they may not be fully aware 
of the consequences (Banerjee et al., 2012). For instance, chapter two shows that depending on 
parameters of the model, anti-corruption policies may end in higher corruption. Chapter two 
paved the first step towards answering this question. This chapter tries to shed light on more 
choices of the government in a setting which determines the policy choices as the outcome of 
the model endogenously.  
As discussed in previous chapters, following Caselli and Gennaioli (2008), deregulation is defined 
as eliminating unnecessary setup costs, for instance by reducing the number of licenses needed 
to open a business, the number of agencies involved in issuing such licenses and the quantity of 
paperwork to be produced. By implementing deregulation policies, the government facilitates 
the entry and production through reducing the fixed cost.  
Acemoglu (2008) investigates political economy of barriers of entry and analyses the economic 
performance under two political regimes of oligarchy and democracy. Although this chapter is 
similar to the Acemoglu model in its discussion about the deregulation and entry barriers, it is 
different from his in two aspects: (1) I distinguish different politicians with respect to their 
tendencies towards consumers rather producers. In this model, the oligarchic politician assigns 
higher weight to producer surplus compared to consumer surplus, while in Acemoglu’s model, 
the oligarchic society is the one in which the majority of elite decide on the policies, not the 
majority of people. Therefore, in my model, it mainly refers to the strategy of the politician rather 
than the general rules of the game in the society. His chapter studies how different regimes may 
change endogenously, while I assume it as exogenous strategy of the politician. (2) My model is 
a three-tier hierarchical model in which two players are determining the policies while in Ace-
moglu’s model, when the majority, either the society’s majority or that of the elite, vote for 
something, that would be implemented. This chapter tries to give the process of deregulation a 
more real picture by assuming the regulator, which in real world can work for his own purpose 
and may or may not be aligned with the politicians’ objectives. 
However, this chapter does not assume the politician’s intent to constraint the regulator to be 
purely in favour of the society, but rather he pursues it because it is in his interest to make a 
balance in his decision, such that his chance of re-election can be enhanced. The politician, or 
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the highest governmental body in this model, may have different incentives to monitor other 
players of a lower level in the government.32  
By assuming an electoral setting in which the politician tries to attract more votes, the model 
introduces a democratic setting with a flavour of checks and balances. In the setting provided, 
the politician can potentially constraint the regulator by limiting the chance of misusing his po-
sition to take bribe easily in exchange to implement policies that are more in favour of the pro-
ducers.  
The politician’s tool to implement constraints on the regulator is mainly through improvement 
of detection technology and hence indirectly affecting the regulator to work more in favour of 
competition; which ultimately will result to higher welfare for consumers. As Djankov et al. 
(2002) mention, such a democratic procedure for governments, either will ease the regulation or 
will yield more visible social benefits. Anti-corruption policies are meant to be designed and 
implemented to reach to higher probability of apprehension. As regulators, who are responsible 
to determine the industry size, face with higher probability of apprehension, they may work less 
for their personal welfare. Consequently, they will be more devoted to social welfare, which is 
equivalent to higher industry size which lets new entrants in the market. However, it is obviously 
against the incumbent’s interest to have higher investment on anti-corruption policies. This will 
bring their opposition as explained in some models (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2008; Perotti and 
Volpin, 2004). It is assumed that citizens by refusing to vote for the incumbent politician show 
their disagreement with his strategies. This is similar to the case of Shleifer and Vishny (1993) 
where citizens by refusing to re-elect corrupt and incompetent officials, show their disapproval 
through local elections. 
The idea of investigating two institutional reforms together, was initially inspired by the model 
of Caselli and Gennaioli (2008). They investigate economic consequences and political feasibility 
of deregulation and financial reform as the two key institutional reforms to foster entrepreneur-
ship. In their dynamic model, the two reforms assumed to be determined exogenously by the 
                                                 
32 As mentioned by Laffont and Tirole (1990, p. 4), this monitor could be due to the conflict between the founding 
fathers and the public decision makers.  
The public decision makers cannot be trusted to implement perfectly the founding fathers' intent because they may be 
self-interested, may have an intrinsically different view of social welfare, or may have an incentive to identify with specific 
interest groups. The founding fathers must 'stack the deck' in favour of their own objectives by constraining the public 
decision makers. 
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governments. The static model provided in this chapter provides a setting that looks at the emer-
gence of the same sort of policies in endogenous ways. The two institutional reforms Caselli and 
Gennaioli investigate are deregulation and financial reform which are both economic. In this 
chapter, however, one of the two institutional reforms, i.e. anti-corruption, does not have only 
economic aspect. The politician by pursuing anti-corruption aims to reduce corruption to attract 
more vote from the majority of voters, i.e. consumers.  
Not all the political and economic decisions are made by one player. Unlike Perotti and Volpin 
(2004) where industry size is determined by the politician, this model assumes that the regulator 
is going to choose industry size, not the politician. Perotti and Volpin do not distinguish between 
different governmental bodies or policymakers.  
The results of the model show that by considering different policymakers with different objec-
tive functions there is no simple pattern between the variables of interests and other exogenous 
parameters of the model. The model shows non-monotonic relations of level of populism with 
social welfare, corruption, probability of re-election and other variables of interest, which is like 
what Perotti and Volpin predict. They find that in more accountable countries, or in economies 
with higher levels of the politician’s populism, entry is less while this model predicts that industry 
size, which is equivalent to the entry in their model, would be non-monotonic in the level of 
populism. Hence, the relation can be increasing or decreasing depending on regulator’s level of 
selfishness.  
By defining the players’ type as a continuous variable in a range, the model shows cases in which 
an economy can reach to zero corruption even without benefitting from a completely benevolent 
regulator. In addition, generally, if the politician finds the type of regulator to be complement to 
his own type, he may stop pursuing consumer-oriented policies. However, the model shows that 
the opposite can take place even without having a completely populist politician. Even semi-
oligarchic politicians may choose to invest on anti-corruption even if they face with a completely 
selfish regulator.  
The road map of the chapter is as follows. Section 3.2   introduces the model. Section 
0investigates comparative statics of changes in 𝛾 and 𝛿. This section later summarizes the pre-
sented comparative statics into two results and provides some policy implications. Section 3.4  
concludes.  
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3.2  MODEL 
This is a state capture model with three players: the politician, the regulator, and the association 
or the lobby, which is comprised by all operating firms in a market. The timeline of the game 
between players is as the followings: 
1. First stage - The politician determines two things: (1) amount of investment on deregu-
lation; (2) amount of investment on anti-corruption policies. This can be presented as if 
the politician determines total expenditure on institutional reforms and the share allo-
cated to each of deregulation and anti-corruption policies.  
2. Second stage -  the regulator chooses the industry size.  
3. Third stage - the lobby (association) chooses the level of transfer to the regulator.  
4. Fourth stage - Firms compete in Cournot fashion.  
 The equilibrium can be found by going backward from the fourth stage. 
3.2.1  Firms, the Regulator and the Lobby 
The inverse demand function and the cost function are the same as (1.1) and (2.1) in chapters 
one and two. The regulator’s problem is also the same as in chapter two. Similar to chapter two, 
firms may establish an association to follow the interest of the industry by convincing the regu-
lator to keep the doors of the market closed. The lobby’s problem is the same as in chapter two.
3.2.2  The Politician 
The politician’s ultimate goal is to maximise his chance of being re-elected. The model investi-
gates the role of the politician in improving two specific institutions: deregulation, 𝑦, and anti-
corruption policies, 𝑧. The politician needs to finance the total expenditure of implementing 
these two reform policies through tax. Hence, it is assumed that 𝑇 is the total tax or total amount 
of money to implement 𝑦 and 𝑧. Therefore,  
𝑇 = 𝑦 + 𝑧 
𝑦 = 𝜇𝑇, 𝜇 ∈ [0,1]. 
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The politician is the top level in the hierarchy of the government. Therefore, he can monitor or 
appoint the regulator, who is of a lower level in the body of government. The politician under-
stands that investment on both anti-corruption policies and deregulation policies will increase 
social welfare and hence his chance of maintaining the office.33  
Deregulation (𝑦), is the same as in chapter two. Probability of apprehension is likely to depend 
on the monitoring intensity or supervisory effort of the player with higher rank (Mishra, 2007), 
which in this model is the politician. Hence, probability of apprehension, 𝜂, is assumed to be 
determined by the effort of the politician to fight with corruption. The success of anti-corruption 
measures is likely to depend on both the honesty as well as monitoring effort of the agents 
(Mishra, 2007). This model encompasses both aspects by letting the players in the governmental 
section to be varied in type and also by assuming that the efforts of the politician determines the 
probability of apprehension. 
The politician’s investment on anti-corruption (𝑧) determines the probability of apprehension 
(𝜂) through the following function  
 𝜂 =
1 + ℎ𝑧
𝑘𝑐 + ℎ𝑧
 
(3.1)  
There are two constants in (3.1). The first one, ℎ, reflects the fixed factors of a society that 
affects the probability of apprehension.34 It also gives us a full range of 𝜂 between 0 and 1. In 
each setting, there is an initial probability of apprehension, 𝜂(𝑧 = 0) = 1/𝑘𝑐 , which is deter-
mined by 𝑘𝑐, which is another constant to make 𝜂 a number between 0 and 1. These two can be 
referred to some other relevant fixed factors recognised in the literature; for instance, general 
features of transition countries, some general characteristics of the initial transition stage (Hoff 
and Stiglitz, 2004; Andvig, 2007), and the role of supporting institutions that affects the anti-
                                                 
33 Unlike the model presented in Andvig (2007), my model does not take into account plan-determined prices or 
plan-allocated output, which are the main concerns for early stages of transition from centrally planned to market-
oriented economies. The model rather investigates the problems of the elite after some reform when the govern-
ment does not interfere in the market but they still have power in determining the industry size. 
34 As shown by the model of Hoff and Stiglitz (2008), it is hard to create a demand for rule of law from scratch. 
The constant ℎ can represent all those that Hoff and Stiglitz mention as factors that reduce demands for rule of 
law. For the case of Russia, they note to ‘lack of experience of a market economy, an historical legacy of corruption, 
a corrupt privatisation, abundant natural resources, open capital markets and a hyperinflation in that by destroying 
private savings aggravated the consequences of imperfect capital markets and made asset stripping appear relatively 
more attractive’. All mentioned factors can exogenously change ℎ and hence the probability of apprehension. Al-
most all of the above are present in Iran, Venezuela and a number of other resource-abundant economies in the 
last few years as well.  
 127 
 
corruption programmes and cannot be put in place overnight (Rousso and Steves, 2007). Ac-
cording to Hoff and Stiglitz (2004), 𝑘𝑐 can also reflect the pessimism about policies implemented 
by the government and whether or not they have been associated with corrupt privatisation.35  
The politician’s objective function is to maximise the probability of re-election by choosing 𝑦 
and 𝑧. As was discussed earlier, this chapter benefits from distinguishing two levels of policy-
makers. Moreover, the objective functions of these two are assumed to be different. Perotti and 
Volpin (2004) relax the assumption of having just one policymaker but the objective functions 
of the policymakers are assumed to be same. In other words, they do not let a hierarchy and 
hence different objective functions among policymakers. 
In case the economy benefits a healthy electoral system, nothing can enhance the politician’s 
chance of re-election like an increase in social welfare. Therefore, the objective function of the 
politician can be framed as the following format. 
 max
y,z
𝐸 =
𝛿. 𝑐𝑠 + (1 − 𝛿). (𝑝𝑠 − 𝑇𝑟)
𝑘𝑒 + 𝛿. 𝑐𝑠 + (1 − 𝛿). (𝑝𝑠 − 𝑇𝑟)
 
(3.2)  
𝑘𝑒 is a constant which makes the probability of re-election in [0,1] and can be regarded as a 
reflection of the institutional settings of an economy in status quo. For instance, following Hoff 
and Stiglitz (2004) this constant can show the presence of civil society institutions, such as a free 
press, churches and political clubs, with countervailing power to hold the state to account.  
The numerator of (3.2) is ‘political welfare’ and is defined as follows.  
Definition 3-1 Political welfare is the weighted sum of consumer surplus and producer 
surplus net of transfers, where weights reflect the politician’s strategy on how important 
is consumer surplus versus producer surplus net of transfers.  
𝛿 is the weight that the politician assigns to the 𝑐𝑠. The more populist politician cares more 
about the consumers rather than producers. Definitely, 1 − 𝛿 shows the importance of the 𝑝𝑠 
                                                 
35 The model is different in defining the indicator of good governance from that of Hoff and Stiglitz in a sense that 
in my model higher indicator will be achieved as the politician invests more on it. Whereas in their model, the main 
determinant of rule of law, and hence good governance, is the number of demanders. In other words, I assume that 
demand for good governance will show itself in the pressure from the social welfare side. It is assumed that in this 
economy what is needed is more investment in enhancing quicker and fairer legal system to punish wrongdoers. 
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in the politician’s eyes. Following Campante and Ferreira (2007) and Acemoglu (2008) we con-
sider high 𝛿 as a more populist politician and the low one as a more oligarchic politician. In this 
regard, a populist politician sets his strategy to address more the consumers’ concerns. Hence, 
he has a base among consumers.36 On the other hand, an oligarchic politician’s strategy is to 
target the producers’ concerns and therefore, he has a base among producers.37 For instance, a 
politician with lower 𝛿 is expected to follow import-substitution policies in a way which can 
protect the business of the rich elite.38  
I take 𝛿 exogenous while in the framework presented by Acemoglu (2008), one can investigate 
the endogenous regime transition between oligarchy and democracy. This can be done when the 
model considers the within-elite conflict.39  
Different types of the politician choose different combination of 𝑦 and 𝑧 to maximise the prob-
ability of re-election. Failing to make this balance will endanger the politician’s reputation.  
Depending on the parameters of the model, we can think of other simpler versions of the poli-
tician’s objective function.40 
                                                 
36 These days the word populism is being used to describe right wing politicians like Trump while some leftist 
politicians such as Maduro and Corbyn are also considered as populists. What this mainly refers to the left wing 
politicians who mostly favour consumer surplus and are obviously different from the right wing politicians.  
 
37 What I mean by the politician’s level of populism is similar to what Perotti and Volpin (2004) introduce as 
measures of 'political accountability' like constraints on the executive. They define 'political accountability' as sensi-
tivity to voter preferences. In their work, the degree of accountability is proxied by the number of independent 
legislators. Hence, like Perotti and Volpin (2004), as the political system becomes more democratic, politicians 
become more ‘accountable’ to voters and 𝛿 increases. Following another suggestion of Perotti and Volpin, 𝛿 can 
be interpreted as a measure of voter education, which allows us to test for variety of other results. 
 
38 Acemoglu (2008) notes that the classification of societies into 'democratic' and 'oligarchic' categories does not 
necessarily coincide with the democracy scores used in the empirical literature. Therefore, for empirical studies a 
more accurate look into this issue would be required. 
 
39 In cases of formerly central planned economies, 𝛿 can represent the role of the Communist Party as discussed in 
(Andvig, 2007). Since the Communist party used to combine ‘the economic roles of entrepreneurship, planning and 
capital markets with the political functions of security, repression and participation’, it helps to understand the 
workings of the European centrally planned economies. The party in some economies had to act somewhat like an 
entrepreneur and sometime as a social planner. According to Andvig (2007), one can see the following three patterns 
in the transition economies: (i) the Communist Party could keep its power, like the case of China and Vietnam, or 
(2) the Communist Party loses its power and have no established replacement, like the formerly Soviet Union 
countries (except Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), Romania and – partly – Bulgaria, or (iii) The Communist Party 
loses its power and there are alternative, established political forces, like the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. 
Andvig believes that only in the first one, the rate of institutional change was a policy variable and in the other two 
cases, the speed of change was not under anyone’s control. 
 
40 For instance, when the politician assigns equal weight to 𝑐𝑠 and 𝑝𝑠, 𝛿 = 0.5, and hence equation (3.2) can be re-
written as  
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3.2.3  Equilibrium 
In order to derive the subgame perfect equilibrium, I follow backward induction. Therefore, 
firms solve their problem assuming a Cournot competition among themselves, given the out-
come of the game between other players. The result is the equilibrium quantity and price of a 
typical firm which is the same as what presented in chapter one.  
Then the game between the lobby and the regulator will start. Hence, the lobby finds the reac-
tion function of the regulator and will plug it into his objective function. So, to find 𝛼𝑟𝑒, the 
lobby will find 𝑁𝑟𝑒 by solving the regulator’s problem which is exactly the same as the regula-
tor’s objective function in chapter two.  
 max
N
𝐺 = (1 − 𝛾). 𝑐𝑠 + (1 − (1 − 𝛼(1 − 𝜂))𝛾)𝑝𝑠 (3.3)  
Following the first order condition for the regulator we have 
 𝐺𝑁
′ = (1 − 𝛾)𝑐𝑠𝑁
′ + (1 − (1 − 𝛼(1 − 𝜂))𝛾)𝑝𝑠𝑁
′ = 0 (3.4)  
and hence 
 −
𝑐𝑠𝑁
′
𝑝𝑠𝑁
′ = 1 +
𝛼𝛾(1 − 𝜂)
1 − 𝛾
. 
(3.5)  
since 𝑐𝑠𝑁
′ > 0 and 𝑝𝑠𝑁
′ < 0, the regulator determines higher industry size as long as the marginal 
effect of one more licence on consumer surplus is higher than marginal effect on producer sur-
plus.  
By solving (3.4) for 𝑁, we can get the regulator’s reaction as a function of 𝛼, 𝑦 and 𝑧.  
 𝑁𝑟𝑒 = 𝑁𝑟𝑒(𝛼, 𝑦, 𝑧), 𝜕𝑁𝑟 𝜕𝛼⁄ < 0 (3.6)  
By plugging the regulator’s best response into the lobby’s objective function and following the 
first order condition we have  
                                                 
max
y,z
𝐸(𝛿 = 0.5) =
𝑠𝑤𝑎
𝑘𝑒 + 𝑠𝑤𝑎
 
Also, it is assumed that the politician takes into account the effect of corruption. A simpler version can definitely 
be the case where corruption may not be considered as an effective issue in voting for the politician. In such a case, 
the politician’s objective function is as follows  
max
y,z
𝐸(𝑇𝑟 = 0) =
𝛿. 𝑐𝑠 + (1 − 𝛿). 𝑝𝑠
𝑘𝑒 + 𝛿. 𝑐𝑠 + (1 − 𝛿). 𝑝𝑠
 
Similarly, in this case, the politician can assign the same weight to 𝑐𝑠 and 𝑝𝑠 which gives the following simple 
version of the politician’s objective function. 
max
y,z
𝐸(𝛿 = 0.5, 𝑇𝑟 = 0) =
𝑠𝑤
𝑘𝑒 + 𝑠𝑤
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𝐿𝛼
′ = (1 − 𝜂𝜙)(−𝑁𝜋 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑁𝛼
′⏟
−
(𝜋 + 𝑁𝜋𝑁
′)⏟      
+/−
). (3.7)  
𝐿𝛼
′  might be zero only if 𝜋 + 𝑁𝜋𝑁
′ < 0 in which the lhs is elasticity of profit with respect to 
industry size. The specification of the model requires to have the Assumption 1, presented in 
chapter one, satisfied. In case Assumption 1 is violated then we will have 𝐿𝛼
′ < 0, ∀𝛼 and hence 
the lobby may not see the transferring process in favour of its members.  
By solving (3.7) for 𝛼, we can get the lobby’s best response as a function of 𝑦 and 𝑧. 
 𝛼𝑟𝑒 = 𝛼𝑟𝑒(𝑦, 𝑧) (3.8)  
Now the regulator can plug back 𝛼𝑟𝑒 to find 𝑁𝑟𝑒 just as a function of 𝑦 and 𝑧. 
The final problem is that of the politician to take the reaction functions of other players of the 
game and solve his own problem.  
max
𝑦,𝑧
𝐸 = 𝐸(𝛼𝑟𝑒(𝑦, 𝑧),𝑁𝑟𝑒 (𝑦, 𝑧), 𝑦, 𝑧) = 𝐸(𝑦, 𝑧) → 𝑦
∗, 𝑧∗ 
Following the first order conditions (𝜕𝐸 𝜕𝑦⁄ = 0 and 𝜕𝐸 𝜕𝑧⁄ = 0), 𝑦∗ and 𝑧∗ can be found.41 
Depending on the values of 𝛾 and 𝛿 there might be corner solution or interior solutions to the 
problem of the politician. In the following section, it will be discussed that in what cases and 
under what values of the parameters of the model, we might end up with a corner solution or 
an interior one. Then by plugging back 𝑦∗ and 𝑧∗ into other reaction functions, we can work out 
𝑞∗, 𝛼∗,and 𝑁∗. 
Before starting to investigate the policy effects, we need a set of definitions. It turns out that 
equilibrium profit is strictly decreasing in industry size or 𝜕𝜋∗/𝜕𝑁 < 0. This is a confirmation 
of the business-stealing effect, which was discussed and presented in chapters one and two.  
Definition 3-2—Depending on other parameters of the model, there is a level of the reg-
ulator’s selfishness, which is called benevolence threshold and is denoted by ?̲?, such that the 
                                                 
41 The point is maximum if at that point we have the followings satisfied.  
𝜕2𝐸 𝜕𝑇∗2⁄ < 0 and (𝜕2𝐸 𝜕𝑇2)(𝜕2𝐸 𝜕𝜇2⁄ ) − (𝜕2𝐸 𝜕𝑇𝜕𝜇⁄ )2 > 0⁄ . 
I used Maple software and manually did a flavour of ‘branch and bound’ method to ensure the output is the maxi-
mum point. Fishback (2009) provides a full explanation of using this method in Maple. 
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outcome of the game between the regulator and the lobby becomes no transfer for all 
regulators with lower than ?̲?. Formally, it could be written as follows  
 𝛾 = {𝛾: 𝛼∗(𝛾 < 𝛾) = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼∗(𝛾 > 𝛾) > 0}. (3.9)  
To make it simpler, when for a regulator 𝛾 < 𝛾, he has no incentive to participate in the game. 
According to other parameters of the model, 𝛾 may differ. It would be better to distinguish 
regulators according to ?̲?. Further results can be explained better in light of this separation. 
Definition 3-3—The regulator is zero-bribe if the outcome of the model is zero transfer 
(𝛼∗ = 0). Referring to the definition of ?̲? in (3.9), zero-bribe regulators are those with 𝛾 <
?̲?. Consequently, positive-bribe regulators are those with 𝛾 > ?̲?.  
Obviously, positive-bribe regulators are more selfish than zero-bribe regulators.  
There are also two more levels of 𝛾 that are important. First, there is a level of selfishness at 
which the politician starts to invest on anti-corruption policy 
 ?̳? = {𝛾: 𝑧∗ (𝛾 < ?̳?) = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑧∗ (𝛾 > ?̳?) ≥ 0}. (3.10)  
For all level of selfishness lower than ?̳? the politician invests nothing on anti-corruption. The 
next relates to the level of selfishness at which, again, the politician sets the investment on anti-
corruption to zero42.  
 ?̿?𝑧 = {𝛾: 𝑧
∗(?̿?) = 0} (3.11)  
Depending on parameters of the model, there is a level of total expenditure, ?̅?, at which no 
incentive remains for firm. Increasing in total expenditures improves the chance of investing on 
both deregulation, 𝑦, and anti-corruption, 𝑧. As was discussed in chapter 2, An increase in 𝑦, on 
one hand decreases the fixed cost (profit-enhancing effect), but on the other hand, it burdens 
more expenses on firms in terms of taxes (Efficiency-enhancing effect). Decreasing the fixed 
                                                 
42 It can be of two types:  
1. when 𝛿 < 0.6. In this case we won’t have 𝑦∗ = ?̅?.  
2. when 𝛿 > 0.6. In this case 𝑦∗ = ?̅? and 𝜋∗ = 𝑝𝑠∗ = 0. This is the level at which industry size would set 
to unregulated one. In this case no profit would remain for firms or they will transfer all their profit. 
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cost can potentially increase the industry size until it reaches to the industry size under an un-
regulated entry, 𝑁𝑒 . Similar to chapter two, the industry size under an unregulated entry case is 
the number of firms (𝑁𝑒) that remain with no profit for firms in this market. 
 𝑁𝑒 = {𝑁: 𝜋
∗(𝑁𝑒) = 0} (3.12)  
Alternatively, the total tax burden can be increased until the profit becomes equal to zero. Formal 
definition of 𝑇 is as the following 
 𝑇 = min
𝑇
{[𝑇: 𝜋∗(𝑇) = 0], [𝑇: 𝑁∗(𝑇) = 𝑁𝑒]}. (3.13)  
Similarly, given other parameters of the model, there might be a maximum of 𝑦 (or 𝜇) at which, 
like 𝑇, firms are encountered with either zero profit or the case at which they transfer all their 
profits to the regulator. As soon as 𝑦 reaches to a level that can satisfy either of the above, there 
will be no incentive to make transfer. 𝑦 represents that level and can be formally introduced as 
the following  
 𝑦 = min
𝑦
{[𝑦: 𝑁∗(𝑦) = 𝑁], [𝑦: 𝑁∗(𝑦) = 𝑁𝑒 ]}. (3.14)  
It is clear that 𝛾 and 𝛿 are of high impacts on 𝑦. These two conditions in (3.14) are inspired by 
𝜕𝜋∗ 𝜕𝑁⁄ < 0 and 𝜕𝑁𝑒 𝜕𝑦⁄ > 0. 𝑦 as introduced in (2.17) is the minimum of 𝑦 that makes the 
industry size equal to either 𝑁𝑒 or 𝑁.  
Similar to the previous chapters, to guarantee the formation of the lobby, we need to have 
Assumption 2 satisfied. Assumption 2 says that firms may only have the incentive to form the 
lobby provided that the expected profit after forming the lobby is greater than or equal to the 
profit under the first best number of industry size.    
3.3  POLICY EFFECTS 
In this section, I will first look at how the model may react to changes in 𝛾 when the politician 
is neutral or 𝛿 = 0.5. Then the comparative statics of changes in both 𝛿 and 𝛾 will be investi-
gated in Section 3.3.2  . Based on the results, then the politicians will be categorised into different 
types. 
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3.3.1  Neutral Politician, 𝜹 = 𝟎. 𝟓 
I first start with a simple case in which the politician assigns equal weight to consumer surplus 
and producer surplus in his objective function. This makes the political welfare, defined in Def-
inition 3-1, equal to social welfare. This exercise of the neutral politician enables us to look more 
carefully to the mechanics of the model. For instance, this section looks at how reaction func-
tions might be changed according to changes in other parameters of the model.  
In the first stage, the politician chooses 𝑦∗ and 𝑧∗ based on the reaction functions of the other 
players of the game. In the second stage, other players will see the politician’s choices and the 
resulted probability of apprehension based on those. Then the regulator, according to the lobby’s 
reaction function and the politician’s choices, will chose 𝑁∗. The lobby will then choose how 
much to transfer (𝛼∗). At the final stage, given all the choices of other players, firms will compete 
in Cournot fashion.  
Assuming a neutral politician in the office, investments on both deregulation and anti-corrup-
tion, respectively 𝑦∗ and 𝑧∗, turns out to be non-monotonic in the regulator’s level of selfishness, 
𝛾. This is in line with the empirical finding of Klapper et al (2004) that entry regulations are 
neither benign nor welfare improving. Consequently, total tax or 𝑇∗ turns out to be non-mono-
tonic as well. When the regulator is extremely selfish (here in our case, 𝛾 > 0.91), 𝑦∗ and 𝑧∗ are 
decreasing in 𝛾 because the regulator becomes less sensitive to the politician's choices of 𝑦∗ and 
𝑧∗. In other words, the regulator is going to set the industry size less dependent on the politician's 
and the lobby's choices. The politician knows that the extremely selfish regulator may not pay 
attention to his choices of 𝑦∗ and 𝑧∗ and that he is going to set lower industry size whatsoever. 
We know the politician's success depends heavily on social welfare (𝑠𝑤 = 𝑐𝑠 + 𝑝𝑠). Since the 
lower industry size may reduce consumer surplus anyway, the politician will try not to pressure 
firms by burdening more tax (𝑇 = 𝑦 + 𝑧). Therefore, both 𝑦∗ and 𝑧∗ reduce. Appendix 1 dis-
cusses how different combinations of 𝑦∗ and 𝑧∗ may affect the probability of re-election and its 
contours.  
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Figure 3-1 - Investment on Deregulation vs. Regula-
tor's Level of Selfishness, case of 𝛿 = 0.5. 
 
Figure 3-2 - Investment on Anti-Corruption vs. Regu-
lator's Level of Selfishness, case of 𝛿 = 0.5. 
 
 
Figure 3-3 - Total Expenditures on Institutional Reforms vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, case of 𝛿 = 0.5. 
The lobby may also reduce his choice of 𝛼 when the regulator is extremely selfish. Intuitively, 
this is so because the lobby understands that even if they reduce 𝛼, the extrermely selfish regu-
lator is going to choose lower industry size, which is in line with the lobby's intention. Hence, at 
the end, 𝑁∗ and 𝛼∗ will be lower. 
By investigating the changes in reaction functions, we can see the reason behind the described 
behaviour. Based on the lobby’s reaction function presented in (3.8), it is expected that both 𝛾 
and the equilibrium 𝑦 and 𝑧 affect reaction function of the regulator.43 Before going further, it 
                                                 
43 In order to be able to analyse the behaviour of the politician, I need to have 𝑁𝑟𝑒 = 𝑁𝑟𝑒(𝑦, 𝑧) and 𝛼𝑟𝑒 =
𝛼𝑟𝑒(𝑦, 𝑧), reaction functions of the regulator and the lobby, respectively. In order to have these two, we first need 
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would be better to see what would be the effect of a change in 𝛾 on reaction functions of the 
regulator given other variables, including 𝑇∗, are fixed. Then we can fix 𝛾 to see the effect of a 
change in 𝑇 on the reaction functions.  
A more benevolent regulator would work more in favour of social welfare rather than his per-
sonal welfare. So, as depicted in Figure 3-4, given a relatively benevolent regulator in the office, 
upon an increase in 𝛾, a higher industry size will be determined. Also, as the level of selfishness 
increases, the regulator becomes more sensitive to the transfer from the lobby.  
𝜕𝑁𝑟(𝛼)
𝜕𝛾
< 0,
𝜕2𝑁𝑟(𝛼)
𝜕𝛾2
> 0 
The effect of a change in total tax (𝑇∗) on reaction function of the regulator is opposite to that 
for 𝛾. As the politician determines higher total tax, the industry size determined by the regulator 
increases. The regulator knows that when the politician allocates more resources (higher 𝑇∗), it 
is going to enhance the detection technology or deregulation or both.  
𝜕𝑁𝑟(𝛼)
𝜕𝑇
> 0,
𝜕2𝑁𝑟(𝛼)
𝜕𝑇2
> 0  
                                                 
to find 𝑁𝑟𝑒 = 𝑁𝑟𝑒(𝛼, 𝑦, 𝑧) and then plug it into the lobby's obective function and solve for 𝛼 to find 𝛼𝑟𝑒(𝑦, 𝑧), the 
lobby's reaction function. Then, we need to plug this into the regulator's problem to have 𝑁𝑟𝑒 = 𝑁𝑟𝑒(𝑦, 𝑧).  
In order to realize the effect of a change in exogenous variables, like 𝛾, we need to have the contours of 𝛼 and 𝑁 
in the space of 𝑦 and 𝑧. Then we can track the changes of 𝛾 on these two.  
Due to problems to solve the model symbolically, I cannot draw the contours of 𝛼𝑟𝑒 and 𝑁𝑟𝑒 . One option to find 
the reaction functions would be to run the model for numerous combinations of the parameters and then sort them 
by 𝛼∗ or 𝑁∗ in order to be able to draw the contours of 𝛼 and 𝑁 for different combinations of 𝑦 and 𝑧. 
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Figure 3-4 - The Regulator’s Reaction Function for 
Different Levels of the Regulator’s Selfishness 
 
Figure 3-5 - The Regulator’s Reaction Function for 
Different Levels of Total Tax 
Now that the effect of 𝛾 and 𝑇 on the reaction functions are investigated separately, we can look 
at the combination of both. By a change in 𝛾, we will have a new equilibrium combinations of 
(𝑦∗, 𝑧∗) and, hence, a new equilibrium 𝑇∗. The following sections will discuss how changes in 
parameters of the model affect 𝑦∗ and 𝑧∗ in details. According to these new combinations, the 
reaction function of the regulator would shift. However, the direction of shift is different for 
different combinations of (𝑦∗, 𝑧∗), which will be explained below.  
When 𝛾 < 0.91, the reaction function would shift as suggested in the Figure 3-6 and when 𝛾 >
0.91, the reaction function would shift as in Figure 3-7. 
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Figure 3-6 - Changes of Reaction Function of the 
Regulator, when 𝛾 < 0.91. 
 
Figure 3-7 - Changes of Reaction Function of the 
Regulator, when 𝛾 > 0.91. 
 
Knowing how the reaction function reacts to changes in 𝑦 and 𝑧, as depicted in Figure 3-6 and 
Figure 3-7, the equilibrium (𝛼∗,  𝑁∗) will be resulted. According to the findings, when 𝛾 < 0.91, 
by an increase in 𝛾,  𝑁∗ is decreasing and 𝛼∗ is increasing in 𝛾. Then for γ > 0.91, 𝑁∗ remains 
decreasing and 𝛼∗ becomes decreasing too.  
Reaction functions of the regulator gets affected by the chosen combination of (𝑦∗, 𝑧∗) as 
depicted in Figure 3-8 and Figure 3-9. In the first case, as 𝛾 increases, 𝛼∗ increases and 𝑁∗ 
decreases. In the second case where 𝛾 > 0.91, increase in 𝛾 results to lower 𝛼∗ and 𝑁∗. The 
common thing in both cases is that industry size will be always lower under a more selfish 
regulator, but the behaviour of transfer (𝛼∗) depends on the value of 𝛾 and whether it lies below 
or above 0.91. 
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Figure 3-8 - Equilibrium Industry Size and Transfer, 𝛾 < 0.91 
 
Figure 3-9 - Equilibrium Industry Size and Transfer, The case of extremely selfish regulator, 𝛾 > 0.91 
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As the next step, we should see how 𝛼∗ may change. As expected, the lobby anticipates that a 
higher 𝑇 will be spent to improve the institutional framework. Given better institutional frame-
works, it is expected that the regulator increases the industry size upon an increase in 𝑇. There-
fore, the lobby’s response to all the described changes is an increase in 𝛼∗, or the regulator’s 
share from the firms’ profit.  
 
Figure 3-10 - Equilibrium Transfer vs. the Regulator's 
Level of Selfishness for Different Levels of Total Tax; 
(𝜇 = 0.8, 𝜙 = 0.7) 
 
Figure 3-11 - Equilibrium Transfer vs. Total Tax for 
Different Levels of the Regulator's Selfishness; (𝑐 =
100, 𝐹 = 100, 𝜙 = 0.7) 
What this exercise shows is that given fixed 𝛿, the outcome of the model differs for different 
values of 𝛾. This echoes Perotti and Volpin (2004) finding that by taking into account the polit-
ical process and institutional context, one cannot offer a generic recommendation on economic 
reforms.  
This exercise was done to show how the equilibrium can change according to changes in 𝑦∗ and 
𝑧∗. I will postpone investigating the effects on 𝑇𝑟∗, 𝑠𝑤∗ and 𝐸∗ to the following sections.  
3.3.2  Effects of Politicians’ Type (Changes in 𝜹) 
This section aims to investigate the comparative statics of changes in 𝛿 and 𝛾. First, I will present 
a summary of the economic story behind the outcomes, and then the outcomes of the model 
under different types of politicians will be elaborated in more details.  
The model shows that the behaviour of the variables of interest are different for extreme types 
of the politician and the regulator. In extreme cases of the key parameters of the model, other 
parameters are not as important as they are in the medium cases. For instance, consider the two 
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main exogenous variables of the model, the regulator’s level of selfishness, 𝛾, and the politician’s 
level of populism, 𝛿. Among these two, the politician with a very low or very high 𝛿 is less 
sensitive to values of 𝛾. Likewise, this type of politician has less of an impact on the choices of 
the extreme types of the regulator. This can be taken as an extension for the result of Perotti 
and Volpin (2004) that more accountable countries are less subject to changes in other parame-
ters of the model and specifically political interference. The following are comparative statics of 
changes in 𝛾 given fixed 𝛿. 
Based on the similar behaviours in different variables, the model enables us to distinguish four 
different groups of politicians: (1) oligarchic politicians; (2) semi-oligarchic politicians; (3) semi-
populist politicians and (4) populist politicians. This distinction of politicians is mainly based on 
how 𝑧∗ and 𝑠𝑤∗ behave in different regions of 𝛿 and 𝛾. It will be discussed that we cannot 
determine fixed ranges of 𝛿 to each type of the politician. It will be shown that, depending on 
the parameters of the model, the corresponding ranges of 𝛿 to each type of the politician will be 
varied. Therefore, whether a politician is regarded as populist or not, depends on his behaviour 
with respect to changes in other parameters. 
In terms of investment on anti-corruption, an oligarchic politician stops investing on anti-cor-
ruption for higher levels of the regulator’s selfishness. However, the semi-oligarchic politician 
insists more on investing in rule of law and may continue to do so even for a completely selfish 
regulator.  
What distinguishes the first two types of the politician from the other two is the behaviour of 
social welfare. Oligarchic and semi-oligarchic politicians are the types who can benefit from a 
higher level of the regulator’s selfishness. The outcome of the model shows that social welfare 
is non-monotonic in 𝛾 for oligarchic and semi-oligarchic politicians, but it turns out to be mon-
otonically decreasing in 𝛾 for semi-populist and populist politicians. 
Political welfare which was defined in Definition 3-4 as weighted social welfare, is the main 
determinant of the politician’s probability of re-election. Having said the behaviour of 𝑠𝑤∗, the 
probability of re-election can be increasing in 𝛾 for the first two groups of politicians. However, 
for semi-populist (including neutral) and populist politicians, the probability of re-election turns 
out to be monotonically decreasing in 𝛾. 
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The politician might have the chance to utilise the regulator’s selfishness to increase his chance 
of re-election. An oligarchic politician assigns a higher weight on producer surplus. In case he 
faces a zero-bribe regulator or a relatively more benevolent regulator, he knows that the regulator 
works more in favour of the public rather than his own interests. In this case, it turns out that 
marginal effect of 𝑐𝑠 on the politician’s chance of re-election is higher than that of 𝑝𝑠. Therefore, 
the politician does not stop investing on anti-corruption. An oligarchic politician knows that 
when 𝛾 exceeds some level, the main concern of the regulator would be to guarantee his own 
personal welfare, not that of the public. This is where an oligarchic politician can benefit from 
having a more selfish regulator in the office. In this case, the politician knows that between 
consumers and producers, the latter might benefit more from the regulator’s choice. Hence, the 
regulator’s choice coincides with the oligarchic politician’s intention, which is to maximise his 
chance of re-election, mainly through 𝑝𝑠 rather than 𝑐𝑠. The politician stops investing in anti-
corruption to make some space for the lobby to convince the regulator to work more in favour 
of producers. Thus, the transfers will be made and consequently the industry size will be 
dropped. This will end with an increase in producer surplus, which will be more than the decrease 
in consumer surplus. Hence, the outcome will be an increase in social welfare. Moreover, the 
oligarchic and semi-oligarchic politician assigns a higher weight on producer surplus, and there-
fore, for higher values of 𝛾 the probability of re-election will increase in 𝛾.  
Whether the regulator can be considered as zero-bribe or positive-bribe depends on the politi-
cian’s type. A semi-populist politician is more in support of investing on anti-corruption. He 
always tries to set policies more in favour of consumers. Hence, the regulator’s selfishness does 
not work towards the main intention of this type of the politician. Consequently, the politician’s 
chance of re-election might be endangered. This means that the story is opposite to that of 
oligarchic and semi-oligarchic politicians.  
Appendix 3 presents the behaviour of variables in more details. In light of the results presented 
in Appendix 3, the next section compares all the different types of politicians. In other words, 
Appendix 3 discusses the details and the next section provides a more general picture that em-
powers us with a detailed mapping.  
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3.3.2.1 Comparing Different Politicians 
This section presents a more general picture by comparing different politicians. The goal is to 
see how different variables of interest behave for different politicians. Given the outcomes dis-
cussed earlier, it should be started by looking at the politician’s choice of 𝑦∗ and 𝑧∗ and then 
investigating the lobby’s 𝛼∗, and the regulator’s 𝑁∗ and the resulted 𝑇𝑟∗, 𝑠𝑤∗ and 𝐸∗. To make 
the main text shorter, the first few steps are presented in Appendix 3. Based on the definition 
of total transfer, presented in (1.10), we need to know the behaviours of 𝛼∗, 𝑁∗ and 𝜋∗. There-
fore, given the behaviour of basic variables of 𝑦∗, 𝑧∗, 𝛼∗ and 𝑁∗ which are discussed in Appendix 
3, I continue this section by investigating the behaviour of corruption. Table 1 in Appendix 4 
tries to summarise the changes in all interesting variables for different values of 𝛾 and 𝛿.  
By introducing 𝛿, we may see some changes in the outcomes of the model. For instance, 𝑇𝑟∗ 
shows different behaviour for different ranges of 𝛿 and 𝛾. This section examines the outcomes 
under different values of 𝛿. The following analysis may help to answer the question that, assum-
ing all parameters fixed, how the changes in the regulator’s selfishness and the politician’s level 
of populism, may change the behaviour of corruption. First, we should see in what cases the 
lobby and the regulator may play the bribery game. In other words, we would like to know 
whether the economy always experiences positive corruption or is there a case with no corrup-
tion. After that the magnitude and the trend of corruption will be investigated.  
Figure 3-12 depicts the behaviour of corruption for different types of politicians. Clearly, there 
is no need to have a completely benevolent regulator to benefit from zero corruption as it is zero 
even for the regulators with 𝛾 > 0. However, the politician’s level of populism affects the level 
of benevolence threshold. The following Remark summarizes the above.  
Remark 9 (1) To reach to zero corruption, an economy does not need to have 
a completely benevolent regulator. (2) The type of the politician changes the 
benevolence threshold and hence the group of positive-bribe regulators. 
A more populist politician, 𝛿 ∈ (0.32,1), decides more in favour of the consumers and, hence, 
works such that finally the industry size increases. This is not in the lobby’s interest, and it re-
quires the lobby’s action to convince the regulator to stop the trend; even if the regulator does 
not welcome transfers. Therefore, the model predicts that as the politician gets more populist, 
more benevolent regulators might be involved in bribery process. In other words, those who 
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were not involved in the bribery process under the case of a relatively more oligarchic politician, 
might get involved due to an increase in 𝛿. 
It is clear that the discontinuity in 𝑧∗ and consequently 𝛼∗, discussed in Appendix 2 section I, 
makes 𝑇𝑟∗ discontinuous too. Given that the regulator is selfish enough to have the lobby-
regulator game started, corruption can be discontinuous. Now, two more questions remain to 
be answered: (1) does a more selfish regulator increase corruption? and (2) would corruption be 
reduced given a more populist politician, who supposedly assumed to be more supportive of 
anti-corruption? The first question should be answered by looking at the trend of corruption in 
Figure 3-12. Answer to the second question lies in comparing magnitudes of corruption in Figure 
3-12.  
 
Figure 3-12 - Corruption vs. the Regulator's Level of Selfishness for Different Values of the Politician's Level of 
Populism 
In terms of the general trend of 𝑇𝑟∗, for all different levels of 𝛿, corruption is non-monotonic 
in 𝛾. Chapter one shows the same result. To see the reason of the non-monotonicity of 𝑇𝑟∗, we 
need to look back into the components of corruption, i.e. 𝛼∗, 𝑁∗ and 𝜋∗.44 In short, the reason 
lies in the marginal effect of each of the components on 𝑇𝑟∗. As in chapter one, for extremely 
high 𝛾, by a rise in 𝛾, 𝑁∗ would be determined very low. This will have two effects: (1) the lobby 
                                                 
44 Figure 3-58 to Figure 3-60 in Appendix 3 present the behaviour of these three with respect to changes in 𝛾 and 
𝛿. 
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is happy for the decline of 𝑁∗ and hence shares less of its profit. Therefore, 𝛼∗ will be deter-
mined low as well; (2) Due to business-stealing effect, profit would be higher. The effects of 𝑁∗ 
is negative and the effect of 𝛼∗ and 𝜋∗ are positive on 𝑇𝑟∗. Note that (1 − 𝛼) appears in 𝑇𝑟∗. 
The marginal effect of 𝛼∗ and the marginal effect of higher 𝜋∗ are lower than the marginal effects 
of 𝑁∗. Therefore, 𝑇𝑟∗ would be decreasing for very high 𝛾. 
In terms of the magnitude of corruption, generally, a more populist politician invests higher 
stakes on anti-corruption, which will increase the probability of apprehension. Therefore, the 
general intuition is to expect lower corruption given a more populist politician in the office. 
However, the model reveals that a more populist politician may or may not cause lower corrup-
tion. An economy with a more oligarchic politician might end up with a lower level of corrup-
tion, compared to a relatively more populist politician. That happens when the regulator is either 
very selfish or very altruistic. For medium values of selfishness, which in our case turns out to 
be 𝛾 ∈ (0.6,0.9), corruption under a more oligarchic politician is higher compared to other 
politicians. Therefore, only for the specified range of 𝛾, the outcome of the model is in line with 
the general intuition, not for all values of 𝛾.45 Increasing the relation of industry size in δ is 
consistent with the main result of Perotti and Volpin (2004). They show the same relation both 
theoretically and empirically. However, 𝛼∗ might behave differently depending on the value of 
𝛾. Consequently, an extremely oligarchic politician may burden less corruption to the economy 
when it is being ruled by an extremely selfish regulator.  
Scale-neutral corruption is depicted in Figure 3-13. This figure confirms that whatever found on 
the behaviour of corruption is not due to scales and even scale-neutral corruption has the same 
pattern of change.  
                                                 
45 To be more accurate, by having a look at Figure 3-58 to Figure 3-60 in Appendix 2, one can find that an increase 
in 𝛿 increases 𝑁∗ and reduces 𝜋∗, regardless of the value of 𝛾. 
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Figure 3-13 - Scale-neutral Corruption vs. the Regulator's Level of Selfishness for Different Values of the Politi-
cian's Level of Populism 
In an economy with a relatively more populist politician, higher probability of apprehension is 
expected. Therefore, the lobby will try harder to convince the regulator. The outcome is that the 
regulators become of the positive-bribe type with lower level of 𝛾 when they expect a more 
populist politician. In other words, regulators with lower level of selfishness could be engaged 
in the bribery process when the politician who rules the office is relatively more populist. It was 
previously discussed in (3.16) that the benevolence threshold is decreasing in 𝛿 for semi-oligar-
chic politicians. 
It is important to note that a politician with higher level of populism is more sensitive to the 
level of the regulator’s selfishness. Therefore, the type of the politician matters as it determines 
the sensitivity of 𝛼∗, 𝑁∗ and 𝑧∗ to 𝛾. These three are more sensitive to 𝛾 for a more populist 
politician.  
 Higher levels of the politician’s populism decreases corruption only if both the politician’s 
level of populism and the regulator’s level of selfishness do not lie in extreme values.  
In other words, Result 1 implies that when the regulator is either very benevolent or very selfish, 
an economy with a less oligarchic politician experiences higher corruption. 
Usually it is expected to have more investment on anti-corruption policies when a more populist 
politician rules the office. However, the model shows that depending on other parameters of the 
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model having a more populist politician, and hence, a higher investment on anti-corruption pol-
icies may end up with higher corruption. This model provides a framework which can explain 
the theory behind the empirical finding of Rousso and Steves (2007) in which the sharp decline 
of corruption between 2002 and 2005 in the transition countries, is not associated with the in-
tensity of short-term anti-corruption initiatives in the preceding period (1999–2002).  
In terms of policy implication, Result 1 and the point mentioned in the preceding paragraph 
show that: (1) When the regulator’s selfishness is extremely high, there is no need to invest more 
on anti-corruption. The regulator chooses the industry size more independent of the parameters 
of the model. Therefore, players lose their incentive to participate in the bribery. (2) The decline 
in corruption in the case of extremely selfish regulators is not due to the politician’s policies, but 
rather is due to the fact that a highly selfish regulator decides such that those who are prone to 
be positive-bribe regulators may see their goal fulfilled even without making higher offers of 
bribery.  
It should be noted that, as Rousso and Steves (2007) emphasised, anti-corruption initiatives are 
not quick fixes and are mainly effective in the longer term. Hence, to empirically investigate the 
policy implications of this model on corruption, one should take into account longer-term effects 
of anti-corruption policies.  
Social welfare is another interesting variable to be investigated after corruption. To find how 
changes in 𝛾 and 𝛿 affect 𝑠𝑤∗, we need to first check the behaviour of 𝑐𝑠∗ and 𝑝𝑠∗, which are 
the components of 𝑠𝑤∗.46 The regulator’s level of selfishness has opposite effects on 𝑐𝑠∗ and 
𝑝𝑠∗. For almost all values of 𝛾, 𝜕𝑐𝑠∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ < 0, 𝜕𝑝𝑠∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0. Therefore, the effect on 𝑠𝑤∗ de-
pends on the magnitude of each effect; by an increase in 𝛾, if the positive effect of 𝛾 on 𝑐𝑠∗ is 
bigger than that on 𝑝𝑠∗, then 𝑠𝑤∗ becomes increasing in 𝛾. In the opposite case, 𝑠𝑤∗ becomes 
decreasing in 𝛾. The aggregate effect is shown in Figure 3-14.  
In terms of magnitude, an increase in 𝛿 ends to higher 𝑐𝑠∗ and lower 𝑝𝑠∗. However, it is clear 
that the effect of 𝛿 on 𝑐𝑠∗ almost always outweighs that on 𝑝𝑠∗. Therefore, social welfare is 
greater for a more populist politician regardless of the regulator’s level of selfishness. 
                                                 
46 Figure 3-61 and Figure 3-62 in Appendix 3 present the behaviour of 𝑐𝑠∗ and 𝑝𝑠∗ in response to changes in 𝛾 and 
𝛿. 
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Figure 3-14 - Equilibrium Social Welfare vs. the Regulator's Level of Selfishness for Different Types of the Politi-
cian 
The economic indicator of social welfare, which was introduced in (1.11), shows the same be-
haviour. However, the effect of 𝛾 would be lower. In other words, social welfare is still increasing 
in 𝛾 when an oligarchic politician rules the office, but the sensitivity to the regulator’s selfishness 
is lower compared to the case of accounting social welfare. 
 
Figure 3-15 - Equilibrium Social Welfare Net of Transfers vs. the Regulator's Level of Selfishness for Different 
Types of the Politician 
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In light of the behaviour of 𝑠𝑤∗, we can compare how 𝐸∗ reacts to changes in 𝛾 and 𝛿 for 
different types of politician. It was mentioned that a relatively more populist politician will be 
less affected by the regulator’s selfishness. In technical words, the sensitivity of 𝐸∗ to 𝛾 is lower 
for higher 𝛿. However, a more careful consideration of 𝐸∗ shows that for medium levels of 𝛿 
(𝛿 = 0.4), 𝐸∗ is almost constant for all levels of the regulator’s selfishness. For relatively higher 
levels of 𝛿 (0.5 < 𝛿 < 0.6), 𝐸∗ is decreasing in 𝛾. This means that the politician prefers to have 
a less selfish regulator in the office to increase his own chance of success. In other words, a 
populist politician may have lower chance of success in case the economy experiences a relatively 
more selfish regulator. Intuitively, higher levels of populism in the politician necessitates a higher 
investment on detection technology and, hence, an improvement in the probability of apprehen-
sion. 
 
Figure 3-16 - Probability of Re-election vs. the Regulator's Level of Selfishness for Different Values of the Politi-
cian's Level of Populism 
Not surprisingly, by assuming 𝛾 fixed, a more populist politician has a higher chance of success 
in election. Intuitively, this is expected because a populist politician invests more on consumer-
oriented policies like anti-corruption, which ultimately enhances social welfare. 
Figure 3-16 shows that, as expected, 𝐸∗ is higher for higher 𝛿. In addition, probability of re-
election for a more populist politician is less sensitive to the regulator’s level of selfishness. This 
means that, in general, the economy in which a populist politician rules would be less vulnerable 
to the regulator’s level of selfishness.  
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For low levels of 𝛿 (𝛿 = 0.1 and 𝛿 = 0.3), it is in the politician’s interest to have a more selfish 
regulator in the office. In other words, an oligarchic politician ends up to higher probability of 
success when a relatively more selfish regulator is in the office. 
This is mainly due to the politician’s level of populism. A populist politician assigns a higher 
weight to 𝑐𝑠 and less weight to (𝑝𝑠 − 𝑇𝑟). 𝑐𝑠∗ is monotonically decreasing in 𝛾 for all different 
values of 𝛿. On the other hand, 𝑝𝑠∗ is monotonically increasing in 𝛾 for all values of 𝛿. Even 
after deducting 𝑇𝑟∗, the graph of (𝑝𝑠∗ − 𝑇𝑟∗) remains increasing for a wide range of 𝛾. Low 𝛿 
causes the 𝑐𝑠∗ part to be dominated by the (𝑝𝑠∗ − 𝑇𝑟∗) part.  
Remark 10 Depending on the politician’s type, social welfare can be non-mon-
otonic in γ.  
Both accounting and economic definitions of social welfare are decreasing in γ for all types of 
the politician except the extremely oligarchic ones. Intuitively, it is expected to have lower social 
welfare when an economy experiences a more selfish regulator. However, the model shows that 
having a more selfish regulator does not necessarily end in lower social welfare. Since the goal 
of an oligarchic politician and a selfish regulator are the same, upon an increase in 𝛾, the increase 
in 𝑝𝑠 can surpass the decrease in 𝑐𝑠 which ultimately ends with higher social welfare and, hence, 
non-monotonic 𝑠𝑤∗ in 𝛾. 
 Higher level of selfishness in the regulator would enhance the politician’s chance of re-
election only if the politician is either semi-oligarchic or oligarchic. For relatively more populist 
politicians, higher levels of the regulator’s selfishness endangers the politician’s chance of re-election.  
Result 2 is the direct consequence of Remark 10 because social welfare is the main determinant 
of probability of re-election. Result 2 says that 𝐸∗ turns out to be non-monotonic in γ for 
relatively more oligarchic politicians.  
Intuitively, it is expected to have lower chance of re-election in case the economy experiences a 
more selfish regulator. However, the model shows that an oligarchic politician will be benefitted 
by a more selfish regulator. Since a more selfish regulator works in favour of an oligarchic poli-
tician, he can enhance the politician’s chance of re-election. Result 2 says that the regulator’s 
selfishness may only harm semi-populist and populist politicians’ chances of success, not that of 
oligarchic and semi-oligarchic politicians. The policy implication of the above is that, given an 
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oligarchic politician in the office, he may benefit more from a selfish regulator rather than a 
benevolent one. 
3.4  CONCLUSION 
The model presented in this chapter comprises of a politician, a regulator and a lobby in a three-
tier hierarchical model. The politician maximises his chance of re-election by determining the 
combination of two policy reforms of deregulation and anti-corruption. The model assumes the 
space of the politician’s type to be a continuous variable in a range. The different types of poli-
ticians assign different weighs on the two main components of social welfare; consumer surplus 
and producer surplus. On one side of the spectrum, a populist politician assigns higher weight 
to consumer surplus, and on the other side, an oligarchic politician assigns higher weight on 
producer surplus. In the investigation of the formerly centrally planned economies, the politi-
cian’s level of populism can show the role of the Communist party (Andvig, 2007). The regula-
tor’s type, like in chapters one and two, also varies from selfish to benevolent, depending on the 
weight he assigns to his personal welfare compared to social welfare.  
By assuming the type of the politician and the regulator to be a continuous variable in a range, 
the model enables us to have a more detailed picture of comparative statics of changes in poli-
cymakers’ type on outcomes of the model. Depending on parameter, outcomes of the model 
help us to distinguish the specific range of each of the four different types of politicians: oligar-
chic, semi-oligarchic, semi-populist and populist. Moreover, based on parameters of the model, 
and namely the level of politician’s populism, the model helps us to determine the specific range 
of two general types of the regulator: zero-bribe or positive-bribe. 
Comparative statics of the model also show that an economy can experience zero corruption 
even without a completely benevolent regulator. Moreover, players’ characteristics or prefer-
ences are of lower importance when parameters of the model lie in extreme values. Therefore, 
the regulator’s level of selfishness has almost no effect on relatively highly populist or relatively 
highly oligarchic politician. Policymakers of extreme values, whether it is the politician or the 
regulator, decide more independently of other parameters of the model. This can be regarded as 
an extension to the results of Perotti and Volpin (2004), in which more accountable countries 
are less subject to other parameters of the model. As another implication, provided that the level 
of politician’s populism is high enough and not necessarily at its highest, he cares less about the 
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regulator’s selfishness. As a result, an economy can benefit from positive investment on anti-
corruption regardless of the value of other parameters, even without a completely populist pol-
itician. 
The model predicts that as the politician gets more populist, regulators that are more benevolent 
might be involved in bribery process. Moreover, a politician with a higher level of populism is 
more sensitive to the level of the regulator’s selfishness. Therefore, the type of politician matters 
as it determines the sensitivity of other variables of interest to the regulator’s level of selfishness. 
The results of the model show that by considering different policymakers with different objec-
tive functions there would be no simple pattern between the variables of interests and other 
exogenous parameters of the model. The model shows that the relation of level of populism 
with social welfare, corruption, probability of re-election and other variables of interest, is not 
monotonic. This echoes the suggestion of Perotti and Volpin (2004) that by considering the 
political process and institutional framework, we cannot offer a generic recommendation of an 
economic reform. Hence, a general policy implication of the results is to adjust expectations for 
outcomes of the model. For instance, when an oligarchic politician is in the office, the regulator’s 
role in determining the industry size is less than the case when a more populist politician holds 
the office. Therefore, in comparing two similar cases with an oligarchic politician but with dif-
ferent regulators, we might not see much of difference in outcomes of the model.  
According to the results of the model, the regulator’s selfishness may only harm semi-populist 
and populist politicians’ chance of success, not that of oligarchic and semi-oligarchic politicians. 
This shows that an oligarchic or a semi-oligarchic politician can have higher chance of re-election 
in those economies with more selfish regulators.  
Whether having a more populist politician will end up in lower corruption or not depends heavily 
on the regulator’s level of selfishness. Among very selfish or very benevolent regulators, as the 
level of populism increases, the economy with a more populist politician experiences higher 
corruption. Since a more populist politician invests more on anti-corruption policies, this result 
can be regarded as a theoretical justification of what Rousso and Steves (2007) found empirically, 
that the sharp decline of corruption between 2002 and 2005 in the transition region, is not asso-
ciated with the intensity of anti-corruption activity in the preceding period (1999–2002). 
Between two economies under two extremely oligarchic politicians, the one under a more oli-
garchic one experiences lower corruption. Thus, having a more oligarchic politician does not 
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necessarily lead to higher corruption. It can even end with lower corruption. Yet another con-
firmation on the fact that providing generic estimation and recommendation can be mis-leading. 
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3.6  APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 How 𝒚 and 𝒛 can affect probability of re-election 
The following figures show how exogenous variables of 𝛾 and 𝛿 can affect the optimum com-
bination of 𝑦 and 𝑧, and then how each combination can change probability of apprehension 
and its contours. Since 𝑦 = 𝜇𝑇 and 𝑧 = (1 − 𝜇)𝑇, the politician’s control variable can be 𝜇 and 
𝑇 rather than 𝑦 and 𝑧.  
 
Figure 3-17 - Probability of Re-election vs. 
Total Tax and Share of Deregulation, given 
𝛾1 and 𝛿1 
 
Figure 3-18 - Probability of Re-election vs. 
Total Tax and Share of Deregulation, given 
𝛾2 and 𝛿2 
 
Figure 3-19 - Contours of Probability of Re-
election vs. Total Tax and Share of Deregu-
lation, given 𝛾1 and 𝛿1 
 
Figure 3-20 - Contours of Probability of Re-
election vs. Total Tax and Share of Deregu-
lation, given 𝛾2 and 𝛿2 
Appendix 2 Outcomes Under Different Types of Politicians 
I. Oligarchic politicians 
Depending on the value of parameters, we may have different regions of 𝛿 for oligarchic politi-
cian. For instance, in my numerical experiment, those politicians with 𝛿 ∈ (0,0.32) are called 
oligarchic. As was mentioned earlier, what distinguishes different politicians is the behaviour of 
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𝑧∗ and 𝑠𝑤∗. The model shows that depending on the politician’s type, there would be a discon-
tinuity in 𝑧∗. Consequently, this causes discontinuity in 𝛼∗ and other variables. Once the equi-
librium changes from 𝑧∗ > 0 to 𝑧∗ = 0, there will be a jump in 𝛼∗. These are depicted in Figure 
3-22 to Figure 3-31. 
This section shows that an oligarchic politician is different in his behaviour of 𝑦∗, 𝑧∗ and 𝑇∗. 
The comparative statics of changes in 𝛾 for this type of the politician is as follows. 
i Zero-bribe regulator (𝛾 < 𝛾) 
When an oligarchic politician rules the office at the same time as a relatively benevolent regulator, 
there would be an incentive incompatibility of pursuing the same type of policies among them. 
An oligarchic politician tends to set policies in favour of producers while a zero-bribe regulator 
prefers to determine higher industry size to support consumers. Given this setting, the politician 
determines 𝑧∗ > 0. As 𝛾 increases, 𝑧∗ increases and 𝑦∗ is either fixed or decreasing. Figure 3-23 
depicts that given 𝛿 = 0.1, when 𝛾 ∈ (0, 0.532), 𝑧∗ is increasing in 𝛾. Figure 3-22 shows that 
for the same set of parameters 𝑦∗ is either fixed or decreasing in 𝛾.  
𝑧∗ is either fixed or increasing in 𝛾 for zero-bribe regulators (𝛾 < ?̲?). 𝑧∗ would be fixed if the 
regulator is extremely benevolent but it is increasing in 𝛾 even for zero-bribe regulators for 
higher levels of 𝛾. That means the politician invests in anti-corruption even when 𝛼∗ = 0. Now 
the question is why should the politician burden more expense on firms by increasing invest-
ments on anti-corruption while there is no bribery between the lobby and the regulator?  
To answer this question, we need to know if transfer is the only variable that makes the regulator 
to change his decision on industry size. The short answer is no. It should be noted that the 
regulator changes his choice of industry size based on his level of selfishness as well as the trans-
fer. In other words, the regulator does not necessarily need transfer to change the industry size. 
A more selfish regulator tends to determine lower industry size, even in case of no transfer from 
the lobby. The politician knows this behaviour of the regulator. Therefore, upon a change in the 
level of the regulator’s selfishness, the politician increases the investment on anti-corruption, 
even if the outcome of the model is zero transfer.  
An oligarchic politician works more in favour of producers. Industry size is almost fixed for 
oligarchic politician when 𝛾 < ?̲?. For further explanation, see the section below. 
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The case where 𝒛∗ > 𝟎 while 𝜶∗ = 𝟎 
There is a range of 𝛾 at which no transfer will be made while, due to the regulator’s willingness 
to change the industry size, the politician reacts by increasing 𝑧∗ (𝛼∗ = 0 and 𝑧∗ > 0). The pol-
itician determines 𝑦∗ and 𝑧∗ knowing that a more selfish regulator generally decreases the indus-
try size.  
Where 𝛿 ∈ (0,32) and 𝛾 ∈ (?̳?, ?̲?), although no transfer is being made from the lobby, the reg-
ulator changes his choice of 𝑁∗ as a result of a change in 𝛾. The politician predicts the reaction 
of the regulator and hence changes his choice of 𝑦 and 𝑧 accordingly. The politician will start 
investing on the rule of law (𝑧∗ > 0). This is to increase the probability of apprehension because 
it is expected from a more selfish regulator to reduce the industry size. The politician wants to 
prevent the regulator to work more in favour of the producers. Hence, he decides to increase 
𝑧∗. On the other hand, the lobby and the regulator know the choice of the politician. Ultimately, 
this means that the regulator would change his decision due to the change in 𝑦∗ and 𝑧∗. The 
result would be that the politician starts investing on rule of law (𝑧∗ > 0) even though 𝛼∗ = 0.  
Therefore, when 𝛾 ∈ (?̳?, ?̲?), even when all other parameters are held fixed, we still have 
𝜕𝑁∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ < 0. However, as shown in the Table 1 when 𝛾 ∈ (0, ?̳?) we have 𝜕𝑁∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ = 0.47 That 
means that in the FOC it is the product of 𝑧 and 𝛾 that matters, which affects 𝑁∗ only when 
𝑧 ≠ 0. 
To test further, I took the range of gamma over which both 𝑧∗  =  0 and 𝛼∗ =  0 in the 3-way 
game. It turns out that it is always the case that over these values of 𝛾, 𝑁∗ is always higher in the 
complete 3-way game than when 𝑧 is set at zero exogenously.  
I think this means that the industry size is changing with 𝑧, and not with 𝛾. However, the reason 
behind the change in 𝑧 is 𝛾. So, I may need to find out what would be the effect of a change in 
𝛾 on the regulator’s reaction function. Figure 3-21 shows how reaction function reacts to 
changes in 𝛾. 
                                                 
47 By rounding 𝑁∗ to 5 digits, there would be no change in 𝑁∗ when 𝛾 changes. However, some changes could be 
witnessed when we take more than 5 digits.  
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Figure 3-21 - The Regulator's Reaction Function for Different Levels of 𝛾 and the corresponding y and z 
As shown in Figure 3-21 the intercept of the regulator’s reaction function changes as 𝑦∗ and 𝑧∗ 
change. That is why the regulator may change the industry size even when 𝛼∗ = 0. In other 
words, it is the politician who changes his choices of 𝑦 and 𝑧 when 𝛾 changes. Consequently, a 
regulator with a different level of selfishness, changes his choice of industry size when he knows 
that the changes in 𝛾 will definitely change the politician’s choice. In other words, the regulator 
knows his level of selfishness. Also, he knows what would be the consequences of a change in 
the level of selfishness. Hence, knowing all these, he will change his choice of industry size. 
It should be noted that this change in the intercept corresponds to the change in 𝑦 not 𝑧. This 
is so because when 𝛼∗ = 0, probability of apprehension does not change the industry size. How-
ever, the changes in 𝑦 will change the cost and consequently other variables of the model.  
In case of an oligarchic politician, for all zero-bribe regulators, 𝑠𝑤∗ turns out to be monoton-
ically decreasing in 𝛾. Also, probability of re-election is monotonically decreasing in 𝛾 and 𝑇∗ is 
monotonically increasing in 𝛾 regardless of the level of 𝛿. 
ii Positive-bribe regulator (𝛾 > 𝛾) 
Probability of re-election is increasing in 𝛾 for all positive-bribe regulators (𝛾 > ?̲?) under oligar-
chic politicians. Among all of the different combinations of 𝛿 and 𝛾, that of an oligarchic poli-
tician and a positive-bribe regulator is the only case in which there is such a relation between 
𝑠𝑤∗ and 𝛾 and, hence, between 𝐸∗ and 𝛾. Note that political welfare is the main determinant of 
𝐸, not 𝑠𝑤. In other words, this type of the politician can take the advantage of higher levels of 
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the regulator’s selfishness, which other types of the politician cannot. Therefore, upon having a 
complementary regulator who supports producers rather than consumers, an oligarchic politi-
cian would stop investing on anti-corruption, which is also a producer-oriented policy. If the 
regulator’s level of selfishness exceeds some value, then the politician will stop investing on anti-
corruption (𝑧∗ = 0). The politician will do so because he knows that the regulator’s selfishness 
will enhance producer surplus, which ultimately will surpass the effect of the consumer surplus. 
The outcome will be increasing probability of re-election (𝐸∗) in 𝛾 when 𝛾 > ?̲?. Having 𝑧∗ = 0, 
probability of apprehension reduces to its initial level (𝜂0 = 1/𝑘𝑐), which can be perceived as 
an incentive for the lobby and the regulator to bring their game to fruition by transferring money 
and setting the industry size accordingly higher. Hence, as soon as the outcome of the model is 
𝑧∗ = 0, a jump in 𝛼∗ and accordingly, a fall in 𝑁∗ will be witnessed. In brief, the politician sets 
𝑧∗ = 0 and 𝑦∗ becomes increasing in 𝛾. For positive-bribe regulators (𝛾 > ?̲?), this could be 
regarded as another policy in favour of producers by oligarchic politician when his rule in the 
office coincide with the rule of a positive-bribe regulator. 
𝑠𝑤∗ is first increasing and then becomes decreasing because the effect of 𝑝𝑠 is greater than that 
of 𝑐𝑠. It should be noted that we can see this effect because our definition of 𝑠𝑤 encompasses 
both 𝑐𝑠 and 𝑝𝑠. Some models do not take into account 𝑝𝑠 as part of welfare or more generally, 
social welfare (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). Some others (Perotti and Volpin, 2004) attach a 
weight to 𝑐𝑠 and 𝑝𝑠, based on the number of consumers and producers.48 
A more populist politician can induce higher corruption given that the politician is oligarchic 
and the game is being played, i.e. when 𝛾 > γ. This sounds counter-intuitive as what is expected 
from a politician with less of oligarchic intensity is less of corruption. However, as was previously 
explained, when it ends to no investment in anti-corruption, then the increase in 𝛼∗ and 𝑁∗, as 
a result of a an increase in 𝛿, surpasses the decrease in 𝜋∗ which ultimately results to higher 
corruption. In conclusion the behaviour of corruption for oligarchic politician is as the follow-
ing: In comparing two economies under the rule of an extremely oligarchic politicians, the one 
with a relatively higher level of populism experiences higher corruption. 
                                                 
48 𝑠𝑤∗ can turn out to be monotonically decreasing if I follow the latter group and give each of 𝑐𝑠 and 𝑝𝑠 a weight 
according to the number of people belong to each group. Generally, the conventional weights of 𝑐𝑠 and 𝑝𝑠 in the 
literature are 0.5.  
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Figure 3-22 - Investment in Deregulation vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Oligarchic Politician 
 
Figure 3-23 - Investment in Anti-corruption vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Oligarchic Politician 
 
Figure 3-24 - Total Tax vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Oligarchic Politician 
 
Figure 3-25 - Transfer vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Oligarchic Politician 
 
Figure 3-26 - Industry Size vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Oligarchic Politician 
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Figure 3-27–Social Welfare vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Oligarchic Politician 
 
Figure 3-28 - Probability of Re-election vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Oligarchic Politician 
 
Figure 3-29 - Corruption vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Oligarchic Politician 
 
Figure 3-30 - Equilibrium Profit vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Oligarchic Politician 
 
Figure 3-31 - Equilibrium Probability of Apprehension vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Oligarchic Politician 
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II. Semi-oligarchic politicians 
In brief, a semi-oligarchic politician does not set 𝑧∗ = 0. He is more independent of other pa-
rameters of the model. Remember that I distinguish different politicians based on the behaviour 
of 𝑧∗. For semi-oligarchic politician, 𝑧∗ turns out to be mostly continuous. By having a contin-
uous 𝑧∗, there would be no discontinuity in other variables of the model. In brief, semi-oligarchic 
politicians are those who decide less dependent on other parameters compared to oligarchic 
politician and hence will keep investing on 𝑧∗ even when they face with very selfish regulators. 
In other words, unlike an oligarchic politician who can benefit from having a more selfish regu-
lator, a semi-oligarchic politician is more determined about his choices, even with more selfish 
regulators who tend to set lower industry size.  
In my numerical experiment, politicians with 𝛿 ∈ (0.32,0.5) are called semi-oligarchic. Com-
pared to the oligarchic politician, this type of the politician decides more in favour of the con-
sumers rather than producers. For instance, it turns out that throughout this region, the politician 
sets 𝑧∗ > 0 in most of the range of 𝛾.  
Making distinction based on zero-bribe and positive-bribe regulator for a semi-oligarchic politi-
cian, may not be as helpful as it was in the previous case. The behaviour of 𝑦∗ and 𝑧∗ for zero-
bribe regulators remains the same as in the case of oligarchic politician and zero-bribe regulator. 
The only difference is in their magnitude, which will be discussed further in more details when 
we compare different politicians. A semi-oligarchic politician sets lower 𝑦∗ and higher 𝑧∗ com-
pared to an oligarchic politician.  
Higher levels of populism in the politician ends with more investment on anti-corruption poli-
cies, even if the regulator is extremely selfish. A semi-oligarchic politician keeps 𝑧∗ > 0, which 
will be regarded as a sign of a higher probability of apprehension. The politician does not stop 
investing on anti-corruption and therefore, unlike the case of oligarchic politician, there will be 
no discontinuity in 𝑧∗ and, hence, no jump in 𝛼∗ once the transfer is being made. Therefore, a 
relatively more populist politician (𝛿 > 0.45), who assigns higher weight on 𝑐𝑠, will never find 
it in his interest to set 𝑧∗ = 0. What was discussed above intuitively, can be written formally as 
follows 
𝜕?̿?𝑧
𝜕𝛿
> 0, ∀𝛿 ∈ (0.32,0.5), 
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where ?̿?𝑧 was defined in (3.11) as the level of 𝛾 at which the outcome of the model is 𝑧
∗ = 0. 
In addition, if the politician’s level of populism exceeds 0.45, he will continue investing on anti-
corruption even if the regulator’s selfishness reaches to its maximum. Formally, that means 
?̿?𝑧(𝛿 > 0.45) = 1. 
In other words, for those politicians with 𝛿 > 0.45 we will not have 𝑧∗ = 0, regardless of the 
level of 𝛾. Depending on the level of ?̿?𝑧, probability of re-election is either monotonically de-
creasing or non-monotonic. A relatively more oligarchic politician in this region (𝛿 < 0.45) may 
find 𝑧∗ = 0 in his favour which can enhance his chance of being re-elected. Therefore, an econ-
omy does not need very populist politician to be benefitted from consumer-oriented policies, 
namely anti-corruption regardless of the regulator’s type. Formally, that means the following 
 {
𝜕𝐸∗
𝜕𝛾
< 0, 𝛾 < ?̿?𝑧 (𝑜𝑟 𝑧
∗ > 0) 
𝜕𝐸∗
𝜕𝛾
> 0, 𝛾 > ?̿?𝑧 (𝑜𝑟 𝑧
∗ = 0)
. 
(3.15)  
According to (3.15), probability of re-election can be decreasing in 𝛾 if 𝛾 < ?̿?𝑧 and can be in-
creasing in 𝛾 if 𝛾 < ?̿?𝑧. The second part of (3.15) where 𝛾 > ?̿?𝑧 shows that a higher 𝛾 can still 
help the politician to achieve a higher chance of re-election.  
It can be concluded that when ?̿?𝑧 = 1, which happens for relatively more populist politician (in 
our case, 𝛿 > 0.45), probability of re-election is monotonically decreasing in 𝛾. This shows that 
even for the semi-oligarchic politician, regulator’s level of selfishness can enhance the politician’s 
chance of re-election, depending on level of the regulator’s selfishness. Formally, this means that 
the second part of (3.15) does not exist for the case where ?̿?𝑧 = 1 and hence for such a case, we 
always have 𝜕𝐸∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ < 0. 
A semi-oligarchic politician works more in favour of consumers compared to the oligarchic pol-
itician. This can be interpreted by all players that it would be harder to convince the regulator to 
work in favour of the industry under a semi-oligarchic politician. Having said that, the model 
shows that, given a semi-oligarchic politician is ruling, some regulators with a lower 𝛾 might be 
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involved in the bribery game and, hence, 𝛼∗ > 0 for a bigger range of 𝛾 compared to an econ-
omy with an oligarchic politician in the office. Formally, this means that the benevolence thresh-
old that was defined in (3.9) is decreasing in level of populism for semi-oligarchic politicians.49  
 
𝜕?̲?
𝜕𝛿
< 0, ∀𝛿 ∈ (0.32,0.5) 
(3.16)  
 
Figure 3-32 - Investment in Deregulation vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-oligarchic Politician 
 
Figure 3-33 - Investment in Anti-corruption vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-oligarchic Politician 
 
Figure 3-34 - Total Transfer vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-oligarchic Politician 
                                                 
49 Assuming 𝛿 ∈ (0.1,0.32), in economies with a relatively more populist politician, it requires a more selfish reg-
ulator to have 𝛼∗ > 0. In other words, among oligarchic politicians, the lower-bound of the range of 𝛾 for positive-
bribe regulators is higher a relatively more populist politician. Formally this means that 𝜕?̲? 𝜕𝛿⁄ > 0 for 𝛿 ∈
(0.1,0.32).  
Assuming 𝛿 ∈ (0.32,1) in economies with a relatively more populist politician, it does not require more selfish 
regulator to take bribes. In other words, even when 𝛿 ∈ (0.32,1), having a relatively more populist politician in the 
office, makes more of benevolent regulators involved in the bribery process. Formally we will have 𝜕?̲? 𝜕𝛿⁄ < 0 
when 𝛿 ∈ (0.32,1). 
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Figure 3-35 - Transfer vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-oligarchic Politician 
 
Figure 3-36 - Industry size vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-oligarchic Politician 
 
Figure 3-37 - Social Welfare vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-oligarchic Politician 
 
Figure 3-38 - Probability of Re-election vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-oligarchic Politician 
 
Figure 3-39 - Corruption vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-oligarchic Politician 
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Figure 3-40 - Equilibrium Profit vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-oligarchic Politician 
 
Figure 3-41 - Equilibrium Probability of Apprehension vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-oligarchic Politi-
cian 
III. Semi-populist politicians 
In my numerical experiment, semi-populist politicians are those with 𝛿 ∈ (0.5,0.6]. The model 
shows that given a semi-populist politician in the office, there will be more policies in favour of 
the consumers. It was discussed that even for high values of 𝛾, a semi-oligarchic politician will 
support consumer-oriented policies. For instance, a semi-oligarchic politician invests on anti-
corruption for all levels of the regulator’s selfishness.  
As was mentioned earlier, 𝑧∗ and 𝑠𝑤∗ differentiates politicians. In the last two cases of oligarchic 
and semi-oligarchic politicians, depending on other parameters of the model, 𝑠𝑤∗ can be non-
monotonic. Here in the case of a semi-populist politician, 𝑠𝑤∗ is monotonically decreasing in 𝛾. 
Consequently, 𝐸∗ turns out to be monotonically decreasing too, which was not the case for the 
first two groups of politicians. In other words, higher levels of selfishness in the regulator en-
dangers the politician’s chance of re-election provided that the politician is either semi-populist 
or populist, which will be discussed later. This means that unlike the case of semi-oligarchic 
politician, the behaviour of 𝐸∗ remains monotonically decreasing in 𝛾. For a semi-oligarchic 
politician, depending on the value of 𝛾, 𝐸∗ becomes non-monotonic or monotonically decreas-
ing in 𝛾.  
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Figure 3-42 - Investment in Deregulation vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-populist Politician 
 
Figure 3-43 - Investment in Anti-corruption vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-populist Politician 
 
Figure 3-44 - Total Transfer vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-populist Politician 
 
Figure 3-45 - Transfer vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-populist Politician 
 
Figure 3-46 - Industry Size vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-populist Politician 
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Figure 3-47 - Social Welfare vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-populist Politician 
 
Figure 3-48 - Probability of Re-election vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-populist Politician 
 
Figure 3-49 - Corruption vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-populist Politician 
 
Figure 3-50 - Equilibrium Profit vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-populist Politician 
 
Figure 3-51 - Equilibrium Probability of Apprehension vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness, Semi-populist Politi-
cian 
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IVPopulist politicians 
For the values chosen in my numerical experiment, populist politicians turn out to be those with 
𝛿 ∈ (0.6,1). Unlike the previous three types of the politician, the problem of a populist politi-
cian ends to a corner solution rather than an interior one.  
The case of a populist politician is somehow opposite to the case of an oligarchic politician. In 
these two extreme cases, the other parameters of the model, namely 𝛾, are not as significant as 
they are in the medium cases. As was previously mentioned, this is in line with the result of 
Perotti and Volpin (2004), that a country with high value of accountability is less subject to 
political interference. Likewise, in this model, the value of 𝛾 plays almost no role in how the 
politician is going to determine 𝑦∗ and 𝑧∗. Hence, for most of the values of 𝛾, a populist politi-
cian picks the highest possible 𝑦∗. It could be interpreted as if the populist politician is being 
helped by the regulator’s benevolence, which will end in a low 𝑝𝑠∗ and high 𝑐𝑠∗. Since the pop-
ulist politician is more consumer-oriented, he will not invest on anti-corruption except for very 
high values of 𝛾. He will do so because his investment on deregulation will fulfil the underlying 
goal of reducing the producer surplus to zero.  
The main feature of a populist politicians is that they choose 𝑦∗ = ?̅? for almost all values of 𝛾, 
except for extremely high ones. According to definition of ?̅?and ?̅? in (3.13) and (2.17), that 
leaves no incentive for firms to participate in the lobby-regulator game anymore. In other words, 
𝜋∗ = 0.  
When 𝛾 is very high, there will be an interior solution for 𝑦∗. In the range of 𝛾 ∈ (0.9,1), 𝑦∗ 
turns out to be decreasing in 𝛾. 
A populist politician does not invest on anti-corruption almost for all types of the regulator 
except for very selfish ones. It is expected to have higher investment on anti-corruption in case 
of a populist politician but it turns out to be 0. However, the whole idea behind investing on 
anti-corruption is to increase 𝑐𝑠 and decrease 𝑝𝑠. Since 𝑦∗ = ?̅?, we have 𝜋∗ = 0 and hence 
𝑝𝑠∗ = 0.  
When 𝛾 is very high, there is an interior solution for 𝑧∗. In the range of 𝛾 ∈ (0.9,1), 𝑧∗ turns 
out to be increasing in 𝛾. 
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In an economy under the rule of a populist politician, the members of the lobby transfer almost 
all of their earnings to the regulator. In other words, it turns out that the equilibrium transfer is 
determined around 1.  
Although the highest 𝑦∗ may not be necessarily in favour of the producers, it definitely enhances 
social welfare. 
In terms of industry size, Figure 3-59 shows that it will be more sensitive to the regulator’s level 
of selfishness when a relatively more populist politician is in the office. In other words, in case 
of an oligarchic politician, industry size is less dependent on the regulator’s selfishness. The 
policy implication would be that in the presence of an oligarchic politician, the regulator’s role 
in determining the industry size is less than the case when a more populist politician holds the 
office. Therefore, in case of an oligarchic politician, we might not see much of a difference in 
the outcomes of the model when a different type of regulator rules the office. In brief, the general 
policy implication of such a result has this message for policymakers that upon having a populist 
politician in the office, they have to adjust their expectations for the policies they follow.  
Appendix 3 Outcomes of the model for different types of politicians 
This section aims to see how different variables of interest behave for different politicians. Given 
the outcomes discussed earlier, it should be started by looking at 𝑦∗ and 𝑧∗. 
 170 
 
 
 
Figure 3-52 - Investment on Deregulation vs. Regu-
lator's Level of Selfishness for Different Politicians 
 
 
 
Figure 3-53 - Investment on Deregulation vs. Politi-
cian’s Level of Populism for Different Levels of Regu-
lator's Selfishness 
 
 
 
Figure 3-54 - Equilibrium Level of Investment on 
Anti-corruption vs. the Regulator's Level of Selfish-
ness for Different Types of Politicians 
 
 
 
Figure 3-55 - Investment on Anti-corruption vs. Politi-
cian’s Level of Populism for Different Levels of Regu-
lator's Selfishness 
 
Figure 3-52 shows the outcome of the model when we have interior solution. In other words, if 
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we continue to show the figures for the cases with 𝛿 ≥ 0.6, then we can see different behaviour. 
 
 
Figure 3-53 depicts that when an economy is being ruled by an extremely selfish regulator, the 
politician’s choice of 𝑦∗ may be less sensitive to the politician’s type.  
Moreover, it could be concluded that a more populist politician is more sensitive to the regula-
tor's level of selfishness.  
After investigating each of the two institutional reforms separately, one might ask about the total 
sum of expenditures, or 𝑇∗ = 𝑦∗ + 𝑧∗ . Total expenditure on institutional reforms is the simple 
sum of investment on deregulation and anti-corruption. In general, a more populist politician 
spends less of money on institutional reform when a relatively selfish regulator is in the office. 
Hence, when the total expenditure is lower, both 𝑦∗ and 𝑧∗ will be lower.  
The behaviour of total expenditure follows mainly that of the investment on deregulation and 
hence depends heavily on 𝛾 and 𝛿. Assuming 𝛾 fixed, 𝑇∗ turns out to be higher for a more 
populist politician. In other words, 𝑇∗ is monotonically increasing in 𝛿 for all different values of 
𝛾.  
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Figure 3-56 - Equilibrium Total Expenditure vs. the 
Regulator's Level of Selfishness for Different Types 
of Politicians 
 
Figure 3-57 - Equilibrium Total Expenditure vs. Poli-
tician’s Level of Populism for Different Levels of 
Regulator's Selfishness 
For the set of the parameters chosen, when 𝛿 < 0.6, no matter what is the value of the regula-
tor's level of selfishness, we have the interior solution for the politician. When 𝛿 > 0.6, depend-
ing on the level of 𝛾, we might have interior solution or corner solution. When 𝛿 > 0.6, if 𝛾 <
𝛾, we have corner solution and when γ > 𝛾, we have interior solution. For the set of parameters 
chosen, 𝛾 turns out to be around 0.9.  
This implies that the politician may invest as much as possible for all different sorts of the reg-
ulator except the extreme cases. An extremely selfish regulator is insensitive to the politician’s 
choice, and hence, the politician may choose lower than maximum possible amount on institu-
tional reforms. Remember that the maximum possible amount is the amount at which no incen-
tive remains for the lobby to participate in the game with the regulator.  
Figure 3-56 also shows that in terms of the trend of 𝑇∗, each politician considers the regulator’s 
level of selfishness. Formally, 𝜕𝑇∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0 and 𝜕𝑇∗ 𝜕𝛿⁄ > 0. For instance, for the case of a 
relatively oligarchic politician, 𝑇∗ is monotonically increasing in 𝛾. Intuitively, this is due to the 
fact that in case of a relatively oligarchic politician, all players will always benefit from improve-
ments in institutional framework. Although, a relatively more populist politician may increase 
𝑇∗ for a wide range of 𝛾, he may stop that for relatively higher 𝛾. It depends when we have 𝑇∗ =
𝑇. Figure 3-56 shows that 𝜕𝑇∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0. Therefore, only a relatively more populist politician 
may stop increasing total expenditure when the regulator turns out to be extremely selfish.  
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In other words, a relatively populist politician always invests on institutional reform as much as 
he can unless the sector is being ruled by a relatively selfish regulator. When the regulator is of 
a very selfish kind, then the politician may find investment on institutional reform useless; be-
cause the regulator becomes insensitive to what the politician is investing in. Moreover, the pop-
ulist politician may want to invest on institutional reforms as much as possible. However, this 
may not be possible because an improvement in institutional framework may leave no incentive 
for firms due to an increase in industry size. 
By reconsidering 𝑇∗ and 𝑧∗ we may find that when 𝑇 is the highest possible one, 𝑧∗ = 0. How-
ever, the opposite is not true. In other words, when there is a corner solution for 𝑧∗ (i.e. when 
𝜇∗ < 1 and hence 1 − 𝜇∗ > 0), we might have either corner solution for 𝑇 or interior solution. 
The following figures show how 𝛼∗, 𝑁∗ and 𝜋∗ may change as a result of a change in both 𝛾 and 
𝛿.  
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Figure 3-58 - Equilibrium Transfers vs. the Regulator's 
Level of Selfishness for Different Values of the Politi-
cian's Level of Populism 
 
Figure 3-59 - Equilibrium Industry Size vs. the Regula-
tor's Level of Selfishness for Different Values of the 
Politician's Level of Populism 
 
Figure 3-60 - Equilibrium Profit vs. the Regulator's 
Level of Selfishness for Different Values of the Politi-
cian's Level of Populism 
 
 It should also be noted that when 𝛿 > 0.4, the industry size is the same for all extreme values 
of 𝛾. In other words, industry size would be different only for medium values of 𝛾 and hence 
industry size converges for all different 𝛿s when the regulator is either very benevolent or very 
selfish. 
To investigate the behaviour of 𝑠𝑤∗, we need to know how its components, i.e. 𝑐𝑠∗ and 𝑝𝑠∗ 
behave with respect to changes in 𝛾 and 𝛿. The following figures shows how 𝑐𝑠∗ and 𝑝𝑠∗ react 
to changes in 𝛾 and 𝛿. 
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Figure 3-61 - Equilibrium Consumer Surplus vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness for Different Types of Politi-
cians 
 
Figure 3-62 - Equilibrium Producer Surplus vs. Regulator's Level of Selfishness for Different Types of Politicians 
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Appendix 4 Table of outcomes 
Table 1 - Comparative Statics of changes in 𝛿 and 𝛾–The effects on the main four variables 
 𝜹 𝜸 𝒚∗ 𝒛∗ 𝑻∗ 𝜶∗ 𝑵∗ 𝒔𝒘∗ 𝑻𝒓∗ 𝑬𝟑
∗  
1 
(0,0.32) 
(0, ?̳?) 𝜕𝑦∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ = 0 0 Increasing 0 𝜕𝑁∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ = 0 
Monotonically 
dec. 
0 Monotonically dec. 
2 (?̳?, ?̲?) 𝜕𝑦∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ < 0 
𝑧∗ > 0 
𝜕𝑧∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0 
Drops to 0 
Increasing 0 𝜕𝑁∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ < 0 
3 (?̲?, 1) 𝜕𝑦∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0 0 
Discontinuous at ?̅? 
Increasing 
𝛼∗ > 0 
𝜕𝛼∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0 
𝜕2𝛼∗ 𝜕𝛾2⁄ < 0 
Non-mon. 
𝜕𝑁∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ < 0 Non-monotonic Non-monotonic Monotonically inc. 
4 
(0.32,0.5) 
(0, ?̳?) 𝜕𝑦∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ = 0 
0 
(Non-zero for 𝛾 < 0.1) 
𝜕𝑇∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ = 0 0 𝜕𝑁∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ = 0 
Monotonically 
dec. 
0 Monotonically dec. 
5 (?̳?, ?̲?) 𝜕𝑦∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ < 0 
(1) Discontinuous  
(2) Increasing up to 
around ?̲? 
Non-monotonic/ 
Mostly increasing/ 
0 No single behaviour 
6 (?̲?, 1) 
𝜕𝑦∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0 
𝜕2𝛼∗ 𝜕𝛾2⁄ < 0 
 
Non-mon. 
(1) Non-mon for 𝛾 > ?̲? 
(2) Inc for most of the re-
gion 
(3) Very low for very high 𝛾 
Discontinuous at ?̅?/Drops/ 
Increasing in 𝛾 
𝛼∗ > 0 
𝜕𝛼∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0 
𝜕2𝛼∗ 𝜕𝛾2⁄ < 0 
Non-mon. 
𝜕𝑁∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0 
𝜕2𝑁∗ 𝜕𝛾2⁄ < 0 
 
Non-mon. 
Mostly Dec. in 𝛾 
Non-monotonic Non-monotonic 
1) Non-monotonic for 
lower 𝛾 
2) Monotonically dec. for 
higher 𝛾 
7 
(0.5,0.6) 
(0, ?̳?) 
No single behav-
iour 
Mostly 0/ 
No single behaviour 
No single behaviour/ Discontinuity/ Fixed for low 
𝛿/ Increasing both before and after discontinuity 
0 𝜕𝑁∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ = 0 
No single behav-
iour/  
Unknown 
0 
Monotonically decreasing 
8 (?̳?, ?̲?) 
No single behav-
iour 
Non-mon/ 
First decreasing then in-
creasing 
Increasing 
𝛼∗ ≥ 0 
Corner solution/ 
Close to 0 
Discontinuous due to 
corner solutions in 𝛼∗ 
𝜕𝑁∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ < 0 
9 
(?̲?, 0.9) 
No single behav-
iour 
First zero 
Then non-mon 
First increasing then de-
creasing 
Corner solution at ?̅? 
Increasing 
𝛼∗ > 0 
𝜕𝛼∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0 
𝜕2𝛼∗ 𝜕𝛾2⁄ < 0 
Non-mon. 
𝜕𝑁∗ 𝜕𝛾⁄ > 0 
𝜕2𝑁∗ 𝜕𝛾2⁄ < 0 
Non-mon. 
Monotonically 
dec.  
Non-monotonic 
(0.9,1) 
Interior solution 
No single behaviour 
Mon. dec.  Mon. dec. 
10 
(0.6,1) 
(0, ?̳?) 
Corner solution at 
?̅? 
Increasing in 𝛾 
0 
1) Interior for 𝛾 < 0.3; 
2) Corner solution at ?̅? for 𝛾 ∈ (0.3, ?̳?) 
Increasing 
Discontinuous and 
Different 
Decreasing 
Ends to 𝑁∗~2 
   
11 (?̳?, 1) 
Interior solution 
Decreasing in 𝛾 
Increasing in 𝛾 
Discontinuous at ?̳?/ 
1) First Corner solution at ?̅? for 𝛾 ∈ (?̳?, 0.9) 
Increasing 
2) Then interior solution for 𝛾 ∈ (0.9,1) 
Dec. for 𝛾 ∈ (?̳?, 1) 
Inc. from before ?̳?/ 
Max. 𝛼∗ at ?̳?/ Gener-
ally Non-mon 
Discontinuous at ?̳?/ 
Sharp jump/ 
Decreasing after 
   
  
Appendix 5 Numerical outcomes 
 
𝜹  ?̳?  ?̲?  𝜶∗(?̲?)  ?̿?𝒛 
Aver-
age 𝜼 
Comments 
0.05 <0.001 0.518 
𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.0006  
𝛼∗(𝛾 = 0.589) = 0.17244  
0.589 0.43 
Discontinuity at 𝛾 = 0.589 
0.1 <0.001 0.42 
𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.00033  
𝛼∗(𝛾 = 0.5354) = 0.1677  
0.535435 0.31 
Discontinuity at 𝛾 = 0.535435 
0.15 0.3 0.44 
𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.00414123535  
𝛼∗(𝛾 = 0.48997) = 0.1649  
0.48996 0.30 
Discontinuity at 𝛾 = 0.48997 
0.2 0.290 
0.45856195
415 
𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.168063  =?̲? 0.28 
Discontinuity at 𝛾 = ?̲? = 0.4585619 
0.25 0.0999 0.479 𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.20659917036  =?̲? 0.21 Discontinuity at 𝛾 = ?̲? = 0.4790 
0.3 0.25 
0.51087164
7  
𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.245674  =?̲? 0.3377 
Discontinuity at 𝛾 = ?̲? =
0.510871647  
0.32 0.24 0.5182 
𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.0005846281  
𝛼∗(𝛾 = 0.519725) = 0.25827  
0.51972 0.3110 
Discontinuity at 𝛾 = 0.519725 
0.34 0.210 0.5156 𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.0001480219  0.56 0.453 No discontinuity in 𝛼
∗ 
0.36 0.200 0.512 𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.0004911999  0.64 0.498 No discontinuity in 𝛼
∗ 
0.38 0.185 0.508 𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.0011012468  0.8 0.43 No discontinuity in 𝛼
∗ 
0.39 0.175 0.504 𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.0013467438  0.8 0.5128 No discontinuity in 𝛼
∗ 
0.4 0.170 0.500 𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.00107  0.86 0.5694 No discontinuity in 𝛼
∗ 
0.45 0.165 0.475 𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.0097085634  1 0.6531 No discontinuity in 𝛼
∗ 
0.5 0.155 0.425 𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.0058848128  1 0.7587 No discontinuity in 𝛼
∗ 
0.55 0.118875 0.39793 𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.1000692  1 0.5068 Discontinuity at 𝛾 = ?̲? = 0.39793 
0.575 <0.01 0.37131 
𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.15676802945  
𝛼∗(𝛾 = 0.574) = 0.99140  
1 0.7062 
Discontinuity at two points: (1) 𝛾 = ?̲? =
0.37131; (2) 𝛾 = 0.574 
0.6 <0.1 0.32723 
𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.09  
𝛼∗(𝛾 = 0.35558) = 0.2224  
1 0.5465 
Discontinuity at two points: (1) 𝛾= ?̲? =
0.32723; (2) 𝛾 = 0.35558 
0.65 0.88 0.2 𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.98282  1 0.32  
0.7 0.89 0.1 𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.9273  1 0.3139  
0.75 0.90 0.1 𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.9273  1 0.3346  
0.8 0.90 0.1 𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.9273  1 0.2725  
0.85 0.90 0.1 𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.9273  1 0.3593  
0.9 0.90 0.1 𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.9273  1 0.3361  
0.95 0.90 0.1 𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.9273  1 0.2528  
0.99 0.90 0.1 𝛼∗(?̲?) = 0.9273  1 0.2528  
